SMALL  PROBLEMS 
FOR  INFANTRY 


SPECIAL  REPRINT  FOR  TRAINING  CAMPS 


GIFT  OF 


SMALL  PROBLEMS 
FOR  INFANTRY 


PREPARED  BY 


CAPT.  A.  W.  BJORNSTAD 
•  t 

16th  Infantry,  Instructor 


UNDER,  THE  DIRECTION  OF 

DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 

THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


SPECIAL  REPRINT  FOR  TRAINING  CAMPS 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


PREFACE. 


This  work  was  undertaken  in  view  of  the  many  applications  re- 
ceived by  the  Army  Service  Schools  for  information  as  to  literature 
which  would  assist  in  the  instruction  and  training  of  noncommis- 
sioned officers.  Its  purpose  is  to  place  before  Infantry  officers  and 
noncommissioned  officers  a  series  of  problems  which  may  be  studied 
to  advantage.  The  principal  value  of  the  book,  however,  is  believed 
to  lie  in  the  method  which  it  teaches.  There  are  hundreds  of  single 
sentences  in  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  1911,  each  of  which  can 
be  made  the  basis  for  an  instructive  problem  for  indoor  or  outdoor 
work.  It  is  hoped  that  the  examples  contained  in  this  book  will 
assist  industrious  company  officers  in  preparing  problems  for  pla- 
toons, squads,  patrols,  outguards,  etc.,  using  the  applicatory  method 
which  is  so  largely  responsible  for  whatever  success  the  Army  Service 
Schools  have  achieved  in  teaching  tactics. 

To  Capt.  A.  W.  Bjornstad,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  was  assigned  the 
task  of  writing  the  proposed  work.  The  Infantry  and  Engineer 
Corps  members  of  the  class  of  1916,  Army  Staff  College,  devoted 
five  days  to  the  development  of  certain  problems  outlined  to  them. 
With  this  valuable  assistance  the  work  has  been  completed  during 
such  odd  times  as  could  be  spared  from  the  normal  duties  of  an 
instructor. 

It  is  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of  these  schools  to  view  many 
of  the  solutions  herein  as  no  better  than  other  possible  solutions. 
The  essential  thing  is  to  train  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers 
to  adopt  promptly  some  measure  which  is  practical,  effective,  and 
consistent  with  the  teamwork  which  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  seek 
to  establish.  To  quote  paragraph  372  of  those  regulations,  "  In  a 
given  situation  it  is  far  better  to  do  any  intelligent  thing  consistent 
with  the  aggressive  execution  of  the  general  plan  than  to  search  hesi- 
tatingly for  the  ideal.  This  is  the  true  rule  of  conduct  for  sub- 
ordinates who  are  required  to  act  upon  their  own  initiative." 

The  author  is  indebted  to  Capt.  L.  M.  Nuttman,  Fourth  Infantry, 
Capt.  J.  B.  Gowen,  Tenth  Infantry,  and  Lieut.  Aristides  Moreno, 
Infantry,  for  valuable  assistance  in  correcting  and  proof  reading 
the  manuscript. 

W.  A.  HOL.BROOK, 
Lieutenant  Colonel,  Cavalry,  Senior  Instructor, 

Department  of  Military  Art. 

The  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kans.,  May  10,  1916. 

(3) 
•-If MX*    i  hi 


The  original  plan  for  this  book  contemplated  14  problems,  or. 
more  accurately  speaking,  14  series  of  situations,  dealing  with  advance 
guards,  outposts,  and  patrols,  and  6  problems,  or  series  of  situations, 
in  attack  and  defense,  illustrating  the  leading  of  a  platoon  as  part  of 
a  large  force  of  all  arms.  The  6  problems  in  attack  and  defense 
were  not  ready  for  the  printer  when  War  Department  orders  were 
received  closing  the  Army  Service  Schools  within  24  hours  arid  re- 
turning officers  to  their  regiments.  It  was  decided  to  publish  the 
completed  problems  and  to  add  a  chapter  on  combat  instruction,  to 
include  as  many  examples  of  exercises  as  could  be  prepared  in  the 
short  time  remaining  available. 

A.  W.  B. 

MAY  13,  1916. 

In  printing  a  special  edition  of  "  Small  Problems  for  Infantry  " 
for  use  in  training  camps  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  revise  the  text 
in  the  light  of  the  methods  of  trench  warfare  developed  in  France 
during  the  present  war.  Special  regulations  covering  the  subject 
will  probably  be  issued.  The  present  text  deals  with  operations  and 
combat  in  the  open,  which  have  lost  none  of  their  importance  to  us. 

A.  W.  B. 
MAY  14,  1917. 

(4) 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Introduction — To  company  commanders 7 

Organization  of  first  platoon 12 

Conventional  signs 13 

First  problem — An  advance  guard  point 15 

I.  The  point  marches  out 15 

II.  Road  space  and  estimating  numbers 18 

III.  The  point  marches  too  slowly 19 

IV.  Leaving  the  road  for  observation 20 

V.  The  point  discovers  a  Red  patrol : 21 

VI.  The  enemy  fires  on  the  advance  party 22 

VII.  The  point  as  a  march  outpost 24 

Second  problem — An  advance  guard  connecting  file 25 

I.  During  a  halt 25 

II.  When  to  use  signals 26. 

III.  Care  in  transmitting  signals r 27 

IV.  Maintaining  distance 28 

Third  problem — An  advance  guard  flank  patrol 29 

I.  The  patrol  starts  out 30 

II.  Waiting  for  the  advance  party 33 

III.  Passing  through'woods 34 

IV.  On  emerging  from  woods : 35 

V.  Changing  the  formation 35 

VI.  A  road  formation 36 

VII.  The  point  is  fired  upon 36 

VIII.  The  patrol  continues  by  a  new  route 37 

IX.  The  patrol  drives  off  a  Red  Cavalry  patrol 38 

X.  Returning  to  the  column 39 

XI.  Reporting  to  nearest  company  commander 39 

Fourth  problem — The  platoon  as  an  advance  party 41 

I.  The  start 41 

II.  The  point  loiters 45 

III.  The  enemy  opens  fire 45 

IV.  The  advance  party  returns  the  fire 45 

V.  The  advance  party  attacks 50 

VI.  The  march  is  resumed 52 

VII.  The  enemy  fires  from  the  left  flank 53 

VIII.  The  advance  party  replies 55 

IX.  The  advance  party  and  support  attack 56 

Fifth  problem — A  combat  patrol 59 

I.  The  patrol  starts 59 

II.  Drives  off  small  patrol 63 

III.  Posting  the  patrol 64 

IV.  The  patrol  changes  its  position 67 

Sixth  problem — A  picket 69 

I.  The  first  disposition 70 

II.  A  change  after  reconnaissance 73 

III.  Preparations  for  the  night 73 

(5) 


Page. 

Seventh  problem — Another  picket 79 

I.  Marching  out 79 

II.  The  first  disposition 80 

IV.  Preparations 83 

V.  Changing  an  o'utguard  for  the  night '. - 86 

VI.  Correct  names  and  numbers 87 

VII.  Orders  to  a  visiting  patrol 89 

VIII.  Sending  out  a  reconnoitering  patrol 90 

IX.  An  alarm  at  night 92 

X.  An  investigation  on  the  outpost  line 93 

Eighth  problem — Cossack  post  and  sentry  squad 95 

I.  Arrangements 95 

II.  A  Red  patrol  approaches 96 

III.  The  Red  patrol  is  stopped 98 

IV.  Awaiting  other  Reds 98 

V.  A  Red  patrol  under  different  conditions 99 

VI.  Arrangements  for  the  night 100 

Ninth  problem — A  reconnoitering  patrol 103 

I.  Preparations ]03 

II.  The  first  formation 105 

III.  Reds  are  seen 106 

IV.  Another  formation 107 

V.  An  inhabitant  of  the  hostile  country 108 

VI.  A  disarmed  Red  soldier  appears 109 

VII.  Red  Cavalry  discovered . 110 

VIII.  Red  Cavalry  marches  past Ill 

IX.  The  return  and  report 112 

Tenth  problem — A  visiting  patrol 115 

I.  Preparations  and  march  formation 115 

II.  The  patrol  hears  firing.  .  . . 117 

III.  Approaching  a  sentinel  post 117 

IV.  Exchanging  information 118 

V.  A  sudden  encounter  in  the  dark 118 

VI.  The  disposition  of  a  stranger 119 

Eleventh  problem — A  detached  post 121 

I.  Security  while  marching  out 121 

II.  The' day  disposition 123 

III.  The  night  disposition 125 

IV.  Instructions  to  a  requisitioning  detachment.  .  : 126 

Twelfth  problem — A  requisitioning  detachment  or  patrol 129 

I.  Preparations 129 

II.  Formation  and  route 130 

III.  Formation  and  route,  continued 131 

IV.  Arrangements  for  seizing  cattle 131 

V.  The  return 133 

Thirteenth  problem — A  contact  patrol 135 

I.  Equipment,  route,  and  formations 136 

II.  Strangers  seen  at  a  distance 140 

III.  Investigating  evidences  of  a  camp 141 

IV.  The  patrol  remains  in  observation 141 

Remarks  on  the  Plainview  outpost 143 

Fourteenth  problem — A  small  outguard 147 

I.  The  squad  marches  out 147 

II.  Day  and  night  positions  compared 150 

Combat  instruction. . .  153 


INTRODUCTION. 


TO  COMPANY  COMMANDERS. 

The  noncommissioned  officer  of  Infantry  is  called  upon  to  perform 
a  greater  variety  of  duties  than  the  noncommissioned  officer  of  any 
other  arm  or  special  service,  except,  probably,  Cavalry.  He  deals 
with  elements  which  at  first  glance  seem  quite  simple — men  and 
rifles — marching  and  shooting.  But  when  the  varied  employment 
of  these  elements  in  war  is  fully  comprehended  and  analyzed,  we 
find  human  and  mechanical  vagaries  and  uncertainties  which  defeat 
the  leadership  of  a  novice,  or  even  of  a  practiced  noncommissioned 
officer  whose  development  of  mind  and  soul  has  been  so  deficient  as 
to  leave  him  without  courage,  force,  and  initiative. 

The  possession  of  force  and  initiative  inspires  self-confidence. 
Courage  is  two  parts  self-confidence  and  one  part  bravery.  The  non- 
commissioned officer,  or  prospective  noncommissioned  officer,  who 
after  a  fair  trial  displays  no  progress  in  the  development  of  force 
and  initiative,  should  be  dropped  before  he  becomes  a  fixture  in  the 
company.  It  is  not  in  every  man  to  become  even  a  fair  noncommis- 
sioned officer  and,  considering  the  heavy  demands  on  courage  and 
discipline,  the  Infantry  can  least  afford  to  tolerate  a  noncommis- 
sioned officer  who  is  only  fair. 

Our  difficulty  seems  to  lie  in  the  failure  to  appreciate  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  noncommissioned  officer  must  work  in  war. 
An  indifferent  sailor  can  sail  a  ship  in  fair  weather  and  off  shore. 
His  ship  will  seem  as  trim  and  sightly  as  any  other — if  we  do  not 
inspect  it  too  closely.  But  the  sailor  who  is  to  weather  a  storm,  like 
the  Infantry  sergeant  or  corporal  who  faces  an  enemy,  must  have  a 
reserve  of  courage,  driving  power,  and  skill.  In  time  of  peace  we 
can  hardly  simulate  conditions  which  make  a  demand  on  this  re- 
serve, but  we  must  build  it  up,  nevertheless.  It  is  the  distinguish- 
ing mark  of  well-trained  troops.  The  lack  of  it  accounts  for  the 
low  value  of  organizations  of  reasonably  brave  men,  the  officers  and 
noncommissioned  officers  of  which  carry  only  the  outward  marks  of 
leadership. 

If  Sergt.  What's-his-name  barks  "  squad  right,  march  "  and  "  club 
rifle,  swing"  at  a  flock  of  recruits  for  five  years,  and  does  it  well, 
he  will  acquire  a  certain  confidence  and  bearing,  it  is  true.  This  is 

(7) 


_8 

valuable,  but  he  needs  more.  The  thousand  and  one  situations  that 
may  confront  him  in  war  should  be  presented  to  him  in  various  guises 
under  conditions  which  compel  him  to  decide,  to  act,  to  indicate  his 
will,  and  to  enforce  his  will.  He  is  a  trained  and  dependable  man 
when  he  is,  and  knows  he  is,  fitted  to  meet,  squarely  and  vigorously 
and  understandingly,  any  likely  combination  of  circumstances.  His 
men  must  have  a  justifiable  confidence  in  him,  and  he  must  have  a 
justifiable  confidence  in  himself.  This  can  result  only  when  he  pos- 
sesses the  essential  military  virtues  of  a  noncommissioned  officer — 
courage,  force,  and  initiative. 

Quite  recently  I  expressed  some  views  on  the  training  of  platoon 
leaders  and  guides  (Military  Historian  and  Economist,  April.  1916). 
It  seems  appropriate  to  quote  the  following : 

The  platoon  is  the  largest  unit  susceptible  of  direct  personal  control  of  indi- 
viduals in  the  firing  line  by  a  leader.  It  is  our  present  purpose  to  point  out  two 
of  the  most  important  functions  of  the  platoon  in  modern  battle,  and  the  change 
from  old  conditions. 

In  the  days  of  short-range  weapons  a  company  was  under  the  direct,  personal 
control  of  the  captain.  It  never  exceeded  100  men  in  our  service,  and  \vas 
generally  smaller.  It  fought  in  close  order  and  responded  quite  easily  to  the 
vocal  commands  of  the  captain.  Improved  small  arms  and  artillery  long  ago 
made  this  conception  of  company  leading  obsolete.  With  the  necessity  for 
deploying  skirmishers  and  the  utilization  of  all  available  cover,  the  grip  of  the 
captain  was  lost.  After  a  period  of  years,  during  which  no  satisfactory  sub- 
stitute for  the  former  control  of  the  captain  was  devised,  the  Infantry  Drill 
Regulations,  1911,  appeared  with  a  practical  solution.  Direct,  personal  control 
is  now  passed  to  the  platoon  leaders  the  moment  the  company  is  deployed. 
Henceforth  the  captain  exerts  his  will  through  his  four  platoon  leaders,  dispens- 
ing with  much  of  the  detail  which  was  formerly  his  concern.  The  company  has 
become  a  small  battalion.  The  platoon,  formerly  an  unimportant  subdivision 
for  maneuver,  has  risen  to  the  dignity  of  an  important  fighting  unit.  The  ser- 
geant of  Infantry  has  become  a  leader  with  a  grave  responsibility  thrust 
upon  him,  as  we  shall  show  later. 

The  final  test  of  Infantry  is  its  ability  to  attack.  Attack  by  Infantry  is  a 
combination  of  fire  and  movement  while  under  fire  of  the  enemy.  To  fire 
effectively,  and  thus  reduce  loss  from  the  enemy's  fire,  and  to  move  resolutely 
forward  at  every  opportunity,  are  the  simple  elements  of  Infantry  attack.  A 
few  tubes  of  paint,  a  brush,  and  a  piece  of  canvas  are  the  simple  elements  of  a 
Rembrandt  painting. 

The  platoon  organization  and  the  allotment  of  leaders  are  designed  primarily 
with  a  view  to  the  maximum  efficiency  in  these  elements  of  Infantry  attack — 
fire  and  movement. 

Ordinarily,  the  Infantry  firing  line  has  for  its  target  a  thin  and  indistinct 
horizontal  line.  Parts  of  the  line  may  be  invisible  or  indistinguishable.  All 
parts,  however,  must  be  covered  with  fire,  else  the  sine  qua  non  condition  to 
forward  movement,  the  reduction  of  hostile  fire  effect,  may  be  absent.  Each 
man  is  taught  to  fire  constantly  on  one  point  in  the  thin,  horizontal  target,  or 
line,  that  point  being  the  one  which,  with  respect  to  the  section  of  target  pre- 
viously allotted  and  announced  to  his  platoon,  corresponds  to  his  own  position 
in  platoon.  Since  no 'two  shots  fired  by  him  with  the  same  point  of  aim  are 
likely  to  strike  the  same  spot,  the  trajectories  of  his  shots  will  in  time  describe 


a  curved  cone.  The  dimensions  of  the  base  of  the  cone  will  increase  as  the 
dispersion  (wild  firing)  increases.  If  we  now  imagine  the  figures  described  by 
the  cones  of  many  men  placed  side  by  side,  we  see  a  wide,  thin  sheaf  of  fire, 
the  thickness  of  which  increases  as  the  dispersion  increases.  It  is  as~if-many 
men  played  streams  of  water  on  the  target,  the  nozzles  being  held  parallel  to 
each  other.  In  battle,  the  bases  of  the  cones  merge  into  one  another.  Symmetry 
is  lost.  Individual  fire  is  lost  in  the  sheaf.  Only  the  fire  effect  of  the  sheaf  can 
be  observed,  if  indeed  that  much  can  be  observed.  Fire  control  is  the  effort  to 
make  the  sheaf  effective ;  that  is,  to  carry  it  into  the  target  and  to  increase  its 
density  by  regulating  the  volume  and  decreasing  the  dispersion.  It  is  imprac- 
ticable to  control  the  sheaf  of  a  long  firing  line  as  one  unit.  The  platoon  is  the 
subdivision  for  fire  control,  the  fire  unit,  and  the  sheaves  of  the  platoons  are 
regarded  and  controlled  separately. 

Movement,  the  second  element  to  enter  into  Infantry  attack,  must  ordinarily 
be  effected  by  small  groups  making  short  rushes.  To  be  under  fire  possibly  for 
hours  and  then  to  rise  from  a  position  of  real  or  fancied  security  and  rush  for- 
ward 50  or  100  yards  under  a  hail  of  bullets  and  shrapnel  demands  an  effort 
that  all  men  are  not  equal  to.  In  former  times  Infantry  fought  standing  up, 
partly  because  it  was  in  close  order  and  partly  because  the  old  muzzle-loading 
musket  could  not  otherwise  be  loaded,  conveniently.  It  was  more  difficult  for 
skulkers  to  escape  observation.  To-day  each  man  while  firing  is,  or  should  be, 
screened  from  the  enemy's  view  and  this  makes  both  his  location  and  condition 
more  difficult  to  observe.  Furthermore,  it  is  more  difficult  to  advise  him  of  an 
intended  rush  and  many  men  who,  if  duly  warned,  would  willingly  join  the 
rush,  find  themselves  mentally  and  physically  inert  when  they  finally  realize 
that  their  neighbors  have  dashed  forward.  A  battle  field  is  strewn  with  men 
wrhose  only  ailment  is  inertia,  induced  by  causes  too  numerous  to  mention.  It 
is  folly  to  fly  in  the  face  of  history  and  deny  that  American  troops  do  such 
things.  Raw  troops  are  hopeless  in  attack,  more  so  under  modern  conditions 
than  ever  before.  The  temper  of  partially  trained  troops  is  very  uneven. 
Trained  troops  will  have  skulkers  enough. 

The  number  of  men  to  engage  in  a  single  rush  is,  of  course,  variable  and 
depends  upon  the  conditions  of  the  fire  fight.  The  ideal  unit  for  the  rush  is  the 
platoon.  We  may  be  able  to  use  a  larger  fraction,  but  \ve  shall  frequently  be 
obliged  to  use  a  smaller.  In  any  event,  the  preparations,  the  warning,  and  the 
execution  are  in  the  hands  of  the  platoon  leader  and  his  assistant,  the  platoon 
guide.  The  details  are  slurred  too  much  in  peace  time  exercises  by  those  who 
fail  to  comprehend  the  difficulties  peculiar  to  a  battle  field.  In  itself  the  move- 
ment looks  simple  enough,  but  it  requires  infinite  care,  close  observation,  good 
leading,  and  rough  discipline.  The  final  signal  must  not  be  given  until  firing 
has  ceased  and  observation  has  disclosed  that  every  man  is  "set"  and  is,  there- 
fore, warned  and  ready.  The  leader  leads  the  way  to  a  suitable  fire  position 
and  halts,  but  behind  the  platoon  is  the  sergeant  who  drives — the  platoon  guide. 
He  is  the  man  with  the  club — the  policeman. 

This  dual  leadership  of  the  platoon  is  peculiar  to  our  service  and  new.  Its 
usefulness  in  the  forward  movement  has  just  now  been  explained.  In  fire  con- 
trol it  is  likewise  useful.  Fire  control  may  be  described  as  a  two-man  job.  The 
leader's  duties  in  other  directions  are  too  numerous  and  exacting  to  permit  of 
necessary  attention  to  the  conduct  of  the  individual  men  of  the  platoon.  The 
duties  of  platoon  disciplinarian  fall  to  the  platoon  guide.  It  would  not  remedy 
matters  to  divide  the  platoon  and  give  each  sergeant  a  half.  There  would  still 
be  a  two-man  job. 

A  third  reason  for  this  novel  organization  lies  in  the  fact  that  losses  occur 
under  peculiar  conditions.  In  battle,  leaders  and  men  spend  most  of  their  time 


10 

concealed,  or  partially  concealed,  from  the  enemy  and,  therefore,  to  a  more  or 
less  extent,  from  each  other.  But  concealment  of  this  kind  does  not  render 
them  immune  from  bullets.  It  often  happens  that  a  man  lying  some  paces  from 
his  neighbor  is  out  of  action,  without  the  fact  being  known.  If  such  a  fate 
befall  a  few  platoon  leaders,  the  result  could  easily  be  inertia  and  loss  of  con- 
trol, the  disintegrating  factors  of  Infantry  combat.  We  have,  however,  a  second 
in  command  who  lies  close  to  the  leader.  It  is  not  likely  that  both  will  be  put 
out  of  action  in  the  same  instant.  If  one  is  killed  or  severely  wounded,  the 
survivor  calls  a  corporal  to  his  side  and  the  pair  is  restored. 

The  obstacles  to  good  platoon  leadership  are  innumerable;  poor  training,  ex- 
citement, sluggishness,  and  what  not.  *  *  *  In  view  of  the  unavoidable 
scarcity  of  officers,  due  to  absence  on  other  duty  and  losses,  and  in  view  of  the 
heavy  losses  of  Infantry  in  action,  it  may  be  asserted  confidently  that  no  com- 
pany is  well  fitted  for  battle  unless  it  has  at  the  outset  12  men  trained  to 
the  point  which  justifies  us  in  calling  them  good  platoon  leaders.  Furthermore, 
students  of  Civil  War  methods  and  tactics,  who  are  at  the  same  time  familiar 
with  the  requirements  of  modern  war  and  training,  will  agree  that  a  sergeant 
of  Infantry,  as  our  Infantry  is  organized,  must  possess  training,  and  a  quality 
of  leadership  in  action  fairly  comparable  to  that  demanded  of  a  captain  in  the 
Civil  War. 

Each  of  the  12  senior  noncommisisoned  officers  should  be  able  to 
handle  a  platoon ;  the  corporals  at  least  fairly  well.  When  squad  or- 
ganization is  possible,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  the  Regular  Army, 
and  also  in  the  militia  when  in  camp,  it  is  well  to  designate  a  perma- 
nent second  and  third  in  command  of  the  squad  and  give  these  men 
ample  opportuity  to  lead  the  squad  A  company  would  thus  in  time 
have  additional  and  fairly  well  trained  squad  leaders,  and  they  will 
be  needed  to  meet  expansion  and  losses. 

Instruction  on  the  map  is  at  best  a  poor  substitute  for  well  planned 
field  exercises  where  persons  and  things  are  real.  The  problems  in 
this  book  may  serve  best  as  a  guide  to  the  preparation  of  field  exer- 
cises or  tactical  walks.  There  is  scarcely  any  incident  so  trivial  that 
it  does  not  teach  a  lesson. 

Anyone  who  uses  this  book  for  self-instruction  should  pause  when 
he  reaches  such  a  question  as,  "  What  do  you  do?"  or  "  What  do  you 
think?" — then  reread  the  situation  until  he  understands  it,  and  finally 
frame  in  his  own  mind,  if  not  on  paper,  the  answer  to  the  question 
put.  Then,  and  not  until  then,  he  should  read  the  solution  and  dis- 
cussion which  follow. 

A  beginner  would  do  well  to  study  the  appropriate  paragraphs  of 
the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (I.  D.  R.)  and  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations (F.  S.  R.)  before  deciding  upon  his  answer. 

Company  commanders  who  desire  to  use  problems  of  this  character 
for  instruction  on  the  map  or  on  the  ground  can,  with  patience  and 
practice,  prepare  their  own  problems  quite  readily.  The  essential 
thing  is  to  dispose  of  one  point  at  a  time,  and  dispose  of  it  thor- 
oughly. A  thorough  understanding  of  Infantry  Drill  Regulations 
will  be  the  reward  of  the  officer  who  studies  its  paragraphs  syste- 


11 

matically  in  search  of  ideas  for  problems  for  his  noncommissioned 
officers. 

Battalion  and  regimental  commanders  who  believe  such  problems 
are  useful  might  require  each  of  their  officers  to  prepare  OFW  ^each 
month.  The  best  of  these  problems  could  be  furnished  to  the  com- 
panies, and  a  file  kept  for  future  use.  This  applies  to  problems  on 
the  ground  as  well  as  on  the  map.  Many  an  excellent  problem, 
worked  out  near  a  military  post  or  camp,  has  been  lost  to  contemporary 
and  future  company  commanders  because  of  the  lack  of  system  and 
cooperation.  In  time  of  peace  the  military  service  is  a  school.  A  file 
of  old  problems  (if  they  are  good  ones)  is  as  new  and  useful  to  a  new 
batch  of  noncommisisoned  officers  as  a  standard  work  on  algebra  is 
to  successive  classes  of  schoolboys. 

It  is  necessary  to  explain  that  it  has  been  impracticable  for  the 
author  to  visit  the  Hunterstown  region.  The  problems  in  this  book 
are  based  upon  the  map  which  accompanies  the  book  (Hunterstown 
sheet,  R.  F.  1/21120,  of  the  Gettysburg- Antietam-map,  Army  Service 
Schools)  and  not  upon  the  ground  itself.  An  inspection  of  the 
ground  would  probably  suggest  the  wisdom  of  some  minor  changes. 

A.  W.  B. 


THE  FIRST  PLATOON,  COMPANY  A. 


For  convenience,  an  imaginary  platoon  has  been  organized  and 
appears  below  in  column  or  squads.  The  various  situations  are  faced 
by  this  platoon  or  members  of  it.  The  numbers  indicate  second  and 
third  in  command  of  squads,  under  the  system  recommended  on 
page  5. 


1st 
Squad 


2d 

Squad 


3d 

Squad 


4th 

Squad 


Commanding  officer,  Company  A:  Capt.  Rowen. 
Commanding  officer,  First  Battalion:  Maj.  Crosby. 

(12) 


Hill 
(sgt.) 

t 

MARCH  DIRECTION 

Clark 
(corp.) 

Brown 
(2) 

/   Hagen 

Tine 

(3) 

1st  Lt. 
.Mien 

Ames 

Schafer 

McGowan* 

Stone 

In  some 
problems 
the  platoon 
leaclt-r  is 

Koenig 
(corp.) 

Quinn 

Peterson 
(3) 

Butler 
(2) 

Holn 

Sgt.  Hill 

Walinski 

Morgan 

Carter 

Pickett 

-'  Adams 
(corp.) 

Bush 

Willis 

Towney 

(2) 

Bennett 

Schmidt 

Miller 

Kelley 
(3) 

Nelson 
(corp.) 

Schwartz 

Humphrey 

(2) 

Stevens 
(3) 

Barry 

Fassett 

Wilson 

Murphy 

13 


CONVENTIONAL  SIGNS    FOR    WAR    GAME   MAPS 

Adopted  by  Arnny  Service  Schools 

Improved  Roods 
Unimproved  Roods 
Trails 

Railroads  .Single  Track 
«•       Double  Track 
"        Urban  or  Suburban 
Fences,  Barbed  Wire 
11       Smooth   » 
••      Worm 
••      Stone 
••     Hedge 
Streams  under  15' wide 

11        over     "      " 
Embankment 
Cutting 
Arroyo  or  Ditch 


Buildings 
Bridges 
Stone  Culverts 


Corn 


Cultivated  Land 


Trees  without  Underbrush 


Woods  with  Underbrush 


Brush 


Pine  Trees  and  Rocks 


Orchard 


Marsh 


IT  *  t  i 


o  oaooo  a 

OO  9999  Q 
OO  O  OOO  « 
OOP  9QQ  O 


AH  open  spaces  are  Grass  .Lands 


FIRST  PROBLEM. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT. 


EXPLANATION. 

"  The  formation  of  the  advance  guard  must  be  such  that  the 
enemy  will  be  met  first  by  a  patrol,  then  in  turn  by  one  or  more  larger 
detachments,  each  capable  of  holding  the  enemy  until  the  next  in 
rear  has  time  to  deploy  before  coming  under  effective  fire."  (I.  D. 
R.,  642.) 

The  "  patrol "  which  leads  the  way  is  called  the  "  point."  It  is 
followed  by  the  advance  party,  support,  and  reserve  in  the  order 
named.  These  parts  combined  make  up  the  advance  guard.  The 
advance  guard  is  followed  by  the  main  body. 

Sometimes  an  advance  guard  is  so  small  that  it  will  have  no  re- 
serve. It  even  may  be  so  small  that  it  will  be  divided  into  point  and 
advance  party  only.  Finally,  if  the  whole  column  on  the  road  is 
very  small,  for  example  a  platoon,  the  advance  guard  may  be  only 
a  point,  but  always  there  is  an  advance  guard  and  a  main  body 
if  the  column  is  marching  toward  the  enemy;  and  the  advance 
guard  always  has  a  point,  although  that  may  be  all  that  it  does 
have. 

The  commander  of  the  point  is  under  the  orders  of  the  advance 
party  commander. 

Sometimes  an  advance  guard  has  two  points,  one  being  mounted 
(Cavalry  or  mounted  orderlies)  and  riding  far  in  advance  of  the 
other  point.  To  avoid  confusion  we  call  one  the  "  mounted  point " 
the  other  the  "  infantry  point." 

SITUATION  I. 

Your  battalion  camped  last  night  along  the  farm  road  east  of 
636  (northeast  of  Granite  Hill  Station),  in  friendly  country.  The 
battalion  has  a  cossack  post  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  near  the 
road  1,100  yards  north  of  636.  It  is  late  fall  and  the  corn  is  cut  and 
shocked. 

At  7.30  o'clock  this  morning  your  battalion  formed,  ready  to 
march.  Your  captain  ordered  the  pieces  to  be  loaded,  assembled  the 

(15) 


16   . 

officers    and   noncommissioned   officers   opposite   the   center   of   the 
company,  and  gave  the  following  verbal  order: 

A  Red  Cavalry  squadron  was  wrecking  the  railroad  south  of  Biglerville  yes- 
terday. Biglerville  is  7  or  8  miles  northwest  of  here.  Our  battalion  is  going 
to  march  to  a  place  called  Hershey  Mill,  about  6  miles  north  of  here,  to  pi<-k 
np  some  wagons  and  haul  back  to  this  p*lace  a  lot  of  forage  and  flour  that  the 
inhabitants  have  collected  for  us  at  the  mill.  This  company  will  be  the  advanro 
guard.  The  main  body,  which  is  the  rest  of  the  battalion,  follows  at  500  yards. 
Mr.  Allen,  your  platoon  and  th6  second  platoon  will  form  the  advance  party. 
Here  is  a  map  for  you.  Take  that  road  (pointing  to  the  map  and  to  the  north) 
through  585,  537,  546,  Woodside  Schoolhouse,  616,  to  Hershey  Mill.  March 
at  once.  The  rest  of  the  company  will  be  the  support  and  will*  follow  the 
advance  party  at  300  yards.  I  shall  be  with  the  support.  Posts. 

Lieut.  Allen  summoned  the  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  first 
and  second  platoons  and  gave  the  following  verbal  orders : 

Sergt.  Hill,  take  four  men  of  the  first  squad  and  march  north  on  that  rond 
(pointing  to  road  a  half  mile  north  of  camp)  as  the  point.  Precede  the 
advance  party  by  about  200  yards.  At  crossroads  and  road  forks  flash  me 
AV,  W,1  and  I  will  signal  the  direction.  The  rest  of  the  platoon  is  the  advance 
party.  I  shall  be  with  it.  Start  at  once. 

You  are  Sergt.  Hill,  platoon  guide  of  the  first  platoon.  What  do 
you  do  up  to  the  time  that  the  point  takes  up  the  march  on  the  road  ? 

NOTE. — Before  reading  what  appears  below,  study  your  problem  and  solve  it 
as  explained  on  page  10.  Observe  the  same  rule  hereafter  whenever,  at  the  end 
of  the  statement  of  a  "  situation  "  you  are  asked  :  "  What  do  you  do?  "  or  "  What 
do  you  think?"  The  question,  "What  <lo  you  do?"  will  be  asked  frequently. 
The  answer  to  it  should  include  all  orders,  exactly  as  you  wrould  give  them  in 
the  field. 

SERGT.    HILL'S    SOLUTION. 

I  call  out: 

Rear  rank,  first  squad,  follow  me, 

and  march  toward  the  point  where  the  fence  meets  the  bend  in  the 
road  800  yards  north-northeast  of  636. 

First  I  make  sure  that  the  four  men  follow  me,  then  I  call  them 
alongside  and,  while  crossing  the  field,  I  tell  them  what  they  ought 
to  know  about  the  situation,  which  is  as  follows: 

The  battalion  is  going  about  6  miles  north  of  here  to  haul  back  some  forage 
and  flour,  which  we  shall  find  at  a  place  called  Hershey  Mill.  There  are  no 
Blue  troops  in  that  direction,  but  we  may  meet  Red  Cavalry,  most  likely  from 
the  west.  We  are  the  point.  We  must  keep  200  yards  ahead  of  the  advance 
party.  The  lieutenant  commands  the  advance  party.  He  has  a  map  and  will 
signal  to  us  which  road  to  take  when  we  come  to  crossroads  or  road  forks. 
Stone  is  next  in  command.  Any  questions? 

1  W,  W,  means,  "  Which  way  ?  "  It  can  be  semaphored  in  a  second  and  is  very  useful 
to  patrols,  connecting  files,  or  detachments  which  need  to  We  guided  or  directed  by  some 
one  beyond  the  reach  of  the  voice. 


17 

I  will  answer  the  questions  and  add  whatever  is  necessary  to  make 
the  men  understand  their  duties  more  clearly. 
On  reaching  the  road  I  direct: 

McGowan,  along  the  left  of  road ;  Stone,  along  the  right.  Move  out.  I'll 
follow  you  at  10  paces.  Schafer  and  Ames,  follow  me  at  10  paces.  Schafer, 
along  the  left  of  the  road ;  Ames,  along  the  right.  Ames,  you  watch  to  the  rear 
for  signals. 

DISCUSSION. 

Inasmuch  as  the  battalion  is  ready  to  march,  its  actual  start  de- 
pends upon  how  soon  your  point  marches  out.  In  special  cases 
a  point  may  be  told  to  march  out  at  an  increased  gait  or  even  at 
double  time,  but  ordinarily  there  is  no  occasion  for  doing  this.  You 
should,  however,  lose  as  little  time  as  possible  in  starting  out.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  give  your  instructions  before  marching.  You  can 
utilize  the  first  minute  or  two  for  that  purpose,  and  in  the  present 
problem  you  can  safely  go  bunched  as  far  as  the  road;  then  take 
up  a  more  scattered  formation.  You  will  remember  that  there  is  a 
cossack  post  in  the  woods  north  of  you,  and  there  is  little  to  be 
feared  until  you  pass  that  post. 

The  lieutenant  let  you  choose  your  four  men  from  the  first  squad ; 
but  since  the  duties  of  the  point,  aside  from  the  duties  of  the  leader, 
are  very  simple,  every  requirement  is  answered  by  merely  taking  the 
rear  rank. 

Whenever  you  take  a  patrol  or  detachment  out  for  some  special 
task,  you  should  make  use  of  the  first  opportunity  to  explain  to  your 
men  exactly  what  the  conditions  are  and  what  you  are  expected  to 
do.  For  your  guidance  in  these  problems  it  is  suggested  that  you 
study  carefully  the  information  and  instructions  given  to  subordi- 
nates in  the  solutions  and  reason  out  the  purpose  of  each  sentence. 
Also  determine,  if  you  can,  whether,  in  your  opinion,  anything  of 
importance  has  been  omitted. 

You  may  prefer  to  tell  your  men  that  the  company  is  the  advance 
guard;  that  Lieut.  Allen  and  the  first  and  second  platoons  are  the 
advance  party;  that  the  other  platoons  are  the  support  and  follow 
the  advance  party  at  300  yards,  but  all  this  is  not  necessary.  The 
essential  things  are:  Your  command  is  the  point;  it  must  keep  200 
yards  ahead  of  the  advance  party ;  and  Lieut.  Allen  is  your  immediate 
commander. 

The  advance  guard  point  is  a  patrol,  but  its  route  is  exactly  de- 
fined and  it  can  not  march  with  the  caution  that  is  usually  observed 
by  a  patrol.  It  is  compelled  to  use  the  road.  At  the  same  time  it 
should  conceal  its  advance  as  much  as  possible.  For  this  reason  we 
sent  McGowan  and  Stone  abreast  of  each  other  along  the  sides  of 
96790°— 17 2 


18 

the  road,  where  they  may  take  advantage  of  trees,  ditches,  or  other 
road  features,  and  avoid  the  middle  of  the  road.  Naturally  Me- 
Gowan  would  observe  the  country  to  the  front  and  left  and  Stone 
the  country  to  the  front  and  right.  You  follow  at  10  paces,  but  to 
one  side  of  the  road,  in  order  not  to  attract  attention  from  a  distance. 

The  troops  in  rear  are  compelled  to  expose  themselves  by  marching 
in  the  middle  of  the  road,  but  the  object  of  the  point  is  to  see  the 
road  and  the  country  in  front  and  flank  before  any  enemy  that  might 
be  there  sees  the  point.  This  is  possible  less  often  than  it  is  impos- 
sible, but  the  attempt  must  be  made.  Also,  by  using  this  formation, 
the  patrol  is  a  less  definite  target  in  case  it  draws  fire. 

One  member  of  the  point  should  always  be  charged  with  the  duty 
of  watching  the  advance  party  for  signals.  You  will  be  too  much 
interested  in  the  country  in  front  and  to  the  flanks  to  do  so. 

SITUATION  II. 

You  have  reached  the  crossroads  585.  You  notice  that  the  cossack 
post  has  joined  the  column. 

Mark  on  the  map  in  pencil  (or  on  tracing  paper)  the  location  of 
the  different  parts  of  the  battalion,  assuming  that  the  battalion 
marched  as  ordered,  but  disregarding  any  patrols  that  may  be  out. 
Connecting  files  every  100  yards. 

The  field  train  is  not  with  the  battalion. 


I  measure  distances  from  crossroads  585.  Call  this  place  "  X." 
The  point  is  at  X.  It  can  be  represented  by  a  dot  (though  there  may 
be  20  yards  between  the  leading  and  rear  men  of  the  point). 

The  advance  party  is  at  the  place  where  the  wire  fence  runs  west 
from  the  road.  Its  column  is  so  short  that  it  can  be  represented  by 
a  short  dash  that  scales  30  yards. 

The  head  of  the  support  is  therefore  530  yards  south  of  X.  The 
support  is  about  30  yards  long.  It  is  represented  by  a  short  dash 
that  scales  30  yards. 

The  head  of  the  main  body  is  500  yards  south  of  the  tail  of  the 
support,  hence  1,060  yards  south  of  X.  Its  length  is  represented  by 
a  line  that  scales  300  yards;  220  yards  of  this  represents  the  length 
of  three  companies,  the  remaining  80  yards  represent  the  length 
in  column  of  the  four  vehicles  which  constitute  the  combat  train 
(3  ammunition  wagons  and  1  ambulance). 

Connecting  files  will  be  represented  by  a  dot  between  the  point 
and  advance  party,  two  dots  between  advance  party  and  support,  and 
four  dots  between  support  and  main  body. 


19 

The  tail  of  the  column  is  therefore  in  front  of  the  farmhouse,  1,360 
yards  south  of  X. 

DISCUSSION. 

Of  course,  you  will  never  be  required  to  make  such  calculations 
and  measurements  in  the  field,  but  the  problem  is  given  now  for 
several  good  reasons : 

First,  you  should  have  a  fair  idea  of  the  make-up  of  an  advance 
guard  and  how  it  looks  on  the  road. 

Second,  this  problem  and  those  which  follow  must  be  studied  on 
the  map,  and  it  will  be  necessary  to  learn  to  measure  distances  on 
the  map  instead  of  estimating  them  by  eye,  as  you  usually  do  in 
the  field. 

Third,  you  are  obliged  to  apply  a  rule  for  determining  the  road 
space  occupied  by  Infantry  and  wagons.  We  said  that  the  main 
body  (three  companies)  was  220  yards  long.  The  three  companies 
have  about  432  men  (144  men  in  a  company).  The  easiest  rule  to 
remember  is  that  when  Infantry  is  marching  in  column  of  squads 
two  men  equal  1  yard  of  road  space.  Therefore,  432  men  will  make 
a  column  216  yards  (roughly,  220  yards)  long;  that  is,  they  will 
occupy  220  yards  of  road  space.  At  drill  the  distance  is  less^  but  on 
the  march  the  rule  given  here  is  accurate  enough.  Artillery  car- 
riages (guns  or  caissons),  wagons,  ambulances,  and  auto  trucks  each 
occupy  about  20  yards  of  road  space.  To  know  this  rule  assists  you 
in  estimating  numbers.  If  you  are  sent  out  as  a  patrol  leader  and 
reach  a  hill  from  which  you  see  a  long  column  of  Infantry  followed 
by  a  long  column  of  wagons,  you  can  not  count  them,  of  course.  But 
you  are  trained  in  estimating  distances.  Suppose  you  estimate  the 
Infantry  column  to  be  1,000  yards  long  and  the  wagon  column  500 
yards  long.  Now  you  can  safely  report  that  you  have  seen  about 
2,000  Infantry  followed  by  about  25  wagons.  Or,  suppose  you  had 
a  good  map  and  could  locate  on  it  the  position  of  the  head  and  the 
tail  of  the  column.  By  using  the  map  scale  and  a  little  arithmetic 
you  could  make  a  very  accurate  estimate.  But  a  chance  to  use  this 
method  occurs  less  often. 

SITUATION   III. 

At  crossroads  585  you  semaphored  "  W,  W,"  to  Lieut.  Allen.  He 
gave  the  arm  signal,  "  Forward,  march."  You  therefore  marched 
"  through  "  the  crossroads.  When  you  reached  the  triangle  near  537, 
Lieut.  Allen  gave  the  arm  signal,  "  Column  left,  march,"  and  you 
marched  toward  546.  As  you  approach  the  first  house  on  the  left 
(500  yards  northwest  of  537),  McGowan  slows  down  to  about  a  mile 


20 

and  a  half  gait  and  looks  anxiously  toward  the  orchard  and  woods 
west  of  the  house.     Stone  follows  suit.     You  call  out : 

What  is  the  matter,  McGowan;  do  you  see  anything? 
He  replies : 

Not  a  thing,  but  there  might  be  some  one  in  those  woods. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

SERGT.    HILL'S   SOLUTION. 

I  call  out  to  McGowan : 

March  along  a  little  better  than  3  miles  an  hour  until  you  see  something  real. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  point  must  precede  the  advance  party  by  200  yards.  The  ad- 
vance party  and  all  the  troops  in  rear  of  it  must  march  at  a  steady 
gait  unless  prevented  by  the  enemy.  This  means  that  the  point 
must  also  march  at  a  steady  gait.  It  can  not  approach  woods  or 
suspicious  places  as  cautiously  as  a  reconnaissance  patrol  might  do. 
At  maneuvers  and  field  exercises  we  frequently  see  the  marching 
rate  of  the  main  body  reduced  to  2  miles  or  less  for  no  better  reason 
than  that  the  point  and  other  parts  of  the  advance  guard  are  unneces- 
sarily cautious.  The  point  must  move  at  normal  marching  rate 
until  the  enemy  prevents  it  from  doing  so.  The  point  must  take 
chances  when  it  approaches  woods  or  houses  such  as  caused  McGowan 
to  slow  down.  When  the  enemy  is  actually  seen,  or  when  the  point 
is  fired  upon,  the  situation  is  quite  different,  but  we  shall  have  more 
to  say  about  that  later. 

SITUATION  IV. 

When  the  point  reaches  the  house  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the 
road  about  600  yards  southeast  of  546,  McGowan  says : 

Sergeant,  we  could  get  a  fine  view  to  the  north  from  the  second-story  window 
of  that  house.  Shall  I  go  there? 

What  do  you  do? 


I  answer: 
No. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  might  be  tempted  to  tell  McGowan  to  mind  his  own  business, 
but  that  is  not  necessary.  Never  squelch  a  man  for  offering  a  sug- 
gestion which,  from  his  standpoint,  seems  reasonable,  unless  he 
becomes  a  nuisance. 


21 

No  doubt  a  good  view  to  the  north  can  be  obtained  in  the  manner 
suggested  by  McGowan,  but  before  the  observer  returns  to  the  road 
the  advance  party  will  reach  the  house.  If  the  point  were  to  adopt 
a  system  of  sending  a  man  to  every  favorable  point  of  observation, 
there  would  soon  be  no  point  left  unless  the  advance  party,  and  there- 
fore the  whole  column,  halted  while  the  point  made  use  of  these 
places.  This  is  out  of  the  question,  of  course.  It  often  happens  that 
a  member  of  the  point  can  be  directed  to  march  so  as  to  get  a  better 
view.  For  example,  if  the  road  passes  through  a  long,  deep  cut, 
one  man  can  be  sent  along  the  top  of  the  cut.  The  thing  to  bear  in 
mind  is  that  no  man  should  be  sent  on  such  an  errand  if  he  will  be 
unable  to  get  forward  at  ordinary  marching  rate. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  advance  party  or  of  the  support  to  send  men 
off  the  road  when  it  becomes  necessary  or  desirable  to  do  so  for 
reconnaissance  or  observation. 

SITUATION  V. 

The  point  arrived  within  100  yards  of  546  and  you  saw  a  Blue 
patrol  along  the  Hunterstown-546  road,  marching  north,  and  now  700 
yards  south  of  546.  A  moment  later  you  arrived  at  546.  McGowan 
points  to  the  west.  Between  the  rows  of  trees  in  the  orchard  straight 
west  of  546  about  10  cavalrymen  are  hurriedly  mounting  up.  About 
half  of  them  are  already  riding  west  deeper  into  the  orchard.  They 
are  Reds  without  a  doubt. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 

I  extend  my  arms  horizontally  (the  signal  "as  skirmishers,  march'') 
and  call  out: 

Target,  Cavalry  in  the  orchard,  clip  fire,  faster. 
Then  I  face  Lieut.  Allen  and  semaphore : 
Ten  men.  Cavalry. 

Then  I  join  the  men  who  are  firing,  in  order  to  observe  the  enemy, 
the  surrounding  country,  and  the  effect  of  our  fire. 

DISCUSSION. 

By  the  time  you  have  done  all  that  the  solution  includes  it  is  likely 
that  the  patrol  will  have  disappeared  and  it  will  be  time  for  you  to 
do  something  else.  What  you  will  do  next  depends  upon  the  result  of 
your  observation. 

The  Drill  Regulations  give  you  short  and  clear  commands  and  sig- 
nals. They  constitute  a  special  language  which  all  men  learn.  If 
you  were  to  form  the  bad  habit  of  breaking  out  into  ordinary  conver- 
sation in  a  situation  like  the  present  one,  it  is  not  probable  that  all  of 


22 

your  men  would  know  exactly  what  you  wanted.  The  noncommis- 
sioned officer  who  is  so  trained  in  the  application  of  Drill  Regulations 
commands  and  signals  that  he  uses  them  instinctively  and  correctly 
will  get  far  better  results  in  any  emergency.  Furthermore,  he  will 
give  the  impression  among  his  men  that  he  understands  his  business, 
and  this  in  itself  is  a  very  important  matter. 

In  future  problems  we  shall  have  occasion  to  apply  Drill  Regula- 
tions commands  and  signals.  We  may  as  well  indicate  now,  in  the 
beginning,  that  these  commands  and  signals  can  frequently  be  used 
to  indicate  to  your  men  exactly  what  you  want  done. 

When  you  shout  "  target "  and  pause  for  a  moment,  as  you  natu- 
rally will,  your  men  wrill  instinctively  look  toward  you  and  see  you 
signal  "  as  skirmishers,  march."  The  target  itself  is  so  apparent  to 
anyone  who  glances  in  the  direction  in  which  you  are  looking  that 
it  would  hardly  be  necessary  to  describe  it.  An  unmistakable  target 
within  500  yards,  as  in  this  case,  requires  no  announcement  of  range. 
The  command  "clip  fire,"  without  announcement  of  range,  denotes 
battle  sight.  Battle  sight  is  even  more  suitable  against  Cavalry  than 
against  Infantry,  on  account  of  the  height  of  the  target.  It  is  en- 
tirely proper  to  command  "  faster,"  even  before  firing  begins.  It 
indicates  that  when  fire  is  opened  you  desire  a  rate  of  fire  faster  than 
the  normal. 

We  recommend  that  you  study  the  commands  and  signals  used  in 
future  problems  and  determine  for  yourself  whether  they  answer 
every  purpose  and  would  be  perfectly  clear  to  trained  troops. 

You  might  have  signaled  to  Lieut.  Allen  by  holding  your  rifle 
horizontally  over  your  head.  This  signal,  which  has  been  used  many 
years,  indicates  "  enemy  in  sight  in  small  numbers."  The  semaphore 
message  "  ten  men,  Cavalry,"  can  be  flashed  almost  as  quickly  and 
it  is  more  definite.  While  on  this  subject  of  semaphore  signaling,  it 
is  well  to  add  that  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  many 
privates  should  be  able  to  semaphore.  It  is  very  simple,  rapid,  and 
easily  learned.  If  half  of  the  company  is  proficient,  the  other  half 
will  soon  be  able  to  signal  fairly  well. 

There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of  opening  fire  on  the  Reds. 
Their  hurried  movements  would  indicate  that  their  halt  in  the 
orchard  had  been  interrupted  by  the  warning  of  their  lookout.  They 
know  that  Blue  troops  are  approaching,  but  in  order  to  prevent  them 
from  getting  too  much  information  of  our  own  forces  it  is  best  to 
shoot  them  up  while  you  have  a  chance,  and  fill  them  with  a  strong 
desire  to  get  away. 

SITUATION  VI. 

The  Red  patrol  disappeared  and  was  screened  from  view  by  the 
orchard  before  your  men  exhausted  the  first  clip. 


23 

You  immediately  directed  your  point  to  resume  its  march  to  the 
north  at  an  increased  gait,  since  the  advance  party  had  now  closed 
up  to  50  yards.  In  the  meantime  you  shouted  to  Lieut.  Allen, 

Reds  have  gone  west  through  the  orchard. 

When  the  point  arrives  at  the  stream  crossing  between  roadfork 
544  and  crossroad  616,  a  lively  fire  opens  from  the  woods  east  of  the 
road  and  directly  north  of  you.  The  fire  is  over  your  head  and  ap- 
parently is  directed  at  the  advance  party.  You  judge  that  there  may 
be  either  a  sqiiad  firing  very  rapidly  or  a  platoon  firing  slowly.  A 
glance  down  the  road  shows  you  that  the  advance  party  has  started 
to  deploy. 

What  do  you  do? 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 
I  shout, 
Off  the  road  to  the  left  and  up  that  hoi-low, 

pointing  to  the  shallow  hollow  50  yards  west  of  the  road,  and  to  the 
northwest  of  me.  I  march  to  the  north,  parallel  to  the  road,  and  as 
close  to  it  as  I  can  without  giving  up  cover.  I  personally  march 
far  enough  to  the  right  to  be  able  to  peer  over  the  crest  and  watch 
the  edge  of  the  woods.  It  is  my  intention  to  halt  about  halfway  to 
the  wire  fence,  and  then  decide  what  to  do  next  when  I  see  what  our 
column  is  doing  and  what  has  happened  to  the  enemy. 

DISCUSSION. 

There  are  several  reasons  why  it  would  be  unwise  for  the  point  to 
drop  in  its  tracks  and  open  fire.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  have  a 
bad  firing  position.  Also,  the  fire  of  four  or  five  men  would  add 
little  to  the  fire  effect,  unless  delivered  from  the  flank.  The  point  is 
not  being  fired  upon  and  for  the  present  is  free  to  move.  A  quick 
movement  off  the  road  and  to  the  left  may  draw  a  few  shots  from 
the  enemy,  but  it  would  probably  amount  to  nothing.  The  point 
can  help  the  column  most  by  placing  itself  in  a  position  to  get  infor- 
mation and  at  the  same  time  be  ready  to  resume  the  march  promptly. 
If  you  find  later  that  you  can  deliver  a  flank  fire,  you  should  seize 
the  opportunity  to  do  so,  but  for  the  present  it  is  best  to  get 
forward  under  cover  so  that  you  can  watch  not  only  the  enemy  in 
the  woods,  but  the  road  to  the  north  and  the  main  road  a  half  mile 
west  of  you.  Your  first  position  at  the  stream  crossing  was  unfa- 
vorable under  any  circumtsances,  but  in  choosing  a  better  place  you 
should  not  be  drawn  farther  from  the  road  than  is  aboslutely  neces- 
sary, and  you  should  not  fall  back  if  it  is  possible  to  get  forward. 
The  hostile  force  is  probably  small  and  will  stand  for  a  short  time 


24 

only.  It  may  be  the  same  Cavalry  party  which  you  drove  out  of  the 
orchard.  In  this  case,  its  intention  probably  is  to  delay  our  column 
or  make  it  show  its  strength.  The  duty  of  an  advance  guard  in  such 
a  case  is  to  act  vigorously  and  enable  the  column  to  march  with  as 
little  delay  as  possible. 

SITUATION  VII. 

The  enemy  disappeared  north  through  the  woods.  In  the  mean- 
time the  advance  party  had  crossed  the  stream  and  is  now  assembling 
in  the  road.  The  point  was  able  to  fire  a  few  shots,  and  then  to  re- 
turn to  the  road  and  resume  the  march.  When  the  point  arrives  50 
yards  south  of  crossroad  616,  the  command,  "  Halt !  "  is  signaled 
from  the  rear.  You  can  see  the  men  of  the  advance  party  and  sup- 
port fall  out  and  sit  down.  The  main  body  is  in  the  valley  and  is 
not  visible. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

SERGT.    HILL'S    SOLUTION. 

I  continue  the  march  to  crossroad  616  and  give  orders  as  follows : 
Stone,  post  yourself  here  and  watch  the  roads  to  the  northeast,  northwest, 
and  southwest.     Other  men  fall  out. 

I  sit  down  in  a  place  from  which  I  can  see  the  advance  party. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  column  has  apparently  halted  for  a  rest.  When  a  column 
halts,  the  point  becomes  a  "march  outpost."  If  necessary,  it  shifts 
its  position  so  as  to  get  the  best  view  of  the  roads  and  country  to  the 
front  and  flank.  The  point  should  not  move  a  great  distance  for  this 
purpose.  How  far  is  a  matter  of  judgment.  Over  200  yards  to  the 
front,  or  100  yards  to  the  flank,,  or  100  yards  to  the  rear,  would 
probably  be  too  far.  In  the  present  case  an  advance  of  50  yards 
enabled  you  to  place  Stone  at  the  crossroads.  This  is  also  the  high- 
est point  on  the  spur,  and  from  this  position  one  man  can  see  prac- 
tically as  much  as  two  men  can.  You  would  naturally  look  around 
for  a  chance  to  improve  your  observation  of  the  country,  and  prob- 
ably would  decide  to  place  a  second  man  on  the  house  or  barn.  That 
can  not  be  decided  from  the  map  alone.  In  any  event,  every  man 
not  required  for  sentinel  duty  should  be  given  full  opportunity  to 
rest. 


SECOND  PROBLEM. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  CONNECTING  FILE. 


EXPLANATION. 

"When  the  distance  between  parts  of  the  advance  guard  or  the 
nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  make  direct  communication  diffi- 
cult, connecting  files  march  between  the  subdivisions  to  keep  up 
communication.  .  Each  element  of  the  column  sends  the  necessary 
connecting  files  to  its  front."  (I.  D.  R.,  645.) 

Usually  a  connecting  file  consists  of  two  men,  but  special  con- 
ditions may  require  the  use  of  one  man  or  more  than  two  men.  The 
men  of  a  connecting  file  march  together. 

The  distance  between  connecting  files,  or  between  a  connecting 
file  and  the  subdivision  nearest  to  it,  varies  according  to  the  situ- 
ation. Naturally,  the  distance  would  be  greatest  in  flat,  open  coun- 
try in  broad  daylight,  and  in  this  case  may  be  as  much  as  200  yards. 
The  distance  would  be  llsfftt  on  a  very  dark  night.  In  the  latter  case 
the  connecting  files  may  be  so  close  as  to  form  a  single  file  at  about 
5  yards  distance. 

In  daylight  and  in  case  of  doubt  100  yards  may  be  considered  a 
satisfactory  average.  This  distance  has  two  advantages :  First,  men 
are  trained  to  measure  distances  by  eye  in  units  of  100  yards ;  second, 
the  prescribed  distance  between  subdivisions  is  easily  maintained 
by  sending  connecting  files  100  yards  apart ;  thus,  when  600  yards  dis- 
tance is  ordered  the  head  of  the  subdivision  which  is  to  march  with 
600  yards  distance  marches  100  yards  behind  its  fifth  connecting  file. 

SITUATION  I. 

You  are  Pvt.  Dixon,  of  Company  B.  Your  battalion  camped 
last  night  along  the  farm  road  east  of  hill  636  (northeast  of  Granite 
Hill  Station).  At  7.30  o'clock  this  morning  the  battalion  formed, 
ready  to  march.  Your  captain  ordered  the  pieces  to  be  loaded, 
assembled  the  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  opposite  the  cen- 
ter of  the  company,  and  gave  the  following  verbal  order  loud  enough 
for  the  company  to  hear  it: 

A  Red  Cavalry  squadron  was  wrecking  the  railroad  south  of  Biglerville 
yesterday.  Biglerville  is  7  or  8  miles  northwest  of  here.  Our  battalion  is  going 
to  march  about  6  miles  north  of  here  to  haul  back  to  this  place  some  forage  and 
flour.  Company  A  will  be  the  advance  guard  at  500  yards.  Posts. 

(25) 


26 

You  saw  Company  A  march  out  with  point,  advance  party,  and 
support.  It  marched  north  to  the  road  which  leads  toward  585. 
When  the  support  had  marched  about  50  yards  to  the  north  from 
your  company  the  captain  said  to  Pvt.  Scott  of  your  squad : 

Scott,  take  Hanson  with  you  and  follow  the  advance  guard  at  100  yards  as 
connecting  file. 

A  moment  later,  when  Scott  had  marched  about  50  yards,  the 
captain  said  to  you : 

Dixon,  take  Smither  with  you  and  follow  Scott  at  100  yards  as  connect- 
ing file. 

When  you  reached  the  road  you  saw  the  main  body  marching 
300  yards  in  rear  of  you  and  two  connecting  files  between  you  and 
}^our  company.  You  also  noticed  that  the  major  was  riding  at  the 
tail  of  the  advance  guard. 

After  marching  about  1J  miles  you  turned  the  corner  150  yards 
northwest  of  road  fork  537,  and  now,  when  you  are  15  yards  beyond 
the  corner,  you  see  that  the  advance  guard  support  and  Scott's  con- 
necting file  have  just  halted  in  the  road.  On  account  of  the  woods 
you  can  not  see  the  next  connecting  file  in  rear  of  you. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

PVT.    DIXON'S    SOLUTION. 

I  halt  and  say  to  Smithers: 

Go  back  to  the  road  fork  and  stand  where  the  next  connecting  file  can  see  you. 

DISCUSSION . 

Imagine  that  the  advance  guard  support  is  dragging  behind  it 
a  string  100  yards  long.  Scott's  place  is  at  the  end  of  that  string. 
Imagine  also  that  Scott  drags  a  string  100  yards  long.  Your  place 
is  at  the  end  of  that  string.  You  also  drag  an  imaginary  string, 
at  the  end  of  which  the  next  connecting  file  is  supposed  to  be.  Finally, 
the  captain  of  your  company  is  ordinarily  at  the  end  of  the  string 
of  the  last  connecting  file,  but  he  may  close  up  or  drop  back  for 
reasons  of  his  own.  You  have  no  such  discretion.  All  you  can  do 
is  to  shift  slightly,  if  necessary,  in  order  to  see  the  next  connecting 
file  in  front  or  in  order  to  be  seen  by  the  next  connecting  file  in  rear. 
For  this  reason  you  sent  Smither  back  to  the  road  fork.  If  the  dis- 
tance to  the  road  fork  had  been  40  or  50  yards  or  more,  there  would 
have  been  no  object  in  sending  him.  The  next  connecting  file  would 
have  been  there  at  the  same  time,  or  sooner,  and  would  have  halted 
when  it  saw  you  had  done  so. 

SITUATION  II. 

When  Smither  reached  the  road  fork  he  signaled,  "  Halt,"  to  the 
next  connecting  file. 
What  do  you  do  ? 


27 


I  call  to  Smither : 

Don't  signal ;  just  stand  there. 

DISCUSSION. 

Smither  does  not  know  his  business  and  exceeded  his  instructions. 
If  the  signal  "  Halt "  is  transmitted  back  to  your  captain,  he  will 
assume  that  the  major  has  ordered  "  Halt."  You  received  no  such 
signal,  and  hence  should  not  permit  it  to  be  sent  back.  If  your  con- 
necting file  merely  halts,  it  is  sufficient  notice  that  your  imaginary 
string  has  halted.  Each  subdivision  of  the  advance  guard  tries  to 
march  steadily,  but  sometimes  receives  short,  unavoidable  checks. 
The  officer  in  command  of  the  next  subdivision  in  rear,  or  of  the 
main  body,  may  wish  to  avoid  numerous  short  halts,  which  irritate  the 
men  and  do  no  good,  and  to  adjust  the  distance  by  a  slower  gait,  or 
he  may  wish  to  close  up  a  part  of  the  distance  in  order  to  reach  a 
shady  place  in  the  road,  or  in  order  to  get  off  a  conspicuous  hill.  If 
he  receives  the  signal  "  Halt,"  and  knows  the  major  is  in  front,  he 
must  halt  practically  where  he  is.  Bear  in  mind,  therefore,  that 
signals  are  to  be  transmitted  only  when  ordered  by  proper  authority, 
or  when  unmistakably  given  to  you  by  the  next  connecting  file  in 
front  or  rear  of  you. 

SITUATION  III. 

You  reach  a  point  about  50  yards  north  of  road  fork  544,  when 
fire  opens  to  the  north  of  you.  The  advance-guard  support  has 
halted  near  the  summit  of  the  low  ridge  (about  250  yards  north  of 
544).  You  are  then  halted  on  the  upslope  of  that  ridge.  A  minute 
later  Scott  signals,  "Assemble." 

What  do  you  do  ? 

I  signal 

Assemble 

to  the  next  connecting  file  in  rear,  and  continue  the  signal  until  I 
see  that  the  connecting  file  repeats  the  signal. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  have,  of  course,  no  reason  to  question  the  authority  for  Scott's 
signal.  The  main  body  is  under  cover  from  the  fire  which  you  have 
heard,  and  can  advance.  The  major  is  ahead  and  evidently  wants  the 
main  body  to  close  up  on  him;  that  is,  assemble  on  him.  The  im- 
portant thing  for  you  to  do  is  to  continue  the  signal  until  you  are 
sure  that  the  next  connecting  file  in  rear  has  passed  it  along. 


28 

SITUATION  IV. 

You  are  still  halted  north  of  544.  The  advance-guard  support  has 
deployed  east  of  the  road,  but  has  not  yet  advanced.  Scott  is  still 
halted.  The  main  body  has  advanced  a  little  more  than  100  yards, 
and  in  the  meantime  has  picked  up  the  last  connecting  file.  There 
is  now  only  one  connecting  file  between  you  and  the  main  body,  and 
that  connecting  file  is  now  closing  up  on  you  and  keeping  about  100 
yards  ahead  of  the  main  body. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

PRIVATE  CIXON'S  SOLUTION. 

I  stand  fast. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  connecting  file  in  rear  of  you  made  a  mistake.  In  our  present 
case  it  will  make  little  or  no  difference.  You  should  remember,  how- 
ever, that  it  is  important  for  each  commander  of  a  subdivision  of  a 
column  to  know  whether  the  next  subdivision  in  front  is  advancing 
or  has  halted.  Generally,  this  can  be  determined  only  by  observing 
the  connecting  files.  In  thick  country,  and  on  a  winding  road  where 
only  one  connecting  file  is  visible,  that  connecting  file  will  deceive  the 
commander  if  it  takes  its  distance  from  the  rear ;  that  is,  if  it  starts 
to  wind  up  its  hundred  yards  of  string,  instead  of  halting  at  the  end 
of  it. 

In  a  night  march  the  situation  is  more  difficult.  The  advance 
guard  and  all  connecting  files  must  guide  on  the  main  body.  At  the 
same  time,  the  main  body  must  be  warned,  quietly,  if  it  is  jamming 
up  on  the  advance  guard.  A  connecting  file  must  therefore  keep  its 
distance  ahead  of  the  connecting  file  or  body  of  troops  next  in  rear, 
and  at  the  same  time  give  warning  if  the  maintenance  of  this  dis- 
tance results  in  jamming.  For  this  reason,  the  proper  distance  at 
night  between  connecting  files  is  the  maximum  distance  at  which  a 
man  can  be  seen  in  outline. 


THIRD  PROBLEM. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

"  To  afford  protection  to  an  infantry  column,  the  country  must  be 
observed  on  each  side  of  the  road  as  far  as  the  terrain  affords  posi- 
tions for  effective  rifle  fire  upon  the  column.  If  the  country  that  it  is 
necessary  to  observe  be  open  to  view  from  the  road,  reconnaissance  is 
not  necessary."  (I.  D.  E.  648.) 

"  Where  the  country  is  generally  open  to  view  but  localities  in  it 
might  conceal  an  enemy  of  some  size,  reconnaissance  is  necessary. 
Where  the  road  is  exposed  to  fire  and  the  view  is  restricted,  a  patrol 
should  be  sent  to  examine  the  country  in  the  direction  from  which 
danger  threatens.  The  object  may  be  accomplished  by  sending  pa- 
trols to  observe  from  prominent  points.  When  the  ground  permits 
and  the  necessity  exists,  patrols  may  be  sent  to  march  abreast  of  the 
column  at  distances  which  permit  them  to  see  important  features  not 
visible  from  the  road."  (I.  D.  R.  650.) 

Infantry  on  the  march  must  protect  itself  from  being  surprised  or 
being  fired  upon,  not  only  from  the  front  but  also  from  the  right  or 
left.  To  guard  against  the  latter  we  send  out  flank  patrols  when 
necessary.  It  often  happens  that,  from  the  road  itself,  we  can  see 
all  the  ground  so  far  to  the  right  or  left  that  nothing  more  than  small 
hostile  patrols  could  be  within  easy  rifle  shot  of  our  column  with- 
out being  seen  from  the  road.  In  such  cases  we  do  not  bother  to  send 
out  flank  patrols,  because  a  hostile  patrol  will  hardly  fire  on  a  com- 
pany or  a  battalion.  If  the  distance  is  great,  they  could  not  hit  any- 
thing. If  the  distance  is  short,  it  is  not  healthy  to  open  fire  and 
generally  nothing  is  gained  by  doing  so.  Only  poorly  instructed 
patrols  at  maneuvers  do  such  things.  But  from  time  to  time  it  is 
necessary  to  send  out  flank  patrols  toward  woods,  houses,  or  hills  in 
order  to  find  out  whether  the  enemy  is  there  with  enough  men  to  be 
dangerous.  These  patrols  are  sent  by  the  advance  guard,  generally 
by  the  advance  party  if  it  is  strong  enough.  In  this  way  the  in- 
formation can  be  obtained  before  the  troops  in  rear  of  the  advance 

(29) 


30 

party  come  within  easy  rifle  shot  of  the  ground  examined  by  the 
patrol.  Of  course,  mounted  men  are  generally  best  for  such  patrols, 
but  if  there  are  none  on  hand  or  if  the  ground  is  difficult  we  must 
use  Infantry. 

The  patrol  leader  is  told  when  to  leave  the  column,  where  to  go, 
and  about  w^here  to  come  back  on  the  road  on  which  the  column  is 
marching.  When  the  patrol  gets  back  on  this  road  the  leader  will 
usually  find  that  his  company  is  ahead  of  him.  He  is  expected  to 
overtake  the  company  if  possible,  but  without  double  timing.  If  the 
patrol  has  lost  considerable  distance  (say  more  than  a  half  mile)  the 
patrol  leader  should  report  to  the  first  battalion  or  company  com- 
mander that  he  meets. 

SITUATION  I. 

The  situation  is  the  same  as  in  the  first  problem  to  include  Lieut. 
Allen's  order,  page  16. 

You  are  Corpl.  Clark,  first  squad,  at  the  head  of  the  advance  party 
and  approaching  crossroads  585.  Your  rear  rank  is  in  the  point  and 
Pine  and  Hagen  are  ahead  as  connecting  file. 

A  few  minutes  ago  Lieut.  Allen  passed  the  word  along  that— 

Farmers  have  telephoned  that  Red  Cavalry  is  active  attain  this  morning 
south  of  Biglerville ;  that  is  7  miles  northwest  of  here. 

When  you  are  on  the  road  where  the  fence  ends,  200  yards  south  of 
585,  Lieut.  Allen  says  to  you : 

Corporal,  when  we  reach  the  crossroads  in  front  of  us,  take  three  men  and 
patrol  to  those  woods  (north  of  letter  "S"  in  HUNTERSTOWN).  A  half  mile 
beyond  the  crossroads  our  road  turns  to  the  northwest.  From  the  woods  you 
also  go  northwest  until  you  strike  a  main  road.  There  is  the  road  I  mean 
(pointing  toward  S.  H.,  700  yards  north  of  Hunterstown).  That  road  will  take 
you  back  to  the  column.  Keep  about  abreast  of  the  advance  party. 

(1)  What  do  you  think? 

(2)  What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  your  patrol  starts  out  in  patrol 
formation? 

CORPL.    CLARK  S    SOLUTION. 

(1)  I  am  to  go  to  the  woods ;  then  northwest.    Column  goes  north- 
west also,  but  on  the  road.     First  main  road  takes  me  back  to  the 
column.    Keep  abreast  of  the  lieutenant. 

Approaching  the  woods  I  want  some  one  in  front  of  me  and  some 
one  behind.  Better  have  two  men  in  front.  They  will  have  more 
confidence.  We  shall  be  on  a  low  ridge  and  I  will  have  no  trouble 
seeing  the  advance  party.  But  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  get  through 
the  fence  and  then  organize. 

(2)  At  the  crossroad  I  call  out — 
Brown,  Quinu,  and  Peterson,  follow  me. 


31 

I  take  them  through  the  fence  and  walk  toward  the  woods,  mean- 
time telling  the  men — 

We  are  going  to  patrol  those  woods ;  then  go  northwest  to  the  first  main  road ; 
then  along  that  road  to  the  road  the  column  will  be  on.  We  have  to  keep 
abreast  of  the  advance  party.  Brown,  you  go  ahead  now  to  the  nearest  point 
of  the  woods  (south  corner).  Quinn,  25  yards  to  the  right  of  Brown.  I  will 
follow  Quinn  at  50  yards.  Peterson,  50  yards  behind  me. 

We  take  up  this  formation  and  march,  and  watch  Hunterstown. 

DISCUSSION. 

When  you  are  given  a  thing  to  do  the  logical  way  to  go  about  it  is 
as  follows: 

1.  Be  sure  you  understand  what  you  are  ordered  to  do. 

2.  Determine  the  best  way  to  do  it. 

3.  Do  it. 

Sometimes  you  will  have  ample  time  to  follow  out  this  idea.  Some- 
times, however,  you  will  have  barely  time  to  "  do  it "  and  must  trust 
to  your  instinct  to  pull  you  through. 

In  the  present  problem  your  first  thought  should  be  to  fix  firmly  in 
your  mind  the  instructions  given  you  by  Lieut.  Allen.  You  have 
time  before  reaching  the  crossroads.  He  planned  your  route  with  the 
assistance  of  his  map,  but  you  will  have  to  go  without  a  map.  You 
can  not  see  what  lies  beyond  the  woods.  You  only  know  that  north- 
west of  the  woods  there  is  a  main  road  that  will  take  you  back  to  the 
column.  Lieut.  Allen's  directions  look  simple  enough  when  you 
examine  a  perfect  map ;  but  if  you  wTere  on  the  ground  you  would 
realize  the  importance  of  repeating  aloud,  or  at  least  to  yourself,  the 
route  given  you.  If  there  is  any  doubt  in  your  mind  you  should  ask 
Lieut.  Allen  to  explain  it  away.  If  Lieut.  Allen  did  not  have  a  good 
map.  he  would  not  be  able  to  see  beyond  the  first  woods.  In  that  case 
he  would  probably  send  your  patrol  to  the  first  woods  only.  Then, 
later,  when  the  advance  party  reached  the  north  end  of  the  woods  he 
would  have  to  send  another  patrol  through  the  second  woods.  But 
he  has  a  map  and  the  advance  party  is  small,  so  he  trusts  to  your 
intelligence  to  make  the  patrolling  easier. 

You  will  observe  that  your  patrol  left  the  column  without  any 
inspection,  and  marched  without  trying  to  use  cover.  Also,  Lieut. 
Allen  did  not  say  what  the  patrol  was  to  look  for.  At  first  glance 
you  would  think  that  this  is  contrary  to  Infantry  Drill  Regulations 
(par.  609).  But  there  is  a  difference  between  your  advance  guard 
flank  patrol  and  the  patrols  that  paragraph  609  has  specially  in  mind. 
Your  flank  patrol  must  go  out  at  once.  The  men  are  already  in 
inarching  trim  and  pieces  are  loaded.  The  patrol  will  not  be  out  of 
sight  of  the  column  except  perhaps  for  a  few  minutes  at  a  time. 


32 

Furthermore,  if  a  flank  patrol  is  required  to  advance  under  cover 
and  the  column  keeps  up  the  average  rate  of  march,  the  patrol  will 
usually  fail  to  get  anywhere  in  time  to  be  of  use.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  column  slows  up  to  let  patrols  advance  cautiously  under  cover, 
the  column  will  not  get  anywhere.  Of  course,  you  will  use  whatever 
cover  you  find,  but  the  main  thing  is  to  get  over  your  ground  fast 
enough  to  give  the  column  on  the  road  no  excuse  for  slowing  up. 

The  other  point  that  we  raised  was,  Why  did  not  Lieut.  Allen  tell 
you  what  to  look  for?  If  you  are  sent  on  reconnaissance,  this  would 
be  very  important,  but  the  purpose  of  an  advance  guard  flank  patrol 
is  always  the  same.  The  purpose  is  to  give  warning  of  an  enemy,  if 
seen,  in  time  to  save  the  column  from  being  surprised,  and  incident- 
ally to  drive  off  any  hostile  patrols  that  have  a  chance  to  get  informa- 
tion of  our  column.  You  should  understand  this  so  well  that  it 
should  not  be  necessary  for  Lieut.  Allen  to  tell  you  each  time  that 
you  are  sent  out.  How  to  get  this  information  and  how  to  transmit 
it  to  the  column  will  be  explained  later. 

At  the  crossroads  you  commanded : 

Brown,  Quinn,  and  Peterson,  follow  me, 

and  led  them  through  the  fence.  That  is  short,  complete,  unmis- 
takable, and  businesslike. 

Three  of  you  fellows  come  along  with  me 

is  the  way  we  frequently  hear  it.  It  is  wrong.  Pick  your  men  and 
name  them.  Under  Lieut.  Allen's  orders  to  "  take  three  men,"  you 
would  ordinarily  take  them  from  your  own  squad  if  you  had  that 
many  left.  You  would  not  in  that  case  take  any  from  other  squads 
except  for  excellent  reasons,  and,  in  any  event,  only  after  telling  the 
lieutenant  that  you  wished  to  do  so. 

At  first  you  are  so  close  to  the  advance  party  that  you  can  safely 
advance  bunched  for  75  or  100  yards,  and  while  marching  thus  you 
may  give  your  information  and  orders. 

Your  men  have  heard  Lieut.  Allen  give  you  the  route.  Neverthe- 
less, you  will  repeat  it  to  them  as  a  matter  of  habit  and  precaution. 
The  patrol  may  become  scattered,  or  temporarily  separated,  and  you 
should  make  sure  that  each  man  knows  what  ground  the  patrol  is  to 
cover. 

More  often  you  will  have  a  single  place  to  go  to,  instead  of  a  long 
parallel  route,  as  in  this  case.  But  even  then  you  should  tell  your 
own  men,  for  example, 

We  are  going  to  that  hill  to  take  a  look  at  the  country  on  the  other  side, 
then  come  back  to  the  column. 

The  formation  that  we  adopted  sends  two  men  toward  the  woods. 
They  are  25  yards  apart.  Peterson  is  in  the  rear  for  the  special 


33 

purpose  of  keeping  the  advance  guard  in  sight  so  as  to  transmit 
signals.  You  are  in  the  middle  where  you  can  see  the  whole  patrol 
and  run  both  ends  of  it.  Bear  in  mind  four  things : 

(a)  Some  one  must  march  so  as  to  be  able  to  explore  the  ground 
assigned  to  you. 

(b)  Some  one  must  march  so  as  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  advance 
guard. 

(c)  You  must  place  yourself  where  you  can  handle  the  patrol  and 
its  movements. 

(d)  The  patrol  must  make  progress  in  the  right  direction. 

Any  formation  (diamond,  single  file,  a  sort  of  skirmish  line,  etc.) 
which  will  accomplish  these  four  things  is  correct,  but  as  a  matter 
of  safety  you  wrould  never  march  bunched. 

There  are  times,  of  course,  when  you  can  not  help  losing  sight 
of  the  advance  guard  temporarily. 

Brown  is  second  in  command  in  your  squad  (see  p.  12).  Other- 
wise you  would  name  a  second  in  command. 

SITUATION  II. 

Brown  and  Quinn  have  just  reached  the  south  corner  of  the  woods. 
Peterson  has  veered  to  the  northeast  so  as  to  keep  the  advance  party 
in  sight,  and  is  now  at  the  wire  fence  and  100  yards  southeast  of 
Quinn.  You  can  not  see  the  advance  party,  but  you  assume  that  it 
is  on  the  road  just  east  of  the  last  letter  "  N  "  in  Hunterstown,  and  is 
still  marching.  You  estimate  that  in  the  woods  in  front  you  will 
be  able  to  see  a  man  about  75  yards  off  in  any  direction. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

I  signal  to  Brown  and  Quinn,  "  As  skirmishers,  guide  left,  march," 
and  shout, 

Ono  hundred  yards.     Close  up  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  halt. 

I  call  to  Peterson, 

Fifty  yards  on  the  right  of  Quinn. 

Then  I  move  northeast  on  the  ridge  and  halt  (between  the  tops  of 
the  letters  "  TO  "  in  Hunterstown) ,  where  I  can  see  what  the  advance 
party  is  doing. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  recommend  that  a  patrol  advance 
in  a  thin  skirmish  line  when  penetrating  woods  (par.  612).  You  are 
not  ready  yet,  however,  to  go  into  the  woods.  It  is  best  to  make  sure 
of  the  direction  of  march  and  location  of  the  advance  party.  Mean- 
time the  men  can  be  placed  so  as  to  be  ready  to  go  ahead  in  a  thin 
skirmish  line  when  you  decide  to  advance. 

96790°— 17 3 


34 

We  have  here  a  practical  application  of  the  use  of  the  Drill  Kegu. 
lations  signals  in  connection  with  orders.  It  is  doubtful  if  you  could 
devise  a  shorter  and  clearer  method  of  separating  Brown  and  Quinn 
by  a  hundred  yards.  This  is  a  trifling  detail  perhaps,  but  you  should 
always  look  for  the  shortest  and  clearest  way  of  getting  a  thing  done. 

SITUATION  III. 

The  point  has  arrived  about  100  yards  southeast  of  the  small 
orchard  which  lies  700  yards  northeast  of  you.  A  connecting  file 
has  just  appeared  from  the  cover  of  the  woods  and  is  about  100  yards 
behind  the  point. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  place  myself  between  Brown  and  Quinn,  signal 
Forward,  march, 
and  march  a  little  west  of  north  into  the  woods. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  are  now  sure  that  you  know  the  route  of  the  advance  party. 
By  starting  now  you  are  somewhat  in  advance  of  the  advance  party. 
This  has  two  advantages.  First,  you  can  give  warning  more  quickly 
if  you  encounter  anything,  and,  second,  you  will  overcome  in  part 
the  delay  which  the  underbrush  will  cause  and  thus  be  more  nearly 
abreast  of  the  advance  party  when  you  get  through  the  woods.  .V 
thin  skirmish  line  enables  you  to  examine  a  greater  area  of  the  woods. 
Even  so,  you  are  going  to  miss  the  north  half  of  the  woods,  but  that 
is  not  very  important.  The  point  will  pass  the  north  end  of  the 
woods,  and  between  you  and*  the  point  there  is  little  room  for  a  hos- 
tile force  large  enough  to  be  dangerous  to  the  column.  A  large 
force  can  not  be  massed  in  woods  without  substantial  security  detach- 
ments. You  would  encounter  these  detachments  at  least.  You  can 
not  expect  to  comb  the  woods  for  hostile  patrols.  It  is  sufficient  for 
you  to  protect  the  column  against  surprise  by  larger  forces. 

The  patrol  will  naturally  guide  on  you,  and  at  first  you  have  to 
shift  about  to  get  the  50-yard  intervals  that  you  ordered,  but  very 
soon  your  patrol  will  be  marching  on  a  front  of  150  yards  and  will 
be  able  to  observe  a  strip  of  woods  300  yards  wide.  Your  interval 
between  men  might  be  greater  than  50  yards,  if  you  can  see  75  yards, 
as  you  estimated,  but  it  is  better  to  be  safe  and  keep  the  patrol  under 
control. 

You  are  going  to  lose  sight  of  the  column  temporarily,  but  this 
can  not  be  avoided.  If  you  left  a  man  in  position  to  see  the  column, 


35 

he  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  be  seen  by  you,  and  therefore  he 
would  be  practically  useless. 

SITUATION  IV. 

You  emerge  from  the  woods  where  jbhe  wire  fence  enters  it,  350 
yards  east  of  hill  592.  Because  of  the  underbrush  your  progress  has 
been  slow.  The  point  and  connecting  file  are  on  the  road  northeast 
of  you. 

What  do  you  do  ? 


I  give  the  signal — 
Change  direction  to  the  left, 

and  I  personally  march  toward  the  southwest  corner  of  the  orchard, 
walking  slowly  until  Quinn  and  Peterson  are  abreast  of  me.  Mean- 
time I  shout  to  Brown : 

Move  to  the  left  and  follow  the  high  ground  so  that  you  can  watch  to  the  west. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  difficult  to  keep  direction  accurately  in  the  woods  or  to  tell 
how  or  where  you  are  coming  out.  The  first  thing  you  discovered  on 
emerging  was  the  fact  that  high  ground  obstructed  your  view  to  the 
west.  Also,  to  the  northwest  you  see  a  line  of  trees  and  can  distin- 
guish, because  of  their  regularity,  the  trees  which  belong  to  the 
orchard.  Therefore,  since  you  have  not  yet  reached  the  main  road 
mentioned  in  Lieut.  Allen's  orders,  the  patrol  must  get  a  view  to  the 
west  and  at  the  same  time  proceed  toward  the  woods  to  the  north- 
west. Your  present  formation  is  suitable  for  the  next  woods  and  not 
unsuitable  for  crossing  the  open  space,  since  one  man  now,  and  your- 
self later,  will  be  able  to  observe  to  the  west  while  the  other  men  of 
the  patrol  are  extended  in  the  direction  of  the  advance  party. 

SITUATION  V. 

You  emerge  from  the  woods  800  yards  south  of  road  fork  546  and 
50  yards  east  of  the  road.  You  see  the  point  marching  on  the  road 
in  the  hollow  near  the  house  300  yards  southeast  of  road  fork  546. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S   SOLUTION. 

I  signal — 

Assemble, 
and  get  on  the  road  at  the  bend. 


36 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  plain  that  from  the  road  you  can  see  both  the  advance  party 
and  the  country  to  the  west.  There  is  no  object  in  marching  across 
country  when  a  road  serves  the  purpose,  unless  a  route  across  country 
can  be  found  which  offers  concealment  and  easy  marching  without 
interfering  with  observation  and  communication  with  the  advance 
party. 

SITUATION  VI. 

The  patrol  is  assembled  on  the  road,  except  Peterson,  who  is  now 
climbing  the  fence. 
What  do  you  do  ? 


I  order, 

We  will  march  north,  zigzag,  at  10  paces.  Brown,  lead  off  on  the  right  of 
the  road ;  then  myself,  on  the  left ;  then  Quinn,  on  the  right ;  then  Peterson,  on 
the  left.  March  out,  Brown. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  have  nearly  a  half  mile  to  march  before  you  rejoin  the  column. 
You  knoAv  that  Cavalry  has  been  reported  to  the  northwest.  The 
patrol  can  not  march  concealed,  but  it  should  avoid  marching  in  a 
bunch.  A  small  Cavalry  party  may  run  into  you  from  the  rear  or 
the  left.  For  this  reason,  men  should  be  placed  so  as  to  make  a  poor 
target.  A  patrol  which  is  marching  along  a  road  and  which  is  not 
compelled  to  conceal  itself,  but  on  the  contrary  must  advance  at  the 
normal  marching  gait,  would  use  the  same  formation  as  an  advance 
guard  point.  It  is  recommended  that  you  compare  the  formation  in 
the  present  case  with  the  formation  of  Sergt.  Hill's  point  in  the  first 
problem,  remembering  that  there  were  five  men  in  the  point. 

SITUATION  VII. 

You  have  just  taken  up  the  formation  described  in  the  preceding 
situation.  You  see  the  point  jump  into  the  road  at  roadfork  546  and 
fire  into  the  orchard  west  of  546.  The  tree  tops  prevent  yon  from 
seeing  the  ground  more  than  50  yards  beyond  the  south  and  east 
edges  of  the  orchard.  You  see  no  signs  of  the  enemy. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

I  decide  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  west  of  the  road,  particularly 
toward  the  orchard;  meantime,  advance  north  on  the  road  to  the  end 
of  the  fence  which  passes  along  the  south  edge  of  the  orchard,  halt- 
there  in  observation  and  place  myself  where  I  can  communicate  with 
Lieut.  Allen  by  signal. 


37 

DISCUSSION. 

The  reasons  for  closing  in  are  to  see  more  of  the  orchard  and  to 
get  into  communication.  Lieut.  Allen  will  be  somewhere  around  546. 
Under  the  circumstances  you  can  not  yet  join  the  column.  Lieut. 
Allen  needs  you  and  your  eyes  where  you  now  are.  But  also  he  may 
want  to  tell  you  presently  what  to  do.  You  must  make  it  possible  for 
him  to  communicate  with  you.  Semaphore  signaling  without  flags  is 
not  very  dependable  beyond  600  yards. 

If  you  go  too  far,  the  orchard  will  obstruct  your  view.  From  the 
position  indicated  you  can  see  the  road  which  lies  a  half  mile  west, 
the  farm  road  and  the  woods  south  of  hill  574,  and  the  hill  itself  as 
far  north  as  the  number  574.  At  the  same  time  you  are  able  to  com- 
municate with  Lieut.  Allen. 

SITUATION  VIII. 

As  you  arrive  at  your  new  position  (50  yards  south  of  the  fence) 
firing  ceases.  You  see  no  signs  of  the  enemy  anywhere.  Lieut.  Allen 
semaphores 

Attention. 

You  acknowledge,  and  he  semaphores 

Patrol  orchard  and  return. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  acknowledge  the  message  (semaphore  the  letter  "  R  "),  and  order, 

Qninn,  25  yards  on  my  left.  Peterson,  25  yards  on  my  right.  Brown,  follow 
Peterson  at  40  yards. 

Then  I  march  northwest. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  situation  now  is  a  little  different  from  the  situation  in  the 
woods,  where  you  marched  on  the  broadest  possible  front.  You  know 
that  you  will  be  able  to  see  far  between  the  rows  of  trees  in  the 
orchard.  You  can  extend  the  vision  of  the  patrol  considerably  only 
by  separating  its  members  by  so  much  distance  that  you  will  lose 
control.  There  was  something  in  the  orchard  a  moment  ago.  It  is 
best  to  keep  control  and  get  at  least  three  rifles  on  anything  that  you 
meet. 

There  may  be  a  surprise  party  in  store  for  you,  hence,  you  should 
leave  one  man  farther  back.  This  will  lessen  the  chance  of  a  com- 
plete surprise,  since  this  man  may  escape  or  otherwise  give  warning. 
Suppose  that  the  .patrol  marched  well  bunched  and  was  caught  by 


38 

the  enemy  in  a  situation  which  prevented  the  firing  of  a  shot.  This 
would  happen  very  seldom,  but  if  it  did,  Lieut.  Allen^  hearing 
nothing,  would  assume  that  you  were  progressing  and  that  therefore 
the  orchard  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  But  in  the  formation  actually 
adopted  you  have  given  at  least  one  man  a  chance  to  give  warning 
either  by  fire  or  by  escape. 

By  placing  Brown  behind  Peterson,  Brown  is  nearer  Lieut.  Allen, 
and  he  is  the  last  man  to  enter  the  orchard.  Therefore,  his  position 
has  a  double  advantage. 

SITUATION  IX. 

You  emerge  from  the  orchard  at  the  farm  road  on  the  west  edge. 
You  see  four  Red  cavalrymen  slowly  riding  north  on  the  road  700 
yards  west-northwest  of  you.  There  is  nothing  else  in  sight. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

Pointing  out  the  Red  cavalrymen  I  call  to  Quinn  and  Peterson — 
Range,  700.     Fire  at  will. 
Then  I  set  my  sight  and  fire. 

DISCUSSION. 

An  advance  guard  flank  patrol  is  a  covering  patrol.  Besides  giv- 
ing warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  it  should  drive  off  the 
enemy  when  possible.  The  more  information  the  enemy  gets  con- 
cerning us  the  greater  is  the  disadvantage  to  us.  A  column  can 
seldom  march  secretly,  but  frequently  it  can  prevent  the  enemy 
from  learning  all  that  is  worth  knowing.  This  leaves  the  enemy 
more  or  less  in  the  dark.  His  actions  can  not  be  planned  so  well, 
and  hence  they  will  not  be  so  inconvenient  or  damaging  to  us.  You 
may  not  hit  a  man  or  a  horse  in  the  present  case,  but  the  mere  fact 
that  these  four  men  were  fired  upon,  particularly  .by  some  one  off  the 
road,  will  make  them  extremely  cautious  for  sometime  to  come. 
Cautious  men  learn  very  little. 

The  disadvantage  of  firing  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  alarms  the 
column  and  may  delay  it  to  no  purpose.  However,  this  depends 
upon  the  commander  and  the  amount  of  firing.  There  was  a  time 
when  the  tactics  of  the  march  were  so  imperfectly  understood  that 
a  few  shots  on  the  flank  would  stop  a  brigade,  but  now  we  seldom 
see  such  absurd  things.  You  knew  before  you  opened  fire  that  the 
Red  cavalrymen  would  gallop  off  and  probably  would  be  beyond 
your  range  or  vision  before  your  men  loaded  the  next  clip.  Then 
all  would  be  quiet.  The  column  would  continue  its  march.  So, 
under  the  circumstances,  50  cents  worth  of  ammunition  will  do  more 
than  50  cents  worth  of  good. 


39 

Having  attracted  the  attention  of  the  column,  you  should  show 
yourself  as  soon  as  possible  and  make  it  absolutely  clear  that  there  is 
nothing  to  warrant  an  interruption  of  the  march. 

"  The  aiming  point  or  target  is  carefully  pointed  out.  This  may 
be  done  before  or  after  announcing  the  sight  setting.  Both  are  in- 
dicated before  giving  the  command  for  firing,  but  may  be  omitted 
when  the  target  appears  suddenly  and  is  unmistakable;  in  such  case 
battle  sight  is  used  if  no  sight  setting  is  announced."  (I.  D.  R.  135.) 

Sometimes  we  take  the  trouble  to  designate  the  target  when  it  is 
not  necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  we  sometimes  fail  to  designate 
the  target  when  it  is  so  indistinct  that  there  is  slight  chance  that  our 
men  will  pick  it  up  without  careful  designation.  Only  experience 
and  practice  will  remedy  this.  In  the  present  case  there  should  be 
no  difficulty.  The  four  cavalrymen  loom  so  large  and  present  the 
only  possible  target  in  the  direction  in  which  you  are  pointing  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  waste  words  in  designating  the  target.  If  there 
is  any  doubt  in  your  mind^  it  is  better  to  describe  the  target. 

SITUATION  X. 

The  Red  cavalrymen  have  disappeared.  There  are  no  other  signs 
of  the  enemy.  Between  the  rows  of  trees  the  ground  is  visible  to  the 
north  and  south  edges  of  the  orchard.  Brown  is  about  75  yards  east 
on  the  farm  road. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  call  to  Quinn  and  Peterson — 
Follow  me  at  20  yards. 

Then  I  march  east  along  the  farm  road  through  the  orchard,  signal- 
ing Brown — 

Forward,  march. 

DISCUSSION. 

Nothing  remains  but  to  rejoin  the  column,  showing  yourself  as 
soon  as  possible.  You  will  make  better  time  along  the  farm  road 
than  by  going  to  the  north  edge  of  the  orchard.  The  formation 
adopted  is  convenient,  considering  the  location  of  your  men,  and 
serves  your  purpose. 

SITUATION  XI. 

You  have  arrived  on  the  main  road  200  yards  north  of  road  fork 
546.  The  tail  of  the  main  body  (combat  train)  is  approaching 
the  bridge  400  yards  north  of  you.  There  is  a  squad  inarching  on 
the  main  road  about  100  yards  ahead  of  you. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do? 


I  decide  to  overtake  the  last  company  and  report  to  its  captain. 

DISCUSSION. 

Lieut.  Allen  is  nearly  a  mile  ahead  of  you.  You  could  not  over- 
take him  unless  you  marched  during  two  of  the  hourly  halt  periods 
or  passed  the  marching  column  at  a  greatly  increased  gait.  It 
would  be  hard  marching  in  either  case.  Under  the  circumstances 
you  are  justified  in  reporting  to  the  captain  of  the  last  company. 
The  one  thing  you  should  not  do  is  to  straggle  behind  or  drift  around 
in  the  column,  subject  to  no  one's  orders.  That  would  be  contrary 
to  the  spirit  of  paragraph  376,  Infantry  Drill  Kegulations,  which 
says: 

Any  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer  who  becomes  separated  from  his 
proper  unit  and  can  not  rejoin  must  at  once  place  himself  and  his  command 
at  the  disposal  of  the  nearest  higher  commander. 

Anyone  having  completed  an  assigned  task  must  seek  to  rejoin  his  proper 
command.  Failing  in  this,  he  should  join  the  nearest  troops  engaged  with 
the  enemy. 


FOURTH  PROBLEM. 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY. 


EXPLANATION. 

"  The  advance  guard  commander  is  responsible  for  its  formation 
and  conduct.  He  should  bear  in  mind  that  its  purpose  is  to  facilitate 
and  protect  the  march  of  the  main  body.  Its  own  security  must  be 
effected  by  proper  dispositions  and  reconnaissance,  not  by  timid  or 
cautious  advance.  It  must  advance  at  normal  gait  and  search  aggres- 
sively for  information  of  the  enemy.  Its  action  when  the  enemy 
attempts  to  block  it  with  a  large  force  depends  upon  the  situation 
and  plans  of  the  commander  of  the  troops."  (I.  D.  R.  640.) 

"  The  support  sends  forward  an  advance  party.  The  advance 
party  in  turn  sends  a  patrol,  called  a  point,  still  farther  to  the  front. 
*  *  *"  (I.  D.  R.  645.) 

"  They  facilitate  the  advance  of  the  main  body  by  promptly  driv- 
ing off  small  bodies,  of  the  enemy  who  seek  to  harass  or  delay  it ;  by 
removing  obstacles  from  the  line  of  advance,  by  repairing  roads, 
bridges,  etc.,  thus  enabling  the  main  body  to  advance  uninterruptedly 
in  convenient  marching  formations. 

"  They  protect  the  main  body  by  preventing  the  enemy  from 
firing  into  it  when  in  close  formation;  by  holding  the  enemy  and 
enabling  the  main  body  to  deploy  before  coming  under  effective 
fire;  by  preventing  its  size  and  condition  from  being  observed  by 
the  enemy.  *  *  * "  (I.  D.  R.  636.) 

The  present  problem  is  designed  to  illustrate  how  the  advance 
party  commander  assists  the  advance  guard  in  facilitating  and  pro- 
tecting the  march  and  in  taking  proper  action  when  the  enemy 
is  met. 

SITUATION  I. 

A  week  ago  we  marched  south  with  our  division  through  Bigler- 
ville  and  Gettysburg  (Gettysburg  is  2  miles  due  south  of  Boyd 
S.  H.).  We  are  in  the  enemy's  country.  Our  regiment  was  left 
back  to  guard  the  railroad  over  which  our  supplies  come,  while  the 
rest  of  the  division  went  10  miles  south  of  Gettysburg  and  now  con- 
fronts the  enemy. 

(41) 


42 

Our  battalion  and  the  machine-gun  company  is  in  Gettysburg, 
while  the  rest  of  the  regiment  is  scattered  along  the  railroad  to  the 
north,  the  nearest  detachment  being  Company  E  at  Biglerville. 

At  9  o'clock  this  morning  Companies  A,  B,  and  C  and  the  machine- 
gun  company  were  hurriedly  assembled  and  marched  north  out  of 
town;  Comany  A  in  the  lead.  You  are  First  Sergt.  Holmes,  Com- 
pany A.  The  captain,  who  is  the  only  officer  with  the  company, 
called  the  noncommissioned  officers  to  the  head  of  the  company 
during  the  march  and  said : 

The  enemy  attacked  Company  E  at  Biglerville  this  morning.  Our  battalion 
leaves  Company  D  in  Gettysburg.  The  rest  of  the  battalion  and  the  umchiiu'- 
gun  company  are  going  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Biglerville.  This  company  will 
be  the  advance  guard.  The  main  body  will  follow  us  at  600  yards.  Srrgt. 
Holmes,  your  platoon  will  be  the  advance  party.  The  rest  of  the  company 
will  be  the  support  and  will  follow  you  at  400  yards.  I'll  be  with  the  support 
and  will  send  out  the  flank  patrols.  Here  is  a  map.  Take  this  direct  road  to 
Table  Rock;  then  past  Gainer  to  Biglerville.  When  we  reach  the  outguard 
the  battalion  will  halt  and  the  advance  guard  will  get  its  distances.  Posts. 

The  battalion  halts  at  the  outguard,  where  the  Texas  and  Table 
Rock  Roads  meet,  1  mile  south  of  Boyd  S.  H.  (500  yards  south  of 
edge  of  map),  and  the  captain  orders  you — 

Move  out  on  this  right-hand  road. 

It  is  September,  and  the  corn  is  head  high.    Pieces  are  loaded. 
What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  the  advance  p^arty  marches? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

After  receiving  the  captain's  first  order,  and  before  reaching  the 
outguard,  I  make  sure  that  the  noncommissioned  officers  of  inv 
platoon  understand  the  situation  as  stated  by  the  captain.  On 
arrival  at  the  outguard,  I  order — 

Sergt.  Hill,  take  four  men  of  the  second  squad  out  this  right-hand  road  as 
point.  Precede  the  advance  party  by  250  yards.  At  crossroads  and  road  forks 
look  to  me  for  direction. 

(I  assume  he  takes  the  rear  rank,  second  squad.) 
When  Sergt.  Hill  has  inarched  out,  I  order, 

Butler,  take  Quinn  with  you,  and  follow  the  point  at  100  yards  as  connecting 
file. 

While  the  point  and  connecting  file  are  gaining  distance,  I  in- 
form the  platoon  as  follows : 

Company  E  was  attacked  at  Biglerville  this  morning.  Our  battalion  left 
Company  D  in  Gettysburg.  The  rest  of  the  battalion  and  the  machine-gun 
company  are  going  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Biglerville.  Our  company  is  the 
advance  guard  and  this  platoon  is  the  advance  party. 


43 

When  the  connecting  file  has  marched  nearly  150  yards,  I  com- 
mand: 

As  skirmishers,  guide  right,  march ;  platoon  column,  march, 
and  order, 

Column  of  files  each  side  of  the  road.  Corp.  Koenig,  in  rear  to  watch  for 
signals.  Peterson,  join  first  squad. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  observe  that  the  advance  guard  has  no  reserve.  It  would  split 
up  the  company  into  too  many  parts  if  the  advance  guard  in  this  case 
had  a  reserve.  The  company  is  therefore  divided  in  the  same  man- 
ner that  the  support  of  an  advance  guard  would  be  divided ;  that  is, 
it  has  an  advance  party  and  a  support  proper.  The  point  belongs 
to  the  advance  party.  You  have  the  point,  the  connecting  file,  and 
the  advance  party  proper  all  under  your  command. 

Your  noncommissioned  officers  know  the  situation.  During  the 
minute  or  two  that  the  platoon  stands  halted,  it  is  well  to  inform 
your  men  briefly  what  the  situation  is. 

Whenever  possible  you  should  give  your  men  some  idea  of  the  situ- 
ation and  of  the  job  they  are  working  on.  In  peace-time  exercises 
this  policy  increases  the  interest  of  the  men,  and  in  actual  warfare 
it  is  frequently  necessary.  Some  of  the  men  may  be  called  upon  to 
act  independently,  in  charge  of  the  patrols  or  otherwise,  and  they 
can  not  be  expected  to  do  good  work  unless  they  know  what  is 
going  on. 

An  advance  party  of  two  platoons  might  have  an  officer  or  sergeant 
and  one  squad  as  point,  but  in  the  case  of  a  single  platoon  it  is  better 
to  use  only  a  sergeant  and  a  half  squad,  unless  there  is  a  mounted 
point  in  the  front;  in  the  latter  case,  a  squad  would  probably  be 
better. 

The  distance  between  the  point  and  advance  party  will  vary  ac- 
cording to  the  situation.  In  the  present  case,  the  country  is  open 
and  the  enemy  is  aggressive  (he  has  attacked  Company  E),  and  the 
advance  guard  distances  are  longer  than  would  be  the  case  in  close 
country  or  where  the  enemy  is  not  aggressive ;  as,  for  example,  if  he 
is  being  pursued.  We  might  send  the  point  300  yards  in  advance, 
but  certainly  not  less  than  200  yards. 

In  some  regiments  there  is  an  inclination  to  use  more  connecting 
files  than  are  necessary.  In  the  present  case,  there  are  a  number  of 
bends  in  the  road  and  patches  of  woods  along  both  sides  of  it.  A 
connecting  file,  and  one  only,  is  therefore  necessary,  but  it  is  better 
to  give  it  the  usual  100  yards  distance  from  the  point. 

The  captain  left  to  you  the  selection  of  the  leader  and  the  size  of 
the  point;  also  the  question  of  distances  and  connecting  files.  You 


44 

may  be  sure,  however,  that  the  captain  will  observe  how  you  handle 
your  little  problem  and  will  correct  any  mistake  you  make.  In  the 
same  way,  you  will  watch  Sergt.  Hill  start  his  point,  but  you  will 
not  interfere  or  make  suggestions  unless  he  does  something  wrong. 
Where  there  is  only  a  slight  difference  of  opinion  as  to  minor  points, 
the  captain  will  not  interfere  with  you,  and  you  will  not  interfere 
with  Sergt.  Hill. 

The  point  takes  an  inconspicuous  patrol  formation,  but  the  ad- 
vance party  can  not  make  itself  quite  so  inconspicuous.  If  the 
advance  party  consists  of  more  than  one  platoon,  it  is  probably  better 
to  march  it  in  column  of  twos,  the  men  separating  so  as  to  march  in 
double  column  of  files  along  the  sides  of  the  road.  Where  the  ad- 
vance party  is  a  single  platoon,  there  are  several  advantages  in  de- 
ploying as  skirmishers  and  then  marching  as  a  platoon  column,  the 
men  spreading  as  already  mentioned.  There  is  room  between  the 
fences  for  the  original  deployment,  since  the  platoon  column  soon 
relieves  the  crowding.  The  platoon  is  then  ready  to  jump  into  place 
in  an  orderly  skirmish  line  the  instant  you  stretch  your  arms  later- 
ally to  the  signal :  "As  skirmishers,  march."  You  should  drill  your 
platoon  frequently  in  deploying  from  platoon  column  to  skirmish 
line  to  the  front,  right  front,  left  front,  and  even  to  the  right  and 
left.  You  should  place  yourself  quickly  where  you  wish  the  center 
of  the  line  to  be,  and  extend  your  arms  so  that  they  mark  the  exact 
line  you  wish  to  form. 

The  captain  said  that  he  would  look  out  for  flank  reconnaissance. 
Your  advance  party  is  really  too  small  to  do  so.  However,  you  will 
watch  the  flanks  very  closely,  and  may  even  send  a  man  to  some 
near-by  high  point,  but  only  when  this  point  is  especially  advanta- 
geous for  observation.  In  this  connection  compare  situation  IV,  first 
problem. 

It  might  have  been  better  to  have  assigned  two  platoons  to  the  ad- 
vance party  and  charge  it  with  the  flank  reconnaissance.  It  takes 
training  and  judgment  to  determine  what  flank  reconnaissance  is 
necessary  and  what  is  unnecessary.  Possibly,  when  you  have  shown 
that  you  possess  good  judgment  in  such  matters  and  another  case  like 
the  present  one  arises,  the  captain  will  take  advantage  of  your  judg- 
ment and  make  an  advance  party  strong  enough  to  handle  the  flank 
reconnaissance.  There  is,  of  course,  an  advantage  in  sending  flank 
patrols  out  from  the  subdivisions  farthest  in  front. 

All  of  Corpl.  Koenig's  squad  except  Peterson  and  the  corporal  him- 
self have  been  used  in  the  point  and  connecting  file.  The  corporal 
is  available  to  march  as  platoon  guide  temporarily,  but  particularly 
to  watch  for  signals  from  the  rear.  Peterson  should  be  assigned  to 
any  squad  that  has  a  blank  file.  If  no  squad  has  a  blank  file,  he  may 


45 

be  assigned  to  any  squad  and  AY  ill  march  in  the  line  of  file  closers 
when  the  platoon  is  assembled. 

SITUATION  II. 

The  advance  party,  marching  at  ordinary  gait,  reached  road  fork 
511  (near  hill  527),  and  is  now  only  75  yards  behind  the  connecting 
file.  The  connecting  file  appears  to  be  100  yards  behind  the  point. 
It  is  evident  that  the  point  is  marching  cautiously. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 
I  order: 

Hagen,  jog  ahead  and  overtake  the  point.  Tell  Sergt.  Hill  to  march  faster 
and  keep  his  distance  of  250  yards. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  a  small  column  the  advance  party  is  really  the  pacemaker.  It 
must  push  the  point  ahead.  In  every  case  the  column  wishes  to  march 
at  the  regular  gait.  In  the  present  case  it  is  very  necessary  that  the 
column  be  not  delayed  through  the  cautiousness  of  the  point.  We 
are  still  several  miles  from  Company  E.  and  a  difference  of  five  min- 
utes in  the  time  of  our  arrival  may  have  an  important  effect.  In 
this  connection  compare  situation  III,  first  problem. 

You  might  hasten  Sergt.  Hill  along  by  signaling  "  Forward, 
march,"  or,  better  still,  by  semaphore  message. 

SITUATION  III. 

The  advance  party  arrives  on  the  low  ridge  100  yards  south  of  608, 
and  is  fired  upon  from  the  north.  Your  instinct  tells  you  that  the 
fire  comes  from  the  vicinity  of  the  road,  at  a  distance  of  about  a 
half  mile.  The  fire  is  a  ragged  volley,  apparently  a  dozen  rifles. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  jump  to  the  right-hand  fence,  meanwhile  shouting  and  signaling: 

As  skirmishers,  march. 

Then  I  drop  down  and  look  for  the  enemy. 

DISCUSSION. 
Combined  with  Situation  IV. 

SITUATION  IV. 

The  instant  you  lie  down  you  catch  the  movement  of  men  in  the 
edge  of  the  cornfield,  3  fingers  east  of  the  house  700  yards  to  the 
north.  The  tree  tops  in  the  ravine  200  yards  north  of  you  are  about 


46 

5  feet  below  your  line  of  sight.  After  the  ragged  volley  there  is  a 
slight  pause  in  the  enemy's  fire,  followed  by  "  fire  at  will "  at  the  rate 
of  about  one  shot  per  second.  The  fire  seems  to  be  high.  The  point 
is  not  visible. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  shout — 

Range,  700.     Target:  From  the  house  on  the  road,  3  o'clock;  3  fingers;  edge 
of  cornfield.     Fire  at  will— 
and  then  examine  the  target  and  observe  the  fire  with  my  field  gin 

DISCUSSION. 

As  you  march  along  the  road  you  observe  from  time  to  time  posi- 
tions in  front  and  on  the  flank  from  which  the  enemy  might  open  fire. 
With  these  positions  in  mind  you  probably  decide  beforehand,  in  a 
general  way,  what  you  will  do  in  case  you  are  fired  upon.  Probably 
all  you  can  do  in  most  cases  will  be  to  decide  to  which  side  of  the  road 
you  will  jump  in  case  the  road  itself  is  unsuitable.  The  rest  may 
depend  upon  details  which  you  can  hardly  foresee  or  count  on.  When 
you  arrived  about  175  yards  south  of  608,  and  almost  a  minute  before 
firing  began,  you  could  see  the  country  to  the  north  for  about  a  half 
mile.  Along  the  left  you  could  see  an  extensive  cornfield  extending 
north  from  608,  and  beyond  that,  near  the  house,  the  edge  of  another 
cornfield.  This  was  your  first  glimpse  of  the  country  immediately 
north  of  608.  You  probably  asked  yourself :  "  Which  side  of  the  road 
is  best  now,  in  case  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  next  ridge  ?  " 

If  you  were  fired  upon  from  the  north  and  jumped  to  the  left  side 
of  the  road  you  would  commit  yourself  to  an  advance  through  the 
large  cornfield.  In  the  cornfield  the  men  would  be  safe  from  fire,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  would  not  be  able  to  fire  on  the  enemy.  Further- 
more, your  progress  would  be  very  slow  and  patrolling  would  be 
difficult.  If  your  command  were  a  patrol,  compelled  to  force  its  way 
north,  with  no  column  in  rear  depending  up  it  to  clear  the  road,  an 
advance  through  the  cornfield  would  be  satisfactory.  In  the  present 
case,  however,  it  is  your  duty  to  drive  away  small  hostile  parties  and 
also  to  get  forward.'  The  best  line  of  advance  for  this  purpose  is  east 
of  the  road.  In  a  very  short  time  you  are  covered  by  trees  of  the 
ravine,  then  by  the  ravine  itself,  and  finally,  when  you  are  again 
visible  to  the  enemy,  you  will  be  so  close  that  he  will  not  stand  unless 
his  force  is  much  larger  than  his  fire  indicated.  You  will  have  de- 
layed the  column  very  little,  all  things  considered. 

The  advance  party  is  made  strong  enough  and  is  sent  far  enough  in 
advance  of  the  support  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  bringing  an  effec- 
tive rifle  fire  on  the  support  until  it  can  deploy.  But  the  advance 


47 

party  is  also  made  strong  in  order  to  be  able  to  push  small  hostile 
patrols  out  of  the  way  and  thus  save  the  support  the  necessity  of  de- 
ploying and  save  the  whole  column  more  than  trifling  delay.  If  you 
estimate  that  the  enemy  in  your  front  is  so  weak  that  you  can  handle 
him  alone  without  assistance  from  the  support,  your  play  is  to  go 
after  him  as  soon  as  you  can  locate  him  and  give  your  advance  party 
a  proper  formation.  In  the  present  case  you  have  as  yet  no  excuse 
for  awaiting  the  assistance  of  the  support. 

A  road  is  usually  about  60  feet  wide  between  fences.  This  gives 
deploying  room  for  two  squads  only.  Since  the  advance  party  must 
deploy  and  advance,  it  is  best  to  form  a  good  skirmish  line  first,  even 
if  you  lose  a  man  or  two. 

A  small  force  like  your  advance  party  should  not  deploy  in  too 
thick  a  line.  You  have  25  rifles  in  your  firing  line.  In  the  road  there 
is  scarcely  room  for  half  of  them.  It  is  best  for  your  expected  fight, 
and  also  is  best  from  a  disciplinary  standpoint,  to  insist  upon  the 
formation  of  a  proper  line  and  thus  defeat  the  inclination  of  the  men 
to  drop  in  their  tracks.  By  jumping  to  the  right-hand  fence,  mean- 
time giving  the  signal  for  deployment,  you  throw  the  right  half  of 
the  platoon  over  the  fence  and  into  the  field  on  your  right.  The  left 
half  of  the  platoon  will  be  in  line  quickly  in  the  road.  Your  com- 
mands for  firing  can  be  given  almost  at  once.  The  men  nearest  you 
then  open  fire.  The  others  will  open  fire  upon  arriving  in  good  firing 
positions,  approximately  on  the  line.  The  men  who  are  still  running 
to  their  places  may  not  hear  your  first  orders  as  to  range  and  target, 
but  repetition  will  soon  remedy  this. 

You  may  indicate  the  range  before  the  target  or  the  target  before 
the  range.  In  the  present  case  it  makes  no  difference.  If  the  target 
is  one  that  needs  to  be  described  very  carefully  and  is  easily  lost  to 
the  eye,  or  especially  difficult  to  pick  up  a  second  time,  it  is  better 
to  announce  the  range  first,  so  that  men  need  not  take  their  eyes 
off  the  target  after  it  is  shown  them. 

In  designating  a  target  which  your  men  will  probably  have  diffi- 
culty in  seeing  quickly  and  easily,  you  should  always  follow  a 
logical  system.  To  illustrate  what  we  mean  we  shall  analyze  your 
target  designation  in  the  present  case.  When  you  shouted  "  target," 
your  men  were  warned  to  listen  attentively  and  look  sharply.  When 
you  shouted  "  From  the  house  on  the  road  "  you  indicated  a  reference 
point  that  the  men  could  pick  up  quickly  and  without  fail.  Your 
next  command  was  "  3  o'clock."  The  men  then  looked  in  the  direc- 
tion in  which  the  hour  hand  of  the  clock  would  point  at  3  o'clock, 
if  the  house  were  the  center  of  the  clock.  When  you  commanded 
"  3  fingers  "  your  men  held  up  three  fingers  at  right  angles  to  the 
hour  hand,  with  the  outer  edge  of  the  left  finger  against  the  house. 
They  knew  then  that  your  next  command  would  indicate  some  spot 


48 

very  close  to  the  point  where  the  line  of  sight  past  the  outer  edge 
of  the  right  finger  intersected  the  hour  hand  of  the  clock.  So  when 
you  commanded  "  edge  of  cornfield  "  your  men  not  only  knew  which 
cornfield  you  referred  to,  but  they  also  knew  about  how  far  east  of 
the  house  they  should  look  for  their  target. 

Suppose,  now,  that  you  had  said:  "Target:  Edge  of  cornfield, 
8  fingers,  3  o'clock  from  the  house  on  the  road."  By  the  time  you  had 
pointed  out  to  them  the  house  on  the  road,  your  men  might  have 
forgotten  the  o'clock  and  number  of  fingers  and  the  particular  spot 
that  you  wished  them  to  look  at.  The  logical  system,  therefore,  is 
to  warn  the  men  by  shouting  "target";  then  indicate  the  point 
which  you  propose  to  use  as  the  center  of  the  clock;  then  indicate 
the  direction  in  which  the  imaginary  hour  hand  is  pointing ;  then 
indicate  the  number  of  fingers;  and  finally  indicate  the  indistinct 
point  at  which  you  desire  to  direct  their  attention.  If  you  reverse 
this  order,  or  mix  it  up,  or  even  if  you  give  the  proper  order  too 
rapidly,  you  will  find  that  you  will  have  to  repeat  yourself. 

If  your  men  have  any  difficulty  in  understanding  the  use  of  the 
clock  face,  tell  them  to  imagine  that  they  have  a  photograph  of  the 
country  in  front  of  them,  and  that  the  house  on  the  road  is  in  the 
center  of  the  photograph.  Now,  if  the  photograph  is  placed  against 
a  wall  and  the  hour  hand  of  the  clock  moves  around  it  with  the 
house  as  a  center,  it  will  be  clear  that  "  12  o'clock  "  indicates  a  line 
extending  beyond  (north)  of  the  house  as  far  as  they  can  see;  "3 
o'clock"  indicates  a  line  toward  Herrman;  "9  o'clock"  indicates  a 
line  toward  Texas;  and  "6  o'clock"  indicates  a  line  from  the  house 
toward  the  platoon.  The  sketch  on  page  49  represents  the  country 
as  seen  by  your  platoon.  The  house  is  in  the  center  of  the  sketch. 
By  studying  the  radial  lines  you  will  readily  understand  the  use 
of  the  vertical  clock-face  system  on  ground  which  is  roughly  a  hori- 
zontal surface.  (This  sketch  has  been  prepared  from  the  map  only, 
and  not  on  the  ground.  Defects  in  the  sketch  might  be  discovered 
by  a  visit  to  the  ground,  but  it  is  probably  correct  in  the  main  and 
serves  our  purpose.) 

When  the  arm  is  extended  full  length,  3  fingers  will  measure  one- 
tenth  of  the  range.  You  know  that  the  range  is  700  yards  and  you 
saw  signs  of  the  enemy  in  the  edge  of  the  corn  field  TO  yards  cast  of 
the  house.  If  you  had  seen  the  enemy  100  yards  east  of  the  house  the 
point  would  have  measured  4  or  4-J  fingers.  But  when  you  are  on  the 
ground  the  distance  in  fingers  is  determined  directly  by  trial  and  not 
by  the  arbitary  rule  that  wye  have  adopted  here. 

The  School  of  Musketry  has  evolved  a  very  simple  and  accurate 
method  of  using  the  rear  sight  leaf  of  the  rifle  instead  of  fingers  to 
indicate  distance  from  a  reference  point.  Naturally  we  use  the  system 
with  which  we  are  most  familiar. 


49 


96790°— 17- 


50 

Whenever  possible  you  should  indicate  the  two  ends  of  your  target 
in  order  that  your  men  may  distribute  their  fire  over  the  whole  target, 
but  in  the  present  case  it  is  impossible  to  do  so  and  open  fire  quickly. 
The  full  extent  of  the  target  is  not  yet  determined  and  you  must  trust 
to  luck  in  getting  distribution.  Later,  you  may  be  able  to  correct  this 
defect. 

If  there  had  been  good  cover  near  by  for  the  platoon  it  would  lui\v 
been  proper  to  break  into  double  time  at  the  first  volley  and  seize 
advantage  of  this  cover,  but  that  is  not  the  case  here. 

The  fact  that  you  deployed  and  opened  fire  does  not  mean  that  you 
intend  to  stay  here.  By  the  time  the  last  man  is  in  place  and  ready 
for  the  advance  it  would  be  well  to  whistle  "suspend  firing"  and 
quickly  judge  your  next  move. 

SITUATION  V. 

After  your  .platoon  has  been  firing  about  30  seconds  you  whistle 
"  suspend  firing."  Only  one  man,  "  Schafer,  has  been  wounded.  The 
support  appears  to  be  approaching  the  house  south  of  you  in  column 
of  squads.  The  enemy's  fire  continues  at  about  the  same  rate  as  be- 
fore, but  is  not  accurate.  The  point  is  in  the  ravine  in  front  of  you. 
The  road  parallel  to  your  front  is  about  10  feet  lower  than  the  tree 
tops  in  the  ravine  north  of  the  road. 

1.  What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

2.  What  are  your  orders? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

1.  I  intend  to  advance  to  the  road  by  a  rush ;  then  advance  in  quick 
time  to  the  north  side  of  the  wooded  ravine,  carefully  watching  both 
flanks. 

2.  I  blow  a  short  whistle  blast  and  signal- 
Cease  firing. 

Then  I  shout- 
Get  set. 

When  all  appear  to  be  ready,  I  jump  up,  shout- 
Follow  me — 
and  lead  the  platoon  at  a  run  toward  the  road. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  may  run  into  a  larger  Red  force  than  you  anticipated.  That 
remains  to  be  seen.  If  you  judge  their  strength  from  the  volume  of 
their  fire,  you  are  obliged  in  this  case  to  advance  almost  at  once. 


51 

Your  advance  may  prove  that  your  guess  as  to  the  hostile  strength 
is  wrong.  On  the  other  hand,  if  you  wait  for  the  support  to  help 
you  out  and  then  find  later  that  8  or  10  Reds  have  held  you  up,  you 
will  be  very  much  disappointed  with  yourself. 

Unless  the  enemy  increases  the  volume  or  effect  of  his  fire,  you 
should  have  no  difficulty  in  reaching  the  road  and  the  cover  of  the 
trees  in  the  ravine.  As  soon  as  the  trees  screen  you  from  the  enemy, 
he  will  have  no  target  to  aim  at.  From  this  point  you  can  safely 
advance  at  .a  rapid  walk  until  you  are  again  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
view.  This  will  be  when  you  have  arrived  some  distance  north  of 
the  ravine. 

The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  teach  that  fire  superiority  is 
necessary  to  the  successful  advance  of  an  attack.  This  is  not  literally 
true  in  the  case  of  every  small  detachment,  or  where  a  greatly  supe- 
rior force  is  peculiarly  favored  by  the  ground.  In  the  present  case 
the  defender's  fire  is  not  effective,  and  you  have  good  cover  a  short 
distance  in  front  of  you.  It  would  be  wrong  to  settle  down  into  a 
fire  fight  with  a  view  of  creating  a  powerful  moral  effect  on  the 
enemy  by  the  use  of  fire,  or  of  matching  your  fire  with  his.  When 
you  have  passed  the  ravine  and  are  again  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
fire  the  situation  may  be  different  because  of  the  open  ground  be- 
tween you  and  him. 

Whether  the  platoon  is  alone  or  deployed  as  part  of  the  company, 
Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (222)  require  you  to  arrange  carefully 
the  details  for  a  prompt  and  vigorous  execution  of  your  proposed 
rush.  You  are  told  to  cause  the  men  to  cease  firing  and  to  hold 
themselves  in  readiness  to  spring  forward  instantly.  No  preparatory 
command  or  signal  is  prescribed,  although  the  signal,  "  Cease  firing," 
and  the  caution,  "  Get  set,"  or  "  Ready,"  will  be  a  sufficient  indica- 
tion to  trained  men.  Furthermore,  you  will  not  jump  up  and  lead 
the  platoon  forward  until  you  and  your  guide  can  determine  from 
the  positions  of  the  men  that  all  are  ready  and  understand.  You 
should  teach  them  to  draw  up  one  knee  close  to  the  body  without 
raising  the  body  from  the  ground. 

When  you  signaled,  "  Cease  firing,"  the  men  were  already  in  the 
position  of  "  suspend  firing."  The  difference  between  the  two  is  that 
in  "  cease  firing  "  the  sights  are  laid  down,  the  men  are  not  required 
to  keep  their  eyes  on  the  target,  and  they  know  from  experience  that 
a  movement  or  change  in  formation  will  probably  follow. 

The  flanks  of  a  deployed  line  are  vulnerable.  If  there  are  few 
men  in  the  line,  men  can  not  be  spared  for  combat  patrols.  The 
commander  must  watch  his  flanks  very  closely  and  do  the  best  he  can 
without  sending  patrols  to  a  distance.  The  situation  also  affects  the 
question  of  flank  protection.  If  your  platoon  were  alone,  with  no 


52 

supporting  troops  near,  you  would  be  obliged  to  detach  men  to 
watch  your  flanks  in  an  attack  over  the  ground  on  which  we  are 
now  working.  In  the  present  case,  the  support  is  behind  you  and 
very  likely  has  patrols  on  the  flanks. 

Unless  Schafer's  wound  is  one  which  requires  immediate  action, 
which  is  rarely  the  case,  you  are  obliged  to  leave  him  by  the  side  of 
the  road,  without  an  attendant.  In  a  short  time  he  will  receive 
more  intelligent  care  from  the  sanitary  personnel.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  would  be  wrong  for  you  to  bother  about  him,  and  the 
men  nearest  to  him  could  do  no  more  than  help  him  to  a  convenient 
place,  unless  he  were  threatened  with  a  heavy  loss  of  blood.  When 
proper  medical  care  is  so  near  at  hand  it  is  not  wTell  to  tinker  with 
a  man,  and  it  is  wrong  to  decrease  your  fighting  strength  because 
of  any  undue  regard  for  his  comfort. 

SITUATION  VI.      - 

After  passing  the  608 — Herman  Road,  the  whole  platoon  advanced 
east  of  and  parallel  to  the  608 — Table  Rock  Road. 

The  platoon  has  now  arrived  400  yards  north  of  crossroad  608, 
between  the  orchard  and  road.  The  edge  of  the  cornfield  is  clearly 
visible.  There  are  no  signs  of  the  enemy.  The  point  is  in  the  edge 
of  the  cornfield,  west  of  the  road,  450  yards  north  of  crossroad  608. 
The  connecting  file  has  joined  the  platoon.  The  support  appears  to 
be  between  crossroad  608  and  the  wooded  ravine,  but  you  can  not 
see  whether  it  is  deployed  or  assembled. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 
I  order — 

Butler,  tell  the  point  to  continue  the  march  on  the  road ;  then  you  and 
Quinn  follow  again  at  100  yards  as  connecting  file. 

To  Corpl.  Clark: 

Your  squad  will  go  50  yards  into  the  cornfield,  about  where  the  enemy  was, 
and  search  for  dead  and  wounded.  Then  join  me  on  the  road. 

I  lead  the  remainder  of  the  platoon  in  skirmish  line  toward  the 
house,  with  the  intention  of  continuing  the  march  on  the  road  in 
platoon  column. 

DISCUSSION. 

A  small  body  of  hostile  troops  can  delay  our  column  by  firing 
upon  it,  no  matter  how  aggressively  we  handle  the  advance  guard 
work.  One  of  the  great  advantages  in  having  Cavalry  attached  to 
the  Infantry  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Cavalry  can  frequently  drive 
off  these  small  parties  without  delaying  the  Infantry  column.  If  our 


53 

battalion  had  had  even  a  half  troop  of  Cavalry  attached  to  it,  there 
probably  would  have  been  no  delay.  The  Cavalry  would  have  pre- 
ceded the  Infantry  by  considerable  distance  and,  by  trotting  ahead 
after  this  minor  fight,  would  have  regained  whatever  time  it  lost  by 
reason  of  the  fight. 

You  have  been  delayed  a  few  minutes,  however,  and  now,  having 
compelled  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  your  front,  it  is  urgent  that 
you  make  the  delay  as  short  as  possible.  It  does  not  se^m  necessary 
to  comment  upon  the  manner  in  which  this  was  done.  You  merely 
reestablish  your  advance  party  on  the  road  and  start  forward.  If  the 
point  were  not  conveniently  located,  you  would  probably  prefer  to 
send  out  a  new  point. 

There  is  a  twofold  reason  for  sending  Corpl.  Clark  into  the  corn- 
lield  in  search  of  dead  and  wounded.  It  may  be  possible  to  assist 
some  men  who  might  otherwise  escape  discovery  by  the  inhabitants 
and  thus  suffer  unnecessarily.  A  more  important  reason,  probably, 
is  the  fact  that  valuable  information  may  be  obtained,  not  only  from 
the  uniforms  and  pockets  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  but  also  by 
questioning  wounded  men  who  are  conscious.  If  it  involved  a  long 
detour,  you  would  not  send  a  patrol  on  such  mission,  with  such  lack 
of  evidence  as  to  whether  there  really  were  any  dead  or  wounded. 

SITUATION  VII. 

Corpl.  Clark's  squad  has  rejoined.    The  corporal  reported : 

I  found  a  wounded  cavalryman.  He  said  that  his  squadron  had  been  sent 
to  cut  the  railroad  and  had  fought  Blue  Infantry  this  morning.  I  brought  him 
to  the  road  and  left  Hagen  in  charge,  to  turn  him  over  to  the  captain. 

From  Table  Rock  S.  H.  you  saw  high  dust  south  of  Table  Rock, 
and  a  moment  later  you  caught  a  glimpse  of  8  or  10  mounted  men 
rapidly  riding  north  into  Table  Rock. 

You  reach  the  first  house  (south  end)  of  Table  Rock.  On  each 
side  of  the  road  there  is  a  broad  ditch  nearly  2  feet  deep.  A  stiff 
volley  comes  from  a  direction  squarely  to  the  left  of  you  and  from  a 
point  rather  close  to  you.  A  momentary  pause  follows. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  face  about,  shout,  "  Cover,"  and  jump  into  the  ditch  on  the  west  side  of 
the  road.    Then  I  look  for  the  enemy. 

DISCUSSION. 

While  you  were  marching  into  Table  Rock,  the  ditches  alongside 
of   the    road   certainly    attracted   your   attention    because    of   their 


54 

tactical  value.  In  a  former  situation,  we  said  you  would  study  the 
ground  as  you  marched.  Your  advance  party  is  likely  to  be  fired 
upon  from  any  direction.  The  troops  in  rear  of  you  will  be  saved 
from  such  annoyance  because  of  your  advance  party  marching  in 
front,  and  the  flank  patrols  that  the  support  will  send  out  from  time 
to  time.  In  a  large  command  the  advance  party  itself  will  receive 
better  protection  because  the  command  will  have  Cavalry,  and  this 
Cavalry  can  send  patrols  to  the  flanks  ahead  of  the  advance  party. 
While  approaching  Table  Rock  you  probably  thought  as  follows: 

If  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  front,  we'll  make  a  break  for  the  nearest 
houses ;  if  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  right,  we  will  jump  into  the  ditch  on  the 
right ;  if  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  left,  we  will  jump  into  the  ditch  on  the  left. 

In  other  words,  your  action  was  practically  decided  upon  before 
the  volley  was  fired.  This  is  not  always  possible,  but  with  practice 
in  field  exercises  you  will  find  that  you  will  rarely  be  caught  unpre- 
pared for  reasonably  quick  action. 

In  a  previous  situation  we  pointed  out  that  you  should  make  the 
platoon  do  exactly  as  you  wished.  You  can  not  do  so  if  you  are  in 
the  habit  of  attempting  impracticable  or  impossible  things.  Gener- 
ally, only  the  simplest  thing  will  work.  Your  men  look  instinctively 
to  you  the  instant  the  first  shot  is  fired,  unless  their  experience  has 
shown  them  that  you  get  rattled  and  that  they  have  to  shift  for 
themselves  until  you  pull  yourself  together.  In  the  present  case,  if 
you  jump  into  the  ditch  and  say  nothing,  the  men  will  probably 
follow  suit.  But  no  matter  how  obvious  may  be  the  necessity  for 
seeking  cover  at  once,  an  order  to  that  effect  gives  the  impression  of 
quick  thinking  and  decision.  To  act  properly  even  in  such  a  case 
trains  your  men  to  expect  orders  and  not  to  adopt  their  own  ideas. 
Sometimes,  when  the  natural  inclination  of  your  men  may  be  to  do 
one  thing,  you  may  have  a  very  good  reason  for  wanting  them  to  do 
something  else.  In  such  case,  if  your  men  have  learned  that  you 
never  fail  to  indicate  quickly  what  you  want  done,  their  eyes  and  ears 
will  expect  signals  and  orders,  and  you  will  have  their  attention  at 
once. 

Noncommissioned  officers  of  Infantry  and  Cavalry  are  often  sud- 
denly confronted  by  many  peculiar  and  novel  situations  requiring 
quick  and  decisive  action.  In  such  moments  they  need  the  strict 
attention  of  their  men,  but  they  will  not  receive  it  if  the  men  have 
discovered  that  it  is  wasted. 

In  a  sense,  the  enemy  has  surprised  you.  Let  the  men  get  the  best 
cover  available,  while  you  expose  yourself  only  enough  to  locate  the 
enemy  and  see  what  else  is  going  on.  One  of  the  disadvantages  of 
marching  in  platoon  column  is  the  mixing  of  the  platoon  which  re- 
sults when  the  right  half  crosses  the  road  and  joins  the  left  half. 


55 

This  could  be  avoided  by  signaling,  "As  skirmishers,  march,"  and 
facing  to  the  left,  thus  placing  the  right  half  of  the  platoon  on  the 
right.  However,  the  mixing  which  results  from  the  method-whlch 
we  have  adopted  affects  only  two  squads  and  can  be  straightened 
out  quickly.  We  shall  leave  it  this  way  for  the  purpose  of  the  next 
situation. 

If  you  march  along  the  road  and  estimate  that  the  danger  is 
greatest  on  one  or  both  flanks,  a  platoon  may  be  marched  in  platoon 
column,  but  broken  in  such  a  manner  that  one  squad  leads,  say, 
on  the  right  side  of  the  road;  the  next  squad  follows,  but  on  the 
left  of  the  road;  the  next  squad  on  the  right,  and  so  on.  Which- 
ever flank  the  platoon  faces,  squads  will  be  together  when  formed  in 
one  line  and  there  will  be  no  crowding.  When  you  reach  a  point 
on  the  road  where  the  greatest  danger  is  in  front,  it  will  only  be 
necessary  to  order,  "  Close  up,"  and  the  platoon  will  be  ready  for  a 
rapid  deployment  astride  the  road.  If  serious  danger  is  appre- 
hended, you  would  change  the  formation  as  the  direction  of  possible 
danger  changed. 

You  are  frequently  told  that  it  is  unpardonable  to  be  surprised. 
This  hardly  applies  to  patrols,  or  even  small  advance  parties.  It 
does  apply  to  your  battalion.  The  battalion  uses  the  point,  advance 
party,  and  flank  patrols  to  guard  itself  against  surprise,  but  these 
latter  detachments  can  not  always  avoid  surprise.  By  surprise  we 
mean,  in  the  present  case,  unforeseen  hostile  fire  at  effective  range. 

SITUATION  VIII. 

After  the  volley  the  enemy  fires  at  will.  There  are  probably  50 
rifles  firing  upon  you.  You  soon  realize  that  the  enemy  is  firing 
through  the  tops  of  the  trees  along  the  creek  northwest  of  you,  and 
therefore  not  very  accurately.  In  a  moment  you  see  between  these 
tree  tops  the  movements  of  several  men  who  are  firing  from  the  edge 
of  the  woods  500  yards  away  and  on  line  with  hill  651.  The  point 
has  previously  taken  the  left-hand  road  and  is  not  in  sight.  The 
support,  southwest  of  road  fork  567,  is  starting  to  deploy  into  the 
orchard.  All  this  has  happened  in  a  half  minute.  It  has  taken  you 
this  much  time  to  get  your  bearings  and  locate  the  enemy. 

What  do  vou  do? 


I  shout — 
Target — 
extend  my  arm  toward  the  woods  and  add — 

Look  sharply  up  the  slope.    Edge  of  woods.    Range,  500.    Fire  at  will. 
Then  I  resume  my  observation. 


56 

DISCUSSION. 

You  have  a  difficult  target  to  describe.  If  we  were  on  the  ground, 
we  might  find  some  conspicuous  object  to  assist  in  target  designation. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  might  see  as  little  as  we  see  on  the  map,  or 
even  less.  The  conditions  of  our  ordinary  fire  problems  are  generally 
too  ideal.  We  can  quickly  pick  up  the  limits  of  the  target.  The  view 
is  generally  unobstructed.  In  the  present  case  we  can  not  wait  to 
make  a  long  examination  and  explanation.  The  support  is  deploying 
with  the  intention  of  attacking.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  advance  party 
to  attract  to  itself  as  much  of  the  enemy's  attention  and  fire  as 
possible.  Hence  the  advance  party  should  fire  as  soon  as  it  locates  a 
part,  if  not  all,  of  the  enemy's  force.  All  that  you  can  do  for  the 
present  is  to  direct  the  attention  of  your  men  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods.  Every  man  must  find  for  himself  an  opening  through  the 
tree  tops  and  fire  upon  whatever  men  he  sees  through  his  opening. 
Each  man's  view  will  be  different.  None  will  see  much.  This  is  no 
time  to  bother  with  fire  distribution.  Firing  exercises  teach  sound 
principles  of  command  and  execution.  You  will  apply  these  princi- 
ples whenever  you  can.  When,  in  your  judgment,  the  situation  makes 
it  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  indicate  the  limits  and  to 
expect  fire  distribution,  do  not  fool  away  valuable  time  in  a  useless 
effort  to  be  perfect,  but  tackle  your  job  in  the  simplest  and  most 
practical  way  that  occurs  to  you.  This  advice,  however,  should  not 
.be  made  an  excuse  for  failing  to  be  more  definite  and  exact  when 
time  and  conditions  permit. 

In  a  previous  situation  the  advance  party  alone  drove  out  the 
enemy.  It  is  evident  it  can  not  do  so  now.  The  volume  of  the  enemy's 
fire  has  caused  the  support  commander  to  see  the  situation  in  the 
same  light.  The  support  is  therefore  preparing  to  assist  you  in  driv- 
ing the  enemy  out  or  in  determining  his  exact  strength  and  position. 
The  most  decisive  results  will  come  from  the  action  of  the  support. 
The  more  you  can  attract  the  enemy  to  the  advance  party  the  easier 
will  it  be  for  the  support  when  finally  it  is  able  to  open  fire  and  push 
its  attack. 

You  might  be  tempted  to  advance  at  once  under  whatever  cover  is 
offered  by  the  trees  along  the  creek,  but  you  will  not  gain  time  by 
doing  so,  and  when  the  support  opens  fire  the  advance  will  be  much 
easier. 

SITUATION  IX. 

Four  minutes  after  you  opened  fire,  the  right  flank  of  the  support 
appeared  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  orchard  (west  of  road  fork 
567).  The  left  flank  seems  to  be  west  of  the  creek.  The  point  is 


57 

north  of  you,  at  the  house  nearest  the  bridge.  You  have  not  seen 
the  main  body.  The  enemy  has  been  firing  steadily  upon  your  ad- 
vance party.  His  fire,  like  your  own,  has  been  interfered  with"  by 
trees  along  the  creek.  One  man  on  your  left  seems  to  be  wounded. 
You  are  about  in  the  center  of  the  platoon.  A  moment  later  the 
support  opens  a  vigorous  fire.  Another  moment,  and  the  fire  upon 
your  advance  party  is  reduced  by  half. 

The  field  in  front  of  you  is  flat.  The  brush  along  the  creek  is  head 
high,  but  does  not  reach  the  foliage  of  the  trees  by  6  feet. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 


I  intend  to  advance  to  the  creek  at  once.  The  platoon  being  some- 
what mixed,  I  will  send  forward,  first,  the  men  on  my  right,  then  the 
men  on  my  left.  If  cover  all  the  way  to  the  creek  is  not  good,  the 
advance  will  be  made  in  two  "  hitches." 

Disctrssiox. 

We  have  purposely  thrown  on  you  the  full  responsibility  for  han- 
dling the  platoon.  W"e  think  that  ordinarily  you  would  receive  from 
the  captain  some  instructions  or  hints  to  guide  your  actions.  On  the 
other  hand,  you  will  often  be  called  upon  to  act  on  your  own  re- 
sponsibility, without  any  intimation  as  to  what  the  captain  desires. 
When  this  happens,  you  should  comply  with  the  spirit  of  paragraphs 
372  and  373,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations. 

The  attack  by  our  company  or  battalion  will  be  without  result 
unless  we  close  on  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  the  support  gets  into  ac- 
tion and  the  effect  of  its  fire  is  felt  by  the  enemy,  your  waiting  game 
ceases.  From  this  point  you  should  not  hold  back  unless  an  advance 
is  impossible. 

It  is  over  200  yards  to  the  creek.  There  is  a  6-foot  strip  of  day- 
light between  the  brush  and  the  foliage  of  the  trees.  From  the  road 
you  can  not  tell  what  the  effect  of  this  strip  will  be  on  your  advance. 
Your  first  real  halt  will  be  at  the  creek.  Any  intermediate  halt  that 
may  be  necessary  will  be  made  only  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the 
enemy  under  fire  while  the  platoon  covers  long,  exposed  stretches  (if 
you  find  any)  by  rushes,  or  to  save  the  men  from  the  fatigue  of  a 
long,  continuous,  rapid  advance. 

We  would  not  recommend  an  attempt  to  advance  by  the  road  and 
the  two  bridges  north  of  you.  The  men  would  have  to  slip  to  the 
right,  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view  and  fire.  Unless  the  long  way 
around  has  some  special  advantage,  the  short  way  is  the  better. 


58 

Sergt.  Hill,  in  command  of  the  point,  seems  to  understand  that  it 
is  necessary  for  him  to  watch  your  right  flank.  He  appears  to  have 
taken  over  the  duties  of  a  combat  patrol.  As  long  as  his  action  and 
movements  are  satisfactory,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  give  him 
any  orders. 

The  preparation,  orders,  and  signals  for  an  advance  by  rushes  will 
be  considered  more  in  detail  in  another  problem. 

The  next  change  in  the  situation  will  make  your  platoon  a  combat 
patrol.  This  will  be  made  the  subject  of  the  problem  which  follows. 


FIFTH  PROBLEM. 


A  COMBAT  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

"Reconnaissance  continues  throughout  the  action.  A  firing  or 
skirmish  line  can  take  care  of  its  front,  but  its  flanks  are  especially 
vulnerable  to  modern  firearms.  The  moral  effect  of  flanking  fire  is 
as  great  as  the  physical  effect.  Hence,  combat  patrols  to  give  warn- 
ing or  covering  detachments  to  give  security  are  indispensable  on 
exposed  flanks.  This  is  equally  true  in  attack  or  defense."  (I.  D.  R. 
396.) 

By  a  careful  reading  of  the  paragraph  quoted,  you  conclude  that  if 
the  force  sent  out  on  the  exposed  flank  is  so  small  that  it  can  only  give 
warning,  it  is  called  a  combat  patrol.  If  it  is  large  enough  to  offer 
resistance,  it  is  called  a  covering  detachment.  The  distinction  in 
name  is  unimportant.  For  convenience,  all  bodies  sent  to  an  exposed 
flank  to  warn  or  resist  are  called  combat  patrols  unless  they  are  quite 
large.  If  a  regiment  is  fighting  alone,  the  colonel  may  send  a  com- 
pany to  an  exposed  flank  and  call  it  the  right  (or  left)  flank  detach- 
ment. If  a  brigade  is  fighting  alone,  the  same  company  may  be  sent 
to  an  exposed  flank  and  may  be  called  preferably  a  combat  patrol.  In 
practice,  it  is  partly  a  matter  of  relative  size,  and  partly  a  matter  of 
taste  and  convenience.  The  important  thing  is  to  know  that  the  de- 
tachment, whether  it  is  called  a  combat  patrol  or  a  covering  detach- 
ment, will  resist  if  it  is  strong  enough,  but  in  every  case  it  will  give 
early  warning  and  full  information. 

The  size  of  a  combat  patrol  depends  upon  a  great  many  things  that 
need  not  be  discussed  in  connection  with  the  present  problem.  It  may 
consist  of  only  two  men.  It  is  conceivable  that  in  some  cases  one 
man,  favorably  located  to  observe  and  signal,  would  make  a  satisfac- 
tory combat  patrol. 

SITUATION  I. 

This  is  a  continuation  of  the  last  situation  of  the  preceding 
problem. 

Your  advance  party  is  now  on  the  north  side  of  the  creek,  200 
yards  west  of  the  bridge.  The  support  is  on  your  left,  250  yards 

(59) 


60 

away,  but  moving  north  toward  the  woods.  Firing  has  ceased.  The 
enemy  has  disappeared,  evidently  having  mounted  up  behind  the 
woods  and  galloped  toward  632.  The  point  is  on  the  bridge.  Your 
former  connecting  file  is  with  the  platoon.  As  you  start  to  move  for- 
ward, the  battalion  adjutant  arrives  and  says  to  you : 

Red  Cavalry  has  driven  Company  E  a  mile  north  of  Biglerville,  but  Com- 
pany E  is  still  fighting.  Most  of  the  Red  Cavalry  seems  to  be  between  here  and 
Biglerville,  probably  in  position  1  mile  northwest  of  us.  The  battalion  is  going 
to  attack  at  once  in  the  direction  of  Biglerville.  Take  your  platoon  to  the  top 
of  that  hill  (pointing  to  hill  646)  as  a  combat  patrol 

1.  What  do  you  think? 

2.  What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 

3.  What  orders  do  you  give  up  to  the  time  you  reach  the  vicinity  of 
553,  assuming  no  change  in  the  situation  ? 


1.  Combat  patrol  on  that  hill.    I  may  have  to  fight  to  get  the  hill. 
My  left  flank  is  secure  enough.    As  I  march  to  the  hill  I  shall  need  a 
patrol  in  front  and  another  on  the  right  flank.    Better  keep  off  the 
road  and  be  ready  to  deploy. 

2.  I  intend  to  march  by  the  right  flank  to  the  road;  to  send  the 
original  point  forward  by  the  shortest  route  to  the  top  of  the  spur 
250  yards  northeast  of  road  -fork  553,  and  thence  along  the  crest  to 
hill  646;  to  send  another  patrol  of  three  men  northeast  toward  the 
cast  base  of  the  spur,  and  thence  to  the  top  of  the  spur,  to  a  point 
probably  300  yards  northeast  of  road  fork  553,  from  which  the  patrol 
can  observe  the  country  to  the  east  and  northeast  and  at  the  same 
time  signal  to  me.    Then  I  intend  to  restore  the  organization  of  the 
platoon  and  march  on  the  right  of  the  road  and  parallel  to  it. 

3.  I  command, 

By  the  right  Hank,  march — 

and  march  at  the  head  of  the  column  toward  the  sharp  turn  in  the 
road. 

I  signal  the  point  to  join  me,  and  then  give  the  following  order 
to  Sergt.  Hill  and  Corpl.  Koenig: 

Company  E  is  still  fighting  somewhere  north  of  Biglerville,  in  that  direction 
(pointing).  The  enemy  will  probably  put  up  a  fight  a  mile  from  here  on  that 
high  ground  (pointing  to  the  northwest)  between  here  and  Biglerville.  Our 
battalion  will  attack  at  once  toward  Biglerville.  This  platoon  is  the  combat 
patrol  on  the  right  flank.  We  are  going  to  that  hill  (646).  Sergt.  Hill,  march 
your  point  at  once  to  the  top  of  that  spur  (pointing  to  the  spur  northeast 
of  road  fork  553),  then  along  the  spur  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  Corpl.  Koenig, 
take  two  men  and  patrol  through  those  woods  (pointing  to  the  woods  south- 
east of  road  fork  553).  Make  a  loop  to  the  north  and  west  so  as  to  see  the 
country  to  the  northeast,  and  then  halt  on  the  top  of  the  spur  where  you  can 
see  the  country  to  the  east  and  northeast  and  at  the  same  time  see  me.  The 
platoon  will  march  in  the  fields  along  the  right  of  the  road. 


61 

Then  I  march  to  the  first  house  north  of  the  bridge,  assemble  the 
platoon,  restore  its  organization,  and  give  the  following  orders : 

The  enemy  is  probably  on  that  high  ground  and  a  mile  northwest,  of  here. 
Company  E  is  fighting  farther  north.  Our  battalion  is  going  to  attack.  Our 
platoon  is  the  combat  patrol  on  the  right  flank  of  the  battalion.  We  are  going 
to  that  hill.  Corpl.  Clark,  platoon  guide.  Towney,  fall  out  and  march  so 
as  to  be  able  to  see  me  and  at  the  same  time  see  the  battalion,  if  possible,  but 
keep  within  100  yards  of  the  platoon.  As  skirmishers,  march.  Platoon  column, 
march. 

I  lead  the  platoon  through  the  cornfield,  marching  about  30  yards 
from  the  fence  and  keeping  about  150  yards  in  rear  of  the  point. 

DISCUSSION. 

Our  purpose  in  asking,  "  What  do  you  think?  "  is  to  encourage  you 
to  settle  clearly  in  your  mind,  when  time  permits,  the  salient  points 
that  will  influence  your  intentions  and  orders  before  taking  action 
and  issuing  orders. 

The  enemy  is  not  likely  to  leave  such  an  excellent  observation 
point  as  hill  646  without  a  patrol  on  it.  This  is  particularly  true 
when  the  enemy's  force  consists  of  cavalry,  as  in  this  case.  Because 
of  its  mobility,  cavalry  sends  patrols  longer  distances  from  its  main 
body.  Therefore,  you  may  be  obliged  to  fight  for  possession  of  hill 
646.  It  is  possible  that  you  may  find  the  hostile  force  on  the  hill 
too  strong  for  you ;  but  this  fact,  if  you  find  it  to  be  a  fact,  becomes 
very  important  information  for  our  battalion  commander.  The  at- 
tack of  the  battalion,  as  planned,  might  then  become  impracticable. 
Therefore,  your  conclusion  must  be  that  it  is  your  duty  to  attack 
any  force  that  you  find  near  hill  646  in  order  to  drive  it  out  quickly, 
if  possible,  or  failing  in  this,  then  to  fight  vigorously  enough  to  learn 
its  strength  and  position. 

A  march  in  skirmish  line  would  cause  unnecessary  fatigue  and 
disorder.  Even  if  such  a  formation  were  a  justifiable  excuse  for 
dispensing  with  a  point,  which  is  doubtful  in  this  case,  it  would 
still  necessitate  the  flank  patrol.  Under  the  circumstances  it  is 
better  to  march  in  a  platoon  column  with  proper  protection. 

All  bodies  of  troops  marching  in  the  actual  or  probable  presence 
of  an  enemy  must  protect  themselves  from  surprise.  The  number 
and  strength  of  these  covering  detachments,  or  patrols,  as  the  case 
may  be,  vary  according  to  the  strength  of  the  whole  force,  the  immi- 
nence and  nature  of  the  danger,  and  the  ground.  A  detachment 
sent  out  to  cover  (protect)  a  force  will  generally  have  its  own  cover- 
ing detachments.  For  example,  your  platoon  is  a  covering  detach- 
ment (combat  patrol)  for  the  battalion,  but  you  also  must  have  your 
own  covering  detachments.  Therefore,  you  have  a  point  and  a  right 
flank  patrol,  not  counting  Towney,  who  is  merely  to  keep  you  in 
communication  with  the  battalion  if  possible.  Furthermore,  Sergt. 


62 

Hill  will  probably  march  with  one  man  in  front  of  him  and  one  man 
on  his  right,  while  he  and  another  man  form  what  might  be  called 
the  main  body  of  the  point. 

In  view  of  the  short  distance  to  your  destination,  it  would  be 
unwise  to  march  on  the  road.  There  is  an  even  chance  that  you  will 
draw  fire  from  the  vicinity  of  hill  646.  By  marching  in  the  fields 
your  men  can  deploy  quickly  without  running  into  fences.  Further- 
more, as  you  approach  hill  646  you  will  naturally  want  to  reach 
the  higher  ground  east  of  the  road  so  as  to  be  on  fairly  even  terms 
with  your  enemy,  if  you  meet  one. 

You  did  not  prescribe  a  distance  between  the  point  and  the  platoon. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  point  would  take  a  route  somewhat 
different  from  your  own.  It  is  necessary  for  Sergt.  Hill  to  reach  the 
top  of  the  spur  quickly  and  march  along  the  crest  in  order  to  see  to- 
ward the  northeast.  The  platoon,  on  the  other  hand,  should  march 
under  cover  of  this  spur,  but  close  enough  to  the  crest  to  occupy  it  in 
case  of  necessity.  Furthermore,  you  are  now  guiding  on  the  point 
(not  vice  versa,  as  in  the  fourth  problem)  and  may  vary  your  dis- 
tance from  time  to  time. 

The  platoon  should  be  checked  up  and  organization  should  be  re- 
stored as  often  as  necessary  and  possible,  but  it  is  best  to  do  so  under 
safe  cover,  as,  for  example,  the  house  selected.  The  house  has  the 
probable  further  advantage  of  a  water  supply  for  your  men.  How- 
ever, you  would  lose  time  if  you  attended  to  this  matter  first.  Hence, 
you  would  first  send  out  the  necessary  patrols  and  as  they  are  gain- 
ing their  distances  you  would  assemble  the  platoon  and  prepare  for 
the  forward  movement. 

For  reasons  of  your  own  you  have  again  sent  the  platoon  guide  in 
command  of  the  point.  The  senior  corporal  should  be  designated  as 
platoon  guide  for  that  part  of  the  platoon  which  remains  directly 
under  your  command.  In  this  connection,  you  may  be  curious  to 
know  why  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  give  the  platoon  leader  an 
assistant  who  is  second  in  command  while  the  captain  has  none. 
When  a  company  deploys  the  captain  gives  his  commands,  orders, 
and  signals  to  platoon  leaders  only.  If  he  passed  over  these  leaders 
and  tried  to  handle  15  or  16  squads  in  battle  his  control  would  fail 
oftener  than  it  would  succeed.  If  he  tried  to  handle  every  man 
directly  matters  would  be  still  worse;  the  line  is  too  long  and  the 
excitement  and  noise  are  too  great.  A  platoon  is  small  enough  to 
permit  the  observation  and  control  of  individuals;  hence  all  com- 
mands, orders,  and  signals  intended  for  individuals,  or  squads,  or 
the  platoon  as  a  whole,  are  given  by  the  platoon  leader.  Only  the 
general  movements  and  actions  of  the  platoon  are  indicated  by  the 
captain  to  the  platoon  leader.  This  throws  on  the  platoon  leader  the 
necessity  for  watching  to  the  front  and  rear,  and  sometimes  the  flank, 


63 

and  studying  the  situation  with  a  view  to  planning  future  action. 
Some  one  must  observe  the  men  in  the  line  in  order  to  preserve  con- 
trol, discipline,  and  steadiness.  The  platoon  leader  can  not  do  both. 
The  guide,  or  second  in  command,  is  the  watchman  and  disciplinarian. 
If  the  company  is  so  small  that  the  captain  chooses  to  handle  it  as  a 
single  platoon  (I.  D.  R.  166),  the  function  of  watchman  and  discipli- 
narian passes  to  the  lieutenants  and  first  sergeant.  There  will  always 
be  a  first  sergeant  or  acting  first  sergeant  available.  To  follow  out 
the  principles  explained  above  the  platoon,  whether  with  the  com- 
pany or  acting  alone,  must  always  have  a  platoon  guide.  In  battle 
or  skirmish  you  will  quickly  see  the  advantage  of  this  firm  control, 
an  advantage  that  may  not  be  so  apparent  in  peacetime  exercises. 

SITUATION  II. 

When  }rou  restored  the  organization  of  the  platoon  (that  is,  re- 
formed the  squads  and  checked  up  your  men)  you  found  that  Schafer, 
Stone,  and  Wilson  were  missing.  Schafer  was  wounded  in  the  first 
skirmish.  Their  squad  leaders  tell  you  that  Stone  and  Wilson  were 
wounded  in  the  skirmish  just  ended. 

You  are  now  at  the  head  of  the  platoon  column  and  150  yards  north 
of  road  fork  553.  You  can  see  only  the  chimney  of  the  house  on 
hill  646.  The  point  is  about  150  yards  north  of  you  and  100  yards 
east  of  the  road,  but  is  momentarily  lost  to  view.  You  see  a -few 
Blues  about  200  yards  south  of  hill  651,  but  there  is  no  firing  in  that 
direction.  Five  or  six  rifles  open  fire  from  the  vicinity  of  hill  646; 
a  moment  later  you  hear  your  point  open  fire. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  command  and  signal — 
As  skirmishers,  2  paces,  march, 

and  continue  the  advance  at  a  fast  walk,  preceding  the  platoon  so  as 
to  get  an  early  view  of  the  ground  around  hill  646. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  have  some  yards  to  go  before  you  reach  the  secondary  ridge 
which  the  road  crosses  about  200  yards  north  of  road  fork  553.  When 
you  reach  the  crest  of  this  ridge  you  may  be  fired  upon,  but,  more 
important  than  this,  you  will  be  able  to  return  the  fire  and  start  an 
attack.  Skirmish  line  should  therefore  be  formed  before  the  platoon 
is  exposed. 

You  have  now  only  20  men  in  your  skirmish  line.  At  2  paces 
interval  these  men  will  form  a  line  about  45  yards  long.  The  normal 


64 

firing  line  should  hold  about  one  man  to  each  yard  of  front.  But  this 
applies  to  firing  lines  of  larger  forces,  where  there  is  only  a  certain 
amount  of  front  available  or  usable  and  it  is  necessary  to  place  along 
that  front  as  many  rifles  as  possible.  When  we  deal  with  a  platoon 
or  less,  and  sometimes  a  company  or  more,  there  is  an  advantage  in 
making  a  line  longer  and  thinner  (that  is,  less  than  one  man  per 
yard).  It  may  sometimes  reduce  the  vulnerability  of  our  line,  con- 
sidered as  a  target,  and  permit  better  cover  for  individuals.  It  may 
enable  us  to  point  more  rifles  on  our  own  target,  particularly  where 
the  ground  is  broken  or  the  enemy  has  good  cover  and  is  shifting  a 
great  deal.  But  when  you  intentionally  make  your  firing  line  longer 
you  must  adhere  strictly  to  two  principles :  First,  the  line  must  not  be 
too  long  for  easy  control ;  second,  the  line  must  not  be  made  so  long 
that  the  end  rifles  can  not  get  on  your  target. 

When  the  platoon  is  in  skirmish  line  your  post  is  in  front  during  a 
rush  or  charge;  otherwise,  it  is  in  rear  of  the  center,  unless  you  have  a 
reason  for  going  elsewhere.  In  the  present  case  you  precede  the 
platoon,  if  only  by  a  few  yards,  in  order  to  be  the  first  to  see  over 
tl\e  ridge.  In  this  connection  see  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  369, 
second  section. 

SITUATION  III. 

After  a  short,  sharp  fire  fight  you  drove  a  hostile  patrol  away  from 
hill  646  and  reached  the  farmyard  in  skirmish  line.1  Apparently  two 
of  our  companies  are  in  skirmish  line,  halted  astride  the  road  between 
Gainer  and  crossroad  632.  A  moment  ago  some  one  near  Gainer  took 
your  semaphore  message  reporting  progress.  The  same  person  sig- 
naled : 

Enemy  in  position  half  mile  west  of  here. 

One  man  of  Corpl.  Koenig's  patrol  is  in  sight,  halted  about  300 
yards  northeast  of  road  fork  553.  Sergt.  Hill's  point  joined  the 
platoon  during  the  advance,  the  high  corn  offering  sufficient  tem- 
porary right-flank  protection.  There  has  been  no  firing  anywhere 
since  you  ceased  firing.  There  seems  to  be  a  Red  patrol  near  647. 
(Walinski  was  wounded  when  the  point  was  first  fired  upon,  but  he 
was  able  to  walk.  You  sent  him  to  Hirst,  alone.) 

How  do  you  post  the  combat  patrol  ? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  place  3  men  at  the  646  farmhouse  or  barn  to  post  themselves  high 
enough  to  see  the  647  ridge,  to  see  the  Benders  Church  ridge  beyond 

1  In  this  and  following  problems  it  will  be  necessary  to  pass  over  many  important 
and  interesting  phases  in  this  manner,  in  order  to  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  situations 
more  or  less  alike.  The  object  of  these  problems  is  to  present  a  variety  of  situations 
rather  than  all  the  situations  confronting  a  particular  command.  Naturally,  company 
commanders  will  use  the  method  that  best  suits  their  purpose. 


65 

the  cornfield,  to  see  Corpl.  Koenig's  signalman,  and  to  signal  toward 
Gainer.  I  send  2  men  to  the  bend  in  the  road  300  yards  southwest 
of  crossroad  600.  The  rest  of  the  platoon  marches  into  the  field  west 
of  hill  646,  concealed  by  the  corn,  and  advances  toward  600  until  a 
line  facing  600  is  shortened  to  about  30  yards  by  the  fences  along  the 
roads.  The  corn  in  front,  as  far  as  the  fences,  is  trampled  down  so 
as  to  give  firing  positions  for  the  platoon  to  fire  upon  hill  647  and 
the  fields  southwest  of  it.  The  platoon  then  conceals  itself  by  falling 
back  about  5  yards  into  the  standing  corn.  A  man  on  the  left  flank 
is  detailed  to  watch  toward  the  patrol  southwest  of  crossroad  600  and 
along  the  road  to  Benders  Church.  A  man  on  the  right  flank  is 
detailed  to  watch  the  patrol  at  hill  646.  I  remain  near  the  edge  of 
the  standing  corn  so  as  to  observe  the  647  ridge  and  to  the  northwest 
and  west. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  difficult  to  post  a  small  command  with  the  aid  of  a  map  only. 
A  visit  to  the  ground  may  prove  that  your  solution  is  by  no  means 
the  best.  A  map  does  not  show  the  minor  accidents  of  ground  and 
cultivation  that  are  most  useful  to  a  small  force.  However,  the 
solution  will  serve  our  purpose,  which  is  to  show  the  relation  of  the 
combat  patrol  to  the  battalion  and  what  the  patrol  should  be 
prepared  to  do. 

Apparently  the  battalion  is  making  careful  preparations  for  its 
attack.  The  enemy  is  very  likely  along  the  edge  of  the  cornfield, 
about  600  yards  west  of  crossroad  632.  Firing  may  begin  while  you 
are  still  making  the  dispositions  mentioned  in  the  solution.  Even- 
tually the  right  flank  of  the  battalion  may  reach  the  patch  of  woods 
north  of  crossroad  632.  You  can  see  that  this  flank  of  the  battalion 
is  exposed  to  attack  from  the  ridge  that  extends  from  hill  647  south- 
west to  the  cornfield  600  yards  west  of  crossroads  600.  A  counter- 
attack from  this  direction  is  especially  to  be  provided  against  in  the 
present  case,  since  the  enemy's  force  consists  of  Cavalry.  Your  task, 
then,  is  to  protect  this  flank,  by  defensive  action  if  possible,  but 
by  ample  warning  at  all  events.  This  is  the  most  important  area  to 
be  watched.  Other  areas  that  require  watching  are  the  ravine 
between  the  647  ridge  and  the  600 — Benders  Church  Road,  the 
Benders  Church  Ridge,  and  (particularly  since  the  hostile  force  con- 
sists of  Cavalry)  the  various  roads  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
east  of  hill  646. 

Your  patrol  of  three  men  on  hill  646  can  see  the  Guernsey — 610 — 
Biglerville  Road,  from  hill  647,  south  of  Guernsey,  as  far  as  the 
orchard  700  yards  southwest  of  road  fork  610,  and  much  of  the 
intervening  ground.  This  patrol  is  almost  certain  to  see  any  large 
force  that  may  enter  the  ravine  between  the  two  647  hills.  It  can 
96790—17 5 


66 

see  almost  a  mile  along  the  Benders  Church  Ridge.  Tt  can  receive 
and  transmit  signals  from  and  to  Corpl.  Koenig  and  the  battalion 
commander.  It  can  also  see  the  632 — 626 — Biglerville  Road  almost 
to  Biglerville.  Corpl.  Koenig's  patrol  can  see  almost  a  mile  to  the 
northeast,  east,  and  southeast.  Your  patrol  of  two  men,  300  yards 
west  of  crossroads  600,  is  less  important,  but  is  desirable  on  account 
of  the  small  area  north  of  the  600 — 632  road  not  otherwise  visible, 
and  because  you  may  not  otherwise  maintain  connection  with  the 
right  flank  of  the  battalion  firing  line.  Personally,  you  can  see  the 
ridge  from  which  a  counterattack  is  most  to  be  feared. 

The  platoon  is  posted  so  as  to  open  fire  quickly  on  the  ridge  just 
mentioned.  From  its  present  position  it  can  also  stop  an  advance 
by  way  of  the  ravine  southeast  of  647  ridge,  although  the  men  in 
this  case  may  have  to  change  their  firing  positions.  The  platoon  is 
not  in  position  to  stop  an  advance  along  the  Benders  Church  Ridge. 
It  can  not  be  in  two  places  at  the  same  time  without  being  divided. 
It  is  better  to  place  the  whole  platoon  to  cover  the  most  probable 
area  of  danger,  while  other  areas  are  closely  watched,  so  that  the 
platoon  may  be  shifted  in  time  if  need  be. 

If  well  posted,  the  20  rifles  now  immediately  under  your  com- 
mand can  stop  at  least  a  troop  of  Cavalry,  and  possibly  more,  in  a 
mounted  or  dismounted  attack  against  the  flank  of  the  battalion. 
The  firing  line  position  that  you  selected  is  10  or  15  feet  higher 
than  the  crossroads  at  600.  Therefore,  the  cornfield  which  is  west  of 
the  crossroads  presents  little  or  no  obstacle  to  effective  fire  toward 
the  ridge.  The  obstruction  due  to  the  houses  can  only  be  overcome 
by  posting  the  men  on  the  ground.  The  details  are  too  minute  to  be 
indicated  on  the  map. 

You  are  not  likely  to  remain  long  in  your  present  position.  A 
combat  patrol  must  conform  in  a  general  way  to  the  movements  of 
the  force  it  protects.  Until  our  battalion  approaches  the  house  300 
yards  northwest  of  632,  you  can  not  improve  your  present  location. 
It  is  too  early  to  decide  upon  your  next  move.  You  may  get  orders 
on  the  subject,  or  the  attack  may  assume  an  unforeseen  course  or 
extension. 

There  is  no  present  necessity  for  firing  on  the  Red  patrol  near 
647  ridge.  It  is  enough  to  report  it  presence  to  the  battalion  com- 
mander. Neither  is  it  advisable  to  drive  the  patrol  off  by  an  attack. 
A  few  men  might  not  be  able  to  do  so,  and  the  whole  platoon  has 
more  important  work  elsewhere. 

The  dispositions  of  your  platoon  are  probably  not  as  simple  as 
would  be  the  case  in  an  average  combat  patrol  situation.  This  is 
partly  due  to  the  cornfield  and  the  conformation  of  the  ground  and 
partly  to  the  fact  that  the  hostile  force  consists  of  cavalry. 


67 

SITUATION  IV. 

It  turned  out  that  there  were  very  few  Reds  in  the  edge  of  the 
cornfield  600  yards  west  of  crossroads  632.  Before  the  firing  line  of 
the  battalion  advanced,  reconnaissance  disclosed  the  fact  that  the 
enemy's  main  force  was  concealed  in  the  high  corn  600  yards  west 
of  crossroads  600,  and  would  probably  defend  the  edge  of  that  field. 
At  least  that  is  what  a  mounted  orderly  told  you  when  he  arrived 
and  handed  you  the  following  message: 

GAINER  FARMHOUSE, 

4  Sept.,  11.50  p.  m. 
SERGT.  HOLMES  : 

Battalion  attacks  cornfield  west  of  your  hill.  Move  patrol  half  mile  north  to 
high  ground. 

CROSBY,  Major. 

1.  What  orders  do  you  give? 

2.  Indicate  your  route  to  the  new  position. 


1.  To  the  nearest  corporal : 

Adams,  the  platoon  is  going  to  that  hill  (647)  by  way  of  its  east  slope  and 
close  to  the  road.  Take  three  men  as  point  and  go  to  that  barn  (west  side  of 
the  road ) .  March  so  as  to  observe  to  the  north  and  west. 

To  the  man  on  the  left  flank  of  the  platoon : 
Signal  "  assemble  "  to  the  patrol  on  your  flank. 
I  write  the  following  on  a  piece  of  paper : 

OORPL.   KOENIG  ! 

Platoon  goes  600  yards  north.  Move  your  patrol  600  yards  due  north  to  top 
of  ridge.  Watch  road  as  before. 

HOLMES,  1st  Sergt. 

To  the  platoon : 

By  the  right  flank,  march. 

To  Willis,  while  the  platoon  is  crossing  the  road : 

Go  to  that  house  and  find  Kelley.  Tell  him  to  join  me  with  his  patrol. 
Then  go  to  Corpl.  Koenig  and  give  him  this.  Stay  with  his  patrol.  Repeat. 

2.  East  across  the  road;  then  north  in  platoon  column,  marching 
just  far  enough  down  the  slope  of  the  647  ridge  to  escape  observa- 
tion from  the  west. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  must  not  expect  every  message  to  be  exact  in  its  reference  to 
places.  Eef erring  to  Maj.  Crosby's  message,  you  find  that  there 
are  two  cornfields  west  of  crossroads  600.  One  of  them  is  just  across 
the  road  from  your  position.  The  major  must  mean  the  other  one. 


68 

Also,  if  you  look  due  north  from  i;  your  hill "  and  measure  one-half 
mile  by  eye  you  will  not  find  suitable  high  ground  there.  Your 
common  sense,  however,  tells  you  that  the  major  has  in  mind  the 
high  ground  at  G47  ridge.  Messages  should  be  as  exact  as  it  is  pos-  | 
sible  to  make  them;  but  in  interpreting  a  message,  allowance  must 
be  made  for  the  impossibility  of  always  making  them  exact. 

The  only  other  new  point  that  comes  up  in  this  situation  is  the 
sending  of  the  message  to  Corpl.  Koenig.  This  message  is  too  long 
to  be  given  verbally  by  messenger.  If  you  sent  it  to  Corpl.  Koenig 
by  semaphore  you  would  either  have  to  leave  the  platoon  for  awhile 
and  go  to  the  farmhouse  to  send  it,  or  write  the  message  and  send  it 
to  the  farmhouse  to  be  semaphored  to  Corpl.  Koenig.  You  can  not 
leave  the  platoon ;  therefore,  you  must  write  the  message,  no  matter 
how  you  transmit  it.  Having  written  it,  it  is  just  as  simple  and 
much  surer  to  send  it  to  the  corporal  by  messenger. 

You  will  never  know  whether  your  messenger  understands  what 
you  want  him  to  do  unless  you  make  him  repeat  his  instructions. 
Even  then  you  will  not  let  him  go  unless  or  until  he  repeats  these 
instructions  in  a  manner  which  convinces  you  that  he  understands. 

It  is  better  to  have  Willis  remain  with  the  patrol  than  to  have  him 
wandering  around  looking  for  the  platoon.  Later,  when  you  are  in 
signal  communication  with  Corpl.  Koenig  across  the  ravine  you  can 
recall  Willis  if  it  is  desirable  to  do  so. 

You  may  prefer  to  have  Corp.  Koenig's  patrol  and  Willis  rejoin 
the  platoon  at  once  and  leave  Kelley  at  the  house  to  observe  the 
country  and  the  roads  to  the  east.  That  is  certainly  not  seriously 
objectionable,  but  we  prefer  to  have  our  flank  protection  on  our  flank 
and  not  behind  us.  The  battalion  commander  should  look  out  for 
Table  Rock  and  the  country  to  the  south. 

You  may  be  surprised  to  see  two  hostile  forces  moving  about  so 
near  each  other  without  being  warmly  engaged.  The  terrain  fully 
accounts  for  this  condition. 


SIXTH    PROBLEM. 


A  PICKET. 


EXPLANATION. 

"  The  outpost  is  a  covering  detachment  detailed  to  secure  the  camp 
or  bivouac  against  surprise  and  to  prevent  an  attack  upon  it  before 
the  troops  can  prepare  to  resist."  (I.  D.  R.,  678.) 

When  troops  are  in  camp  or  bivouac  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
the  amount  of  rest  and  security  that  can  be  given  depends  upon  an 
outpost  arrangement.  The  number  of  men  actually  on  their  feet  on 
outpost  is  relatively  not  great. 

A  comparison  with  the  advance  guard  problems  wall  show  that  the 
same  principle  of  distribution  applies  to  an  outpost. 

"  Patrols  or  sentinels  must  be  the  first  troops  which  the  enemy 
meets,  and  each  body  in  rear  must  have  time  to  prepare  for  the  blow. 
These  bodies  cause  as  much  delay  as  possible  without  sacrificing 
themselves,  and  gradually  retire  to  the  line  where  the  outpost  is  to 
make  its  resistance."  (I.  D.  R.,  695.) 

The  bodies  of  troops  nearest  the  enemy  are  very  small.  We  find 
that  the  various  parts  of  an  outpost,  as  in  an  advance  guard,  increase 
in  size  as  we  go  back  toward  the  main  camp.  An  advance  guard 
is  a  moving  body  and  is  on  one  road.  An  outpost  is  a  stationary  body 
and  is  divided  so  that  a  part  of  it  is  on  each  road  that  the  enemy  is 
likely  to  use  if  he  marches  toward  our  main  camp. 

Besides  allowing  the  troop  to  rest,  an  outpost  attempts  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  observing  our  camp  and,  in  case  of  attack,  gives 
warning  or  resists  so  that  the  main  body  can  have  time  to  prepare  for 
whatever  may  be  the  proper  action  under  the  circumstances.  An  out- 
post also  reconnoiters  to  the  front  for  information  of  the  enemy  or 
the  ground,  or  both.  Thus,  the  duties  of  the  outpost  are  obser- 
vation, resistance,  and  reconnaissance. 

For  convenience,  the  parts  of  an  outpost  are  given  appropriate 
names,  as  follows:  Reserve,  support,  outguard  (an  outguard  may  be 
either  a  picket,  a  sentry  squad,  or  a  cossack  post),  sentinel  post, 
patrol,  detached  post.  These  names,  and  the  purpose  of  the  parts 

(69) 


70 

which  they  designate,  should  be  clearly  undertsood.  (See  I.  D.  R. 
683-697.)  * 

Usually  the  commander  selects  a  defensive  line  on  which  he  pro- 
poses to  fight  if  the  enemy  attacks.  The  supports  are  ordinarily 
located  at  points  on  this  line  where  roads  cross  it.  These  points  de- 
fine what  is  called  the  "  line  of  supports."  In  front  of  this  line  are 
the  outguards.  Their  duties  are  to  observe  and  reconnoiter  so  as  to 
give  warning.  In  case  of  attack  they  offer  what  resistance  they  can. 
and  eventually  fall  back  to  the  line  of  supports.  In  rear  of  the  line 
of  supports  is  the  outpost  reserve,  conveniently  located  to  reinforce 
whichever  support  is  attacked.  Behind  the  outpost  reserve  is  the 
main  camp. 

The  present  problem  deals  with  an  outguard  which,  because  of  its 
size  and  purpose,  is  called  a  picket,  as  distinguished  from  a  sentry 
squad  or  cossack  post. 

SITUATION  I. 

(This  problem,  and  the  seven  problems  that  follow  it,  are  all  based 
on  the  same  original  situation.  It  is  recommended,  therefore,  that 
you  mark  locations  carefully  with  pins  and  small  tags,  and  preserve 
your  map  thus  "  staked  out "  until  you  have  reached  the  end  of  the 
thirteenth  problem.) 

Our  brigade  has  been  marching  northeast  from  Gettysburg,  on  the 
McElheny-Plainview-Heidlersburg  Road,  in  the  enemy's  country. 
It  has  been  reported  that  the  enemy  is  several  miles  to  the  northeast 
and  that  our  brigade  will  halt  south  of  the  Conewago  Creek  until 
to-morrow  or  the  day  after,  to  await  reinforcements. 

The  Conewago  is  reported  to  be  fordable  only  at  the  fords  shown 
on  the  map.  It  is  November  1,  and  the  corn  is  in  shock. 

Our  battalion  has  been  the  advance  guard  and  is  now  (2  p.  m.) 
halted  as  follows: 

The  reserve  (Companies  A  and  B)  at  crossroads  616,  southwest  of 
Plainview.  The  support  (Companies  C  and  D)  near  the  house  400 
yards  northeast  of  616,  with  its  advance  party  on  the  ridge  800  yards 
northeast  of  616  as  march  outpost.  Later,  Capt.  Rowen  marched 
our  company  (A)  within  100  yards  of  the  advance  party,  halted, 
assembled  the  noncommissioned  officers,  and  said : 

Conewago  Creek  swings  around  this  ridge,  a  half  mile  north  and  a  half  mile 
east  of  here.  The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  in  camp  on  this  road  4  miles  north- 
east of  here.  Our  brigade  is  going  into  camp  on  this  road,  a  mile  and  a  half 
to  the  southwest,  with  our  battalion  as  outpost.  Companies  C  and  D  will  be 
in  reserve  at  the  crossroads  where  we  halted  a  few  minutes  ago.  Company  B, 
as  support  No.  2,  on  that  ridge,  and  about  a  half  mile  west  of  here.  This  com- 
pany, as  support  No.  1,  will  be  in  this  vicinity,  near  the  road.  The  exact  loca- 
tion of  the  company  will  be  fixed  later.  Sergt.  Crane,  take  the  second  platoon 
down  that  farm  road  to  the  east  and  place  outguard  No.  1  to  cover  the  ford 


71 

where  the  road  crosses  the  Conewago.  Sergt.  Holmes,  take  the  first  platoon 
ahead  on  this  main  road  and  establish  outguard  No.  2  covering  the  bridge 
across  the  Conewago.  Posts. 

You  are  Sergt.  Crane,  commanding  second  platoon. 

1.  Where  do  you  place  your  picket  ? 

2.  What  further  dispositions  do  you  intend  to  make  immediately 
upon  arrival? 


1.  I  place  the  picket  in  the  patch  of  woods  450  yards  west  of  the 
ford. 

2.  I  place  a  double  sentinel  behind  a  corn  shock,  selecting  one 
which  will  enable  the  sentinels  to  see  the  ford,  the  fields  along  the 
fence  which  runs  to  the  southeast,  and  the  field  to  the  northwest  as 
far  as  the  wooded  spur  held  by  outguard  No,  2.    I  send  a  patrol  of 
three  men  across  the  Conewago,  by  way  of  the  ford,  to  patrol  a  half 
mile  beyond  the  ford  and  then  return.    I  send  another  patrol  of  two 
men  a  half  mile  to  the  southeast  to  patrol  the  woods  and,  on  the 
return  trip,  to  examine  the  Conewago  for  possible  fording  places.    I 
send  another  patrol  of  two  men  to  locate  outguard  No.  2  and,  on  the 
return  trip,  to  examine  the  Conewago  for  possible  fording  places. 
Along  the  east  edge  of  the  woods  I  begin  the  digging  of  a  fire  trench 
to  command  the  ford,  and  send  a  few  men  to  level  whatever  corn 
shocks  I  find  in  my  proposed  field  of  fire,  except  the  one  used  by  the 
sentinels. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  the  seventh  problem,  which  deals  with  the  first  platoon  as  out- 
guard No.  2,  we  shall  consider  more  in  detail  the  orders  and  instruc- 
tions actually  given  to  an  outguard  and  its  detachments. 

There  are  several  interesting  points  in  connection  with  the  out- 
guard established  by  the  second  platoon.  When  you  study  the  sev- 
enth problem,  you  will  observe  that  the  dispositions  of  the  two  out- 
guards  are  somewhat  different.  At  first  glance  the  two  seem  to  be 
alike  in  every  detail.  Both  are  of  the  same  size;  both  are  sent  out 
from  the  same  support;  and  each  covers  a  Conewago  crossing  and 
and  important  approach  toward  the  troops  that  are  to  be  protected. 
Still,  there  is  enough  contrast  between  the  two  outguards  to  demon- 
strate the  truth  of  the  statement  that  no  two  situations  are  alike,  and, 
therefore,  an  outguard  disposition  which  fits  one  case  may  be  wholly 
wrong,  or  only  partly  right,  in  another. 

Until  the  commander  of  the  support  has  reconnoitered  the  sector 
assigned  to  him,  and  particularly  the  road  assigned  to  your  outguard, 
he  is  obliged  to  leave  to  you  the  first  selection  of  the  position  for 
the  outguard  and  the  first  dispositions  as  to  sentinels,  patrols,  etc. 


72 

As  soon  as  the  captain  is  able  to  do  so,  he  will  visit  your  outguard, 
learn  what  you  have  done,  reconnoiter  the  vicinity,  give  yon  more 
detailed  information  as  to  the  location  and  responsibilities  of  the 
various  parts  of  the  outpost,  correct  your  dispositions  if  he  so  de- 
sires, instruct  you  as  to  the  changes  to  be  made  at  dark,  and  tell  you 
the  arrangements  for  messing  and  ration  supply. 

Naturally,  you  hope  to  arrange  the  picket  so  advantageously  that 
the  captain  will  not  be  induced  to  order  changes.  In  the  present  case, 
you  have  so  obviously  the  proper  place  for  the  main  body  of  the 
picket  that  you  need  not  hesitate  to  entrench  at  once. 

The  map  indicates  that  there  is  no  underbrush  among  the  trees  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  ford.  If  it  were  otherwise,  you  would  do  well  to 
cut  out  the  underbrush  so  as  to  have  a  clear  field  of  fire,  at  least  as 
far  as  the  island. 

Technically,  a  picket  is  only  an  outguard.  An  outguard  ordi- 
narily observes  and  warns,  but  does  not  expect  to  oifer  serious  resist- 
ance. However,  when  the  outguard  is  so  large  that  we  give  it  the 
convenient  name  of  picket,  and  when  in  addition  it  finds  a  favorable 
position  covering  an  important  approach,  it  should  entrench  and  pre- 
pare to  offer  resistance.  Another  reason  for  entrenching,  in  the  pres- 
ent case,  is  the  fact  that  the  support  is  not  between  the  ford  and  the 
outpost  reserve.  In  this  respect,  the  situation  differs  radically  from 
the  one  which  confronts  outguard  No.  2. 

A  single  sentinel  behind  a  corn  shock  might  be  enough,  and  would 
certainly  be  correct  if  the  outguard  were  only  a  sentry  squad.  But  you 
have  an  entire  platoon,  and  the  sentinel  post  is  an  important  one, 
charged  with  the  duty  of  observing  for  long  distances  and  in  many 
directions.  You  might  prefer,  also,  to  post  a  lookout  in  the  immedi- 
ate vicinity  of  the  picket  itself,  to  keep  its  eye  on  the  sentinel  post. 
This  would  surely  not  be  wrong.  On  the  contrary,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary if  you  found  that  the  sentinel  post  was  not  easily  seen  by  most 
of  the  men  of  the  picket. 

As  soon  as  an  outguard  reaches  its  post,  a  commander  must  ac- 
quaint himself  with  the  conditions  in  his  vicinity.  He  can  do  this 
by  a  careful  observation  of  the  ground  if  the  area  that  falls  to  him 
is  limited,  or  if  an  extensive  view  of  his  area  can  be  had.  Where  the 
area  is  quite  large  and  the  view  restricted,  as  in  the  present  case,  and 
when,  in  addition,  the  outguard  has  enough  men,  the  quickest  and 
surest  means  is  to  send  out  patrols  in  various  important  directions. 
But  these  patrols  should  not  go  far.  Your  immediate  vicinity  is  yoiir 
first  concern.  Later,  when  you  are  well  established  and  familiar  with 
the  immediate  vicinity,  you  can  plan  more  carefully  the  changes  and 
patrolling  that  may  be  necessary. 

If  one  of  your  noncommissioned  officers  has  some  skill  in  making  a 
topographic  sketch,  it  would  be  well  to  have  him  start  at  once  a  sketch 


73 

showing  the  road  you  are  on,  the  woods  that  you  occupy  and  the  other 
important  features  to  the  right,  left,  and  front.  Ordinarily,  the  sup- 
port commander,  or  some  one  detailed  by  him,  makes  an  outpost 
sketch  for  the  entire  support.  You  can  assist  materially  in  the  rapid 
completion  of  a  more  accurate  sketch  if  you  turn  over  at  least  a  dia- 
gram showing  directions  and  distances  to  various  important  features. 

SITUATION  II. 

Your  three  patrols  return  and  report  that  they  have  discovered 
nothing,  except  as  follows:  From  the  bend  in  the  road  400  yards 
north  of  the  picket  there  is  a  foot  trail  to  the  east  through  the  woods. 
The  trail  crosses  the  Conewago  by  a  fair  ford  and  appears  to  follow 
the  wire  fence  to  the  road  bend  300  yards  west-southwest  of  544. 

What  further  dispositions,  if  any,  do  you  intend  to  make  ? 


I  intend  to  place  a  cossack  post  on  the  trail  mentioned,  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Conewago. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  cossack  post  would  not  be  necessary  in  daytime  if  your  sentinel 
could  see  the  ford  and  the  trail  east  of  it,  but  there  happens  to  be  a 
patch  of  woods  150  yards  square  (almost  two  city  blocks)  which  con- 
ceals the  trail  and  the  ford.  The  trail  toward  544  is  also  concealed 
by  the  trees  which  fringe  the  Conewago. 

We  have  here  a  case  of  an  outguard  sending  out  a  minor  outguard. 
This  is  frequently  necessary  in  the  case  of  a  strong  picket  assigned  to 
watch  an  important  road.  If  your  outguard  consisted  of  a  squad 
only,  you  would  merely  report  to  the  support  commander  the  exist- 
ence of  the  trail  and  ford  that  your  patrol  discovered.  A  cossack  post 
would  then  be  sent  directly  from  the  support. 

SITUATION  III. 

Ten  minutes  after  your  arrival  at  your  present  position,  two 
mounted  orderlies  of  the  regiment  turned  over  to  you  a  telephone 
connected  with  support  No.  1  and  the  outpost  reserve.1  Presently  the 
captain  arrived.  He  approved  all  that  you  had  done.  He  informed 
you  as  follows:  If  you  are  driven  back,  you  are  authorized  to  fall 
back  on  the  reserve.  The  outpost  has  been  reenforced  by  a  platoon 
of  Cavalry,  which  now  forms  a  detached  post  where  the  road  crosses 
the  Conewago,  1,500  yards  southeast  of  your  picket.  The  second 
fence  500  yards  south  of  your  picket,  and  the  north  edge  of  woods 
from  the  end  of  the  same  fence  to  the  Conewago,  mark  the  right  of 

1  Although  at  present  Infantry  regiments  have  no  telephone  equipment,  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  we  shall  be  without  it  in  war.  In  fact,  it  is  understood  that  a  proper 
equipment  is  being  designed. 


74 

the  sector  of  our  support  (Company  A).  The  support  will  send 
supper  to  the  picket  at  5.30  p.  m.,  and  breakfast  at  an  hour  to  be 
announced  later.  The  changes  for  the  night,  as  far  as  they  relate  to 
your  picket,  will  be  as  follows:  The  picket  will  move  forward  to  tho 
water's  edge  at  the  ford.  Hourly  patrols,  on  the  even  hour,  to  the 
Cavalry  detached  post  and  to  outguard  Xo.  2.  No.  2  will  be  at  the 
bridge  during  the  night.  The  opposite  side  of  the  Conewago  also  will 
be  patrolled.  Night  signal : 
Twenty-three,  forty-one. 

What  preparations  do  you  make,  during  daylight,  to  carry  out  the 
captain's  order  for  night  changes? 


I  cross  the  ford  with  two  corporals,  in  patrol  formation,  leaving 
the  platoon  guide  in  charge  of  the  picket.  Having  decided  to  place  a 
sentry  squad  at  the  east  end  of  the  ford,  I  point  out  its  location  to 
the  corporal  of  the  squad  selected.  To  both  corporals  I  point  out  the 
houses  500  yards  east  and  500  yards  north,  as  guides  for  night  patrol- 
ling. Then  we  return  to  the  picket  and  I  prepare  a  roster  as  follows: 

Cossack  post  (already  established),  1  corporal  and  3  privates. 

One  squad  for  sentry  squad. 

A  guard  for  the  bivouac  of  the  picket ;  three  reliefs  of  one  private 
each,  with  a  corporal  in  charge;  one  hour  on,  two  hours  off. 

For  patrolling  the  roads  300  yards  beyond  the  houses  mentioned 
above  (every  hour,  day  and  night),  two  reliefs  of  four  men  each 
(one  squad;  the  corporal  and  No.  2  as  leaders). 

For  a  visiting  patrol  to  the  Cavalry  detached  post,  two  reliefs  of 
two  privates  each. 

For  a  visiting  patrol  to  outguard  No.  2,  two  reliefs  of  two  privates 
each. 

The  leaders  of  these  patrols  are  then  sent  in  pairs  to  examine  their 
routes  by  daylight. 

The  patrol  to  the  Cavalry  detached  post  is  given  the  following 
route:  From  the  west  end  of  the  ford  (proposed  bivouac)  go  south- 
west along  the  fence  200  yards  to  the  fence  corner ;  thence  1.000  yards 
to  the  southeast  along  the  fence  to  the  fence  corner:  thence  east  to 
the  road;  thence  to  the  Cavalry  post;  thence  return  along  the  west 
bank  of  the  Conewago. 

The  patrol  to  outguard  No.  2  is  given  the  following  route :  Follow 
the  farm  road  to  the  bend  600  yards  northwest  of  the  ford ;  thence 
east  to  the  cossack  post;  thence  along  the  Conewago  to  outguard 
No.  2:  thence  return  by  the  same  route  to  the  cossack  post;  thence 
along  the  Conewago  to  the  ford. 

I  inform  all  members  of  the  patrol  that  the  night  signal  is 
twenty-three,  forty-one. 


75 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  merely  a  coincidence  that  your  roster  utilizes  exactly  every 
corporal  and  private  in  the  platoon.  If  your  first  draft  of  a  roster 
did  not  require  the  services  of  every  man  in  the  platoon,  you  would 
not,  on  that  account,  increase  the  size  of  any  of  the  groups.  If  your 
first  draft  summed  up  more  than  the  total  number  of  corporals  and 
privates  available,  you  would  have  to  reduce  some  of  the  groups,  if 
possible ;  otherwise,  inform  the  captain.  The  platoon  guide  could  be 
put  in  charge  of  the  bivouac  guard,  thus  saving  one  corporal. 
The  sentry  squad  could  spare  one  private  and  still  have  three  reliefs 
of  double  sentinels.  The  patrols  to  the  east  side  of  the  Conewago 
could  be  reduced  to  three  men  each,  etc. 

Although  every  man  is  on  your  roster  for  some  duty  during  the 
night,  you  will  always  have  18  men,  including  yourself,  in  the 
bivouac  of  the  picket  if  you  send  the  four-man  patrol  out  when  the 
visiting  patrols  return.  If  all  patrols  are  out  at  the  same  time,  there 
will  be  14  men  in  your  bivouac. 

At  night  your  trench  is  of  no  value.  The  ford  is  a  defile.  To 
oppose  an  enemy  it  is  necessary  to  place  yourself  at  the  defile.  The 
captain  has  wisely  decided  that  you  should  be  at  the  west  end  of 
the  defile.  Very  likely  he  also  would  have  ordered  the  sending  of  a 
sentry  squad  to  the  east  end,  but  for  our  own  reasons  we  purposely 
caused  him  to  omit  this.  It  is  nearly  300  yards  to  the  east  end  of 
the  ford.  This  is  too  far  for  a  double  sentinel  post  sent  out  directly 
from  the  picket.  There  are  two  alternatives:  Either  send  sentinels 
directly  from  the  picket  to  the  island  or  send  a  sentry  squad  to  the 
east  bank  of  the  Conewago.  If  it  were  not  for  the  dense  woods 
which  cover  the  island  and  line  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago,  a 
double  sentinel  post  on  the  island,  sent  from  the  picket,  would 
probably  serve  our  purpose. 

If  the  other  demands  on  the  platoon  were  not  so  great,  it  would 
be  well  to  change  the  cossack  post  to  a  sentry  squad  during  the 
night. 

The  patrol  to  the  east  side  of  the  Conewago  should  make  its 
rounds  in  daytime  as  well  as  at  night,  on  account  of  the  restricted 
view  of  your  sentinels.  The  last  patrol  before  dark  should  carefully 
cut  all  telephone  wires  so  as  to  isolate  the  houses  in  your  front. 
You  are  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  by  cutting  these  wires  before 
you  make  your  changes  for  the  night,  you  may  prevent  detailed 
information  from  reaching  the  enemy,  or  at  least  delay  the  transmis- 
sion of  it. 

It  is  certainly  a  hardship  to  wade  the  Conewago  in  November. 
The  men's  legs  and  feet  should  be  kept  dry,  if  possible,  particularly 
in  cold  weather.  But,  unless  you  can  find  a  boat  or  build  a  raft,  or 


76 

can  induce  higher  authority  to  order  the  Cavalry  detached  post  to  do 
the  patrolling,  the  exposure  of  your  men  is  unavoidable. 

A  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad  is  not  strong  enough  to  send  out 
patrols,  except  for  the  necessary  examination  of  its  surroundings 
when  it  first  reaches  its  position.  A  picket,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
frequently  a  small  support  and,  if  strong  enough,  must  take  over 
reconnaissance  to  adjoining  parts  of  the  outpost.  Such  patrolling 
is  very  easy  in  daytime,  and  is  frequently  unnecessary,  as  in  this  case. 
At  night,  a  patrol  can  easily  get  lost,  even  if  it  has  covered  its  route 
by  daylight.  This  possibility  generally  can  be  avoided  by  fixing 
routes  that  are  easily  followed  at  night.  Fences,  roads,  streams,  and 
clearly  defined  ridges  or  edges  of  woods  are  very  useful  guides  and 
should  be  used  whenever  possible. 

In  daytime  your  sentinels,  together  with  the  sentinels  of  the 
cavalry  detached  post  and  outguard  Xo.  2,  can  see  all  the  ground 
which  you  propose  to  cover  with  visiting  patrols  during  the  niirht. 
We  hardly  ever  patrol  ground  that  can  be  seen  by  sentinels.  At  night, 
however,  the  intervening  ground  must  be  examined  from  time  to  time. 
We  must  keep  in  touch  with  adjoining  posts  and  exchange  informa- 
tion, even  if  it  amounts  to  no  more  than  an  assurance  that  everything 
is  quiet.  Your  cossack  post  is  visited  twice  each  hour.  Your  four- 
man  patrol  passes  through  the  sentry  squad  twice  each  hour.  Even 
though  you  have  telephone  connection  a  patrol  from  the  support  will 
probably  visit  you  occasionally. 

The  reason  for  starting  your  visiting  patrols  on  the  even  hour  will 
be  apparent  when  you  study  the  seventh  problem. 

If  you  study  the  final  arrangements  along  the  entire  front  of  our 
support  you  will  realize  how  difficult  it  would  be  for  the  enemy  to 
pierce  our  line  unobserved  with  a  sufficient  force  to  be  dangerous.  It 
is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  an  outpost  is  not  good  merely  because  a 
patrol  can  penetrate  it.  A  hostile  patrol  is  not  dangerous  except  in 
the  infrequent  case  where  it  is  imperatively  necessary  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  getting  any  information  whatever.  Such  cases  are  rare. 

"In  posting  his  command  the  support  commander  must  seek  to 
cover  his  sector  in  such  manner  that  the  enemy  can  not  reach,  in  dan- 
gerous numbers  and  unobserved,  the  position  of  the  support  or  pass 
by  it  within  the  sector  intrusted  to  the  support.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  must  economize  men  on  observation  and  patrol  duty,  for  these 
duties  are  unusually  fatiguing.  He  must  practice  the  greatest 
economy  of  men  consistent  with  the  requirements  of  practical  se- 
curity." (I.  D.  E.  704.) 

No  doubt  you  understand  why  the  captain  authorized  you  to  fall 
back  on  the  reserve  in  case  you  are  attacked  and  forced  to  retire.  The 
attack  might  come  from  the  front,  supported  by  rifle  fire  from  troops 
posted  along  the  east  bank  of  the  Conewago,  north  of  the  ford. 


77 

Whenever  possible,  a  noncommissioned  officer  should  be  awake  and 
on  the  alert  at  all  hours  of  the  night.  Patrols  must  be  sent  pe- 
riodically and  the  bivouac  guard  must  be  relieved  hourly.  A  satis- 
factory arrangement  in  the  present  case  would  be  as  follows:  You 
remain  on  this  duty  until  9  p.  m. ;  the  platoon  guide  until  1  a.  in. ; 
and  the  corporal  in  charge  of  the  guard  from  1  a.  m.  until  a  half 
hour  before  daylight,  at  which  time  the  entire  picket  should  be 
awakened. 

The  method  of  night  signaling  prescribed  by  the  support  com- 
mander will  not  be  found  in  any  of  our  regulations.  It  would  not 
be  wise  to  have  a  uniform  system  throughout  the  Army.  It  would 
be  better  if  every  regiment  practiced  two  or  three  systems  and 
changed  them  from  time  to  time.  In  the  present  case  it  is  intended 
that  the  signals  shall  be  given  by  tapping  the  butt  of  the  rifle  with 
the  knuckles  or  a  stick  or  stone,  depending  upon  the  stillness  of  the 
night.  The  one  who  calls,  strikes  the  butt  of  his  rifle  twice,  then  after 
a  short  pause,  he  strikes  it  three  times;  thus  tap,  tap — tap,  tap,  tap, 
making  the  signal  "  23."  If  he  hears  an  answering  signal  "  41 "  he  is 
reasonably  sure  that  he  can  move  in  the  direction  of  the  answer  and 
meet  a  member  of  the  outpost.  Or,  any  one  hearing  the  signal  "  23  " 
will  signal  back  "41,"  and  be  reasonably  sure  that  whoever  ap- 
proaches is  a  friend.  Such  signals  are  particularly  useful  to  night 
patrols  approaching  sentinels  or  outguards.  On  a  still  night  a  tap 
on  the  rifle  butt  can  be  heard  a  considerable  distance  and  readily 
attracts  attention.  We  give  it  as  one  of  many  systems  that  can  be 
devised,  but  we  should  by  no  means  favor  the  uniform  use  of  this 
particular  system. 


SEVENTH  PROBLEM, 


ANOTHER  PICKET. 


SITUATION  I. 


The  situation  is  the  same  as  Situation  I,  sixth  problem,  to  include 
the  support  commander's  orders. 

You  are  First  Sergt.  Holmes,  commanding  first  platoon. 
What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  you  leave  the  support  ? 


I  signal, 
Attention  to  orders, 

and  call  out : 

First  platoon,  we  are  going  out  this  road  to  establish  an  out  guard.  Corpl. 
Adams,  take  three  men  and  precede  us  by  200  yards.  March  out. 

When  the  point  has  gained  its  distance  I  signal : 

Right  by  twos,  march.     Column  of  files  on  each  side  of  road. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  connection  with  the  present  problem  it  is  our  purpose  to  show 
the  successive  steps  by  which  an  outpost  is  established.  On  a  map  it 
is  simple  enough  to  indicate  with  pins  a  complete  outpost  disposition, 
but  in  the  field  we  are  likely  to  fumble  around  a  great  deal  before  the 
outpost  is  finally  established.  At  the  end  of  a  march  men  are  tired 
and  irritated,  and  it  is  a  sign  of  good  leadership  if  the  troops  detailed 
for  outpost  duty  go  smoothly  and  promptly  to  their  proper  places, 
thus  getting  the  men  off  their  feet  and  relieved  of  their  equipment 
as  soon  as  possible. 

You  note  that  the  companies  of  the  advance  guard  reserve  (Com- 
panies A  and  B)  are  to  constitute  the  outpost  supports,  while  the 
advance  guard  support  (Companies  C  and  D)  retires  to  616  and  be- 
comes the  outpost  reserve.  The  hardest  work  on  the  march  falls 
naturally  to  the  advance  guard  support.  When  Maj.  Crosby  was 
ordered  to  establish  the  outpost  of  the  brigade  he  did  not  waste  any 
time  in  a  preliminary  reconnaissance  of  the  outpost  line.  On  the 

(79) 


80 

contrary,  he  immediately  sent  out  Companies  A  and  B,  each  on  a 
road  toward  the  enemy,  and  left  the  completion  of  the  job  to  the 
company  commanders  and  subsequent  inspection  by  himself.  Thus, 
in  a  very  few  minutes  Companies  C  and  D  will  be  in  bivouac. 

For  the  same  reasons  Capt.  Rowen  halted  Company  A  near  the 
Plain  view  road  fork  and  without  wasting  time  or  unnecessary  words 
sent  a  picket  out  on  each  road,  leaving  the  details  as  to  exact  location, 
sentinels,  patrols,  etc.,  to  the  picket  commanders  and  subsequent 
inspection  by  himself. 

To  conform  to  this  principle  you  marked  off  with  your  command 
as  soon  as  possible.  For  the  present  it  is  not  necessary  that  your  men 
should  know  much  about  their  future  duties.  Whatever  you  may 
have  to  say  to  them  can  be  said  better  when  they  reach  the  place  where 
they  are  going  to  work. 

"  The  supports  march  to  their  posts,  using  the  necessary  covering 
detachments  when  in  advance  of  the  march  outpost."  (I.  D.  R.  703.) 

"  Each  outguard  is  marched  by  its  commander  to  its  assigned  sta- 
tion, and,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  picket,  is  covered  by  the  neces- 
sary patrolling  to  prevent  surprise."  (I.  D.  R.  706.) 

Capt.  Rowen  did  not  place  a  point  in  front  of  the  company  because 
he  was  still  behind  the  march  outpost.  But  in  a  minute  or  two  you 
will  pass  the  march  outpost  and  will  march  toward  the  enemy  and 
through  country  that  has  not  yet  been  reconnoitered. 

SITUATION  II. 

No  change.  Corpl.  Adams  has  taken  Willis,  Bush,  and  Schmidt 
with  him. 

1.  Where  do  you  intend  to  post  the  picket  and  its  sentinel  posts  ? 

2.  What  orders  or  instructions  do  you  give  on  arrival  at  the  place 
selected,  and  before  the  captain  arrives  to  inspect  ? 

THE     FIRST     SERGEANT'S     SOLUTION. 

1.  I  intend  to  place  the  picket  near  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  the 
right-hand  side  of  the  road,  about  200  yards  southwest  of  the  near- 
est bridge,  with  a  sentinel  posted  so  as  to  observe  to  the  east  and  along 
the  road  to  the  northeast.    I  intend  to  place  a  cossack  post  on  the 
island  between  the  two  bridges.    Meantime,  Corpl.  Adams  will  patrol 
through  the  woods  to  the  west  from  the  first  bridge,  and  then  south 
and  return  to  the  picket. 

2.  Upon  arriving  in  the  road  opposite  the  point  selected  for  the  out- 
guard,  I  give  the  command : 

Follow  me, 

climb  through  the  fence,  and  find  cover  for  the  outguard,  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  road  and  the  northeast  edge  of  the  woods.  Here  I 


81 

're-form  the  outguard  in  column  of  squads  and  give  the  following 
orders : 

The  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  in  camp  several  miles  northeast  of  here,  on 
this  road.  The  village  where  we  left  the  company  is  called  Plainview.  That 
stream  is  called  the  Gonewago.  This  is  the  Harrisburg  Road.  A  mile  and  a 
half  northeast  of  here,  on  this  road,  is  the  town  of  Heidlersburg.  Our  brigade 
will  camp  on  this  road  about  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  southwest,  with  our 
battalion  as  outpost.  Companies  C  and  D  will  be  the  reserve,  at  the  crossroads 
where  we  left  the  major.  Company  B  will  be  support  No.  2  on  another  road 
about  a  half  mile  from  here,  in  that  direction  [pointing  west].  Our  company 
will  be  support  No.  1  on  the  road  about  where  we  left  the  company.  Sergt 
Crane,  writh  outguard  No.  1,  a  picket  of  one  platoon,  is  on  a  trail  south  of  here. 
We  shall  locate  him  later.  We  are  outguard  No.  2.  Later  we  will  locate  Com- 
pany B  on  our  left.  Bring  to  me  every  person  who  attempts  to  cross  our  out- 
post line  in  either  direction,  or  who  is  picked  up  by  patrols,  except  members  of 
our  company,  patrols  from  Company  B,  and  officers  whom  you  are  sure  you 
know.  No  fires.  Pieces  will  not  be  stacked.  Equipment  may  be  removed,  ex- 
cept belts  and  bayonets  .  Hook  your  bayonet  scabbards  to  your  belts.  Miller, 
come  with  me. 

I  take  Miller  to  the  point  selected  (near  the  fence  along  the  road) 
for  the  picket  sentinel  and  say  to  him: 

This  is  your  post.  You  can  see  up  and  down  the  road  and  to  the  east ;  also 
for  some  distance  into  those  woods  [pointing  north  and  west].  Be  particularly 
careful  to  observe  the  road  to  the  northeast  and  the  country  to  the  east. 

I  then  step  into  the  road,  get  Corpl.  Adams's  attention  and  sema- 
phore him : 

Patrol  500  yards  west  along  the  creek  and  return  here  through  woods. 
Then  I  return  to  the  outguard : 

Towney,  take  Bennett  with  you  and  patrol  south  until  you  find  a  trail.  Fol- 
low the  trail  toward  the  Conewago  until  you  find  outguard  No.  1.  Locate  it 
carefully  so  that  you  can  point  out  its  position  to  me.  On  the  return  trip  exam- 
ine the  Conewago  as  far  as  the  bridge  for  possible  crossings.  Repeat. 

I  satisfy  myself  that  Towney  understands. 

Corpl.  Nelson,  take  three  men  of  your  squad  and  follow  me.  Sergt.  Hill,  while 
I  am  gone  locate  the  trace  of  a  tire  trench  covering  the  biidge.  Remainder  of 

platoon  fall  out. 

I  lead  Corpl.  Nelson  and  his  men  to  the  bridges.  After  an  exami- 
nation I  order  him  as  follows: 

Place  your  cossack  post  here  (off  the  road,  near  the  south  end  of  the  second 
bridge).  Place  your  sentinel  about  here  [indicating  a  covered  position  at  the 
edge  of  the  road  near  the  bridge],  where  he  can  see  the  roads  across  the  creek 
and  at  the  same  time  be  seen  by  the  picket  sentinel.  Send  two  men  at  once  to 
cut  all  the  telephone  and  telegraph  wires  at  those  crossroads  (502)  and  any 
that  leads  to  those  houses  (200  yards  east).  Also  bring  in  the  occupants  of  the 
houses. 

96790—17 6 


82 

Upon  my  return  to  the  picket.  I  send  Butler  on  patrol  with  the  fol- 
lowing instructions: 

Take  two  men  of  your  squad  for  a  patrol.  Go  first  to  Corpl.  Nelson's  cossfick 
post  at  the  second  bridge.  North  of  the  bridge  there  are  some  woods,  probably 
50  acres.  Patrol  the  woods  thoroughly  and  return  here  in  one  hour.  Repeat. 

Then  I  examine  the  trace  selected  by  Sergt.  Hill,  and  having 
adopted  or  modified  it.  as  the  case  may  be,  I  put  the  men  of  the  picket 
jit  work  entrenching. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  position  selected  for  the  picket  has  a  clear  field  of  fire  to  the 
first  bridge. 

The  reasons  for  entrenching  are  about  the  same  as  those  given  in 
the  sixth  problem.  In  your  case,  however,  the  support  is  in  rear  of 
you  and  not  on  your  flank.  But  the  support  probably  will  not  have 
a  good  field  of  fire  in  the  woods  on  the  hill.  Your  picket  may  be 
called  upon  to  offer  stubborn  resistance.  We  think  you  will  find  that 
in  almost  every  case  of  a  strong  picket  on  a  main  road  entrenching 
is  either  necessary  or  very  desirable  for  some  reason  or  other. 

There  is  no  underbrush  among  the  trees  on  our  side  of  the  Cone- 
wago.  Whether  it  would  be  worth  while  to  clear  out  the  brush  on  the 
island  is  a  matter  that  can  not  be  decided  by  reference  to  the  map. 

The  duties  of  the  sentinel  at  your  picket  are  more  important  than 
in  the  usual  case.  Ordinarily,  a  picket  sentinel  has  little  to  do  except 
to  watch  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  picket  and  to  maintain  visual 
communication  with  such  parts  of  the  outpost  as  can  be  seen.  Your 
sentinel,  however,  must  also  watch  the  road  to  the  northeast  and  the 
country  to  the  east,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  cossack  post  is  in 
a  less  favorable  position  to  do  so.  The  cossack  post  can  see  the  road 
only  as  far  as  the  ridge  600  yards  northeast  of  the  island.  The  picket 
sentinel  can  see  the  ridge  1,000  yards  beyond  the  island;  also,  part  of 
the  road  1,200  yards  east  of  the  island,  unless  the  trees  that  fringe 
the  Conewago  are  denser  than  is  shown  on  the  map. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  placing  a  cossack  post  on  the  island 
at  the  south  end  of  the  second  bridge:  First,  the  roads  along  the 
east  bank  of  the  Conewago  could  not  otherwise  be  observed.  Second, 
we  must  prevent  Red  patrols  from  destroying  the  bridges  by  ex- 
plosives or  otherwise.  It  would  not  answer  our  purpose  to  send  a 
sentinel  from  the  picket.  The  distance  is  too  great  (see  I.  D.  R. 
692)  and  four  rifles  may  be  none  too  many  to  prevent  a  swift 
attempt  to  destroy  either  or  both  of  the  bridges. 

If  the  cossack  post  were  placed  at  the  first  bridge,  it  could  not  see 
the  roads  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Conewago,  and  it  might  not  dis- 
cover, until  too  late,  attempts  against  the  second  bridge. 


83 

You  may  prefer  to  place  a  sentry  squad,  instead  of  a  cossack  post, 
at  the  bridge ;  that  would  certainly  not  be  wrong. 

After  reading  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  706,  your  first  impres- 
sion might  be  that  a  roster  should  be  prepared  at  once.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  you  would  not  make  up  your  roster  until  the  support  com- 
mander had  made  his  inspection.  Until  then  you  will  not  have  com- 
plete information  as  to  what  the  picket  must  do,  and  whatever  dis- 
positions you  have  made  may  not,  in  every  detail,  meet  with  the 
approval  of  the  captain.  When  you  finally  make  a  roster,  it  should 
be  based  as  nearly  as  practicable  on  the  duties  already  performed  by 
members  of  the  platoon. 

We  recommend  that  you  study  carefully  the  general  instructions 
given  the  platoon  (p.  91).  You  will  note  the  following: 

1.  Information  as  to  the  direction  of  the  enemy. 

2.  Information  as  to  local  geography. 

3.  Information  as  to  other  outpost  units  and  the  main  camp. 

4.  Orders  for  the  disposition  of  strangers  met. 

5.  Orders  for  preparedness  for  action. 

Naturally,  the  first  three  subjects  (information)  will  be  different 
each  time  you  are  on  outpost.  The  last  two  (orders)  are  practically 
alike  in  every  outguard,  but  you  should  not,  on  that  account,  omit 
them  on  the  assumption  that  your  men  understand.  When  giving 
general  instructions,  remember  the  outline:  Enemy;  geography; 
outpost  and  camp;  strangers;  preparedness. 

You  may  have  to  repeat  the  information  several  times.  Be  sure 
that  the  men  understand. 

SITUATION  IV. 

The  picket  has  been  equipped  with  telephone  connection  to  the 
support  and  to  the  reserve.  The  captain  arrived  and  informed  you 
as  follows :  Your  dispositions  are  satisfactory.  The  outpost  has  been 
reinforced  by  a  platoon  of  Cavalry,  which  now  forms  a  detached 
post  where  the  road  crosses  the  Conewago,  a  mile  and  a  half  below 
your  cossack  post.  The  west  edge  of  the  woods  that  Corp.  Adams 
patrolled  is  a  clearly  defined  line,  and  marks  the  left  of  the  sector 
of  our  support  (a  line  drawn  from  the  letter  "  1 "  in  "  Plainview  "  to 
the  center  of  the  orchard  east  of  Hershey  Mill  passes  along  the  edge 
of  woods  referred  to) .  Support  No.  2  is  near  the  farmhouse  midway 
between  616  and  Hershey  Mill.  It  has  a  picket  on  the  road  500  yards 
south  of  Hershey  Mill.  This  picket  has  a  cossack  post  near  Hershey 
Mill,  where  a  ford  and  trail  have  been  found.  Our  support  will  send 
supper  to  the  picket  at  5.30  p.  m.,  and  breakfast  at  an  hour  to  be  an- 
nounced later.  The  changes  for  the  night,  as  far  as  they  relate  to 
your  picket,  will  be  as  follows:  The  picket  will  move  forward  to 


84 

DISCUSSION. 

To  avoid  repetition,  we  have  omitted  matters  that  were  brought 
out  in  the  sixth  problem. 

The  barricades  will  have  no  particular  value  in  daytime.  If  you 
constructed  them  at  once  your  working  party  might  be  observed  by 
hostile  patrols  or  inhabitants  at  a  considerable  distance,  and  you 
wyould  thus  unnecessarily  give  information  as  to  your  location  or 
plans.  At  night  an  attack  wall  generally  be  a  rush  with  little  or 
no  warning.  Your  fire  will  not  be  effective  beyond  a  few  yards  on 
account  of  the  inability  to  see.  Whether  a  rush  attack  is  made  by 
Cavalry,  mounted,  or  by  Infantry,  it  would  be  seriously  checked  by 
the  two  barricades  and  gaps,  and  thus  give  you  time  to  arouse  and 
form  the  picket. 

On  each  bridge  the  planking  should  be  removed  to  form  a  10  or 
12  foot  gap.  Two  or  three  of  the  planks  should  be  placed  length- 
wise across  the  gap  and  near  the  truss,  for  the  use  of  members  of 
the  outpost.  If  Corpl.  Nelson's  squad  is  driven  back,  the  last  man 
to  cross  on  these  planks  should  kick  them  into  the  creek.  The  other 
planks  should  be  piled  near  the  south  end  of  the  gap  so  that  the 
gap  can  be  covered  quickly  if  it  becomes  necessary  for  mounted 
officers  or  men  to  use  the  bridge.  If  our  enemy  knows  that  we  are 
in  the  habit  of  taking  precautions  such  as  yours,  we  need  have  little 
fear  of  rush  attacks  across  bridges  at  night. 

The  Cavalry  platoon  southeast  of  Plainview  will  probably  furnish 
all  the  patrols  to  be  sent  toward  or  beyond  Heidlersburg.  Whenever 
possible,  a  small  Cavalry  force  is  added  to  an  outpost  for  distant 
reconnaissance.  In  such  case  the  Infantry  is  rarely  called  upon  to 
patrol  very  far  beyond  its  farthest  sentinels.  Your  periodical  patrols 
across  the  Conewago  might  be  given  a  route  as  follows :  From  cross- 
roads 502,  go  southeast  COO  j^ards  to  the  bend  in  the  road,  then  by 
way  of  crossroads  502  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  500  yards  northeast  of 
the  crossroads,  then  by  way  of  crossroads  502  to  the  road  bend  600 
yards  west  of  the  crossroad,  then  return  to  the  picket 

Your  visiting  patrols  will  have  shorter  routes  than  Sergt.  Crane's 
(sixth  problem).  The  patrol  to  the  south  need  go  only  far  enough 
to  gain  contact  with  outguard  No.  1;  that  is,  to  the  cossack  post  of 
outguard  No.  1,  which  you  will  find,  later,  on  the  banks  of  the  Cone- 
wago, 600  yards  southeast  of  your  picket.  Your  patrol  to  the  west 
need  go  only  as  far  as  the  cossack  post  500  yards  east-southeast  of 
Hershey  Mill. 

Capt.  Rowen  has  ordered  Sergt.  Crane's  visiting  patrols  to  leave 
on  the  even  hour  and  yours  to  leave  on  the  half  hour.  His  object 
was  to  have  almost  continuous  patrolling.  Perhaps  he  will  make 
an  arrangement  with  the  commanding  officer  of  Company  B,  where- 


85 

the  first  bridge.  Both  bridges  will  be  barricaded.  You  will  send 
hourly  patrols,  on  the  half  hour,  to  the  nearest  outguards  on  your 
right  and  left.  The  opposite  side  of  the  Conewago  also  will  be 
patroled.  Night  signal : 

Twenty-three,  forty-one. 

1.  What  are  your  plans  with  reference  to  barricading  the  bridges? 

2.  Prepare  your  roster. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

1.  While  there  is  still  daylight,  I  shall  gather  material  for  the 
barricades   (planks,  poles,  rails,  wire,  etc.)    and  place  part  of  the 
same  in  the  woods  west  of  the  first  bridge,  and  another  part  in  the 
woods  near  the  cossack  post.     When  the  picket  moves  to  the  bridge 
at  dark  a  barricade  will  be  built  at  the  south  end  of  the  first  bridge 
and  another  at  the  north  end  of  the  second  bridge,  an  opening  being 
left  in  each  barricade  only  wide  enough  to  permit  horsemen  to  pass 
through  singly.     On  each  bridge  part  of  the  planking  will  be  re- 
moved and  piled  near  by.     The  gap  will  be  bridged  for  men  on  foot. 

2.  Cossack  post  (sentry  squad  at  night)  : 

Corpl.  Nelson's  squad. 

Patrol  across  Conewago  (two  reliefs,  four  men  each)  : 
First  relief: 

Butler,  Peterson,  Pickett,  Carter. 
Second  relief: 

Koeni?.  Quinn,  Morgan,  Walinski. 

Visiting  patrol,  south  (two  relief  s^  two  men  each) : 
First  relief: 
Towney,  Willis. 
Second  relief: 
Kelley,  Miller. 

Visiting  patrol,  west  (two  reliefs,  two  men  each) : 
First  relief: 
Adams.  Bush. 
Second  relief: 
Bennett.  Schmidt. 

Picket  guard  (three  reliefs,  one  man  each,  and  one  in  charge)  : 
Clark,  Ames  (1),  Hagen  (2),  Stone  (3). 
Reserve : 
Hill.  Brown,  Pine,  McGowan,  Schafer. 


86 

by  the  patrols  which  visit  you  frcm  the  picket  of  support  No.  2  will 
leave  on  the  even  hour,  thus  dovetailing  with  your  patrol  in  that 
direction. 

In  the  second  situation,  when  you  sent  Corpl.  Adams  to  reconnoiter 
the  creek  and  woods  west  of  the  bridge,  you  naturally  selected  men 
from  his  squad  to  make  the  first  patrol  toward  outguard  No.  1. 
Therefore,  this  squad  is  used  for  visiting  patrols. 

You  placed  Miller  on  post  as  picket  sentinel  when  the  picket 
arrived  in  its  position,  but  when  you  finally  make  out  your  roster 
you  will  find  it  better  to  relieve  Miller  at  once,  so  that  when  Corpl. 
Clark  takes  over  the  picket  guard,  he  will  have  under  him  men  of 
of  his  own  squad.  Four  men  of  Corpl.  Koenig's  squad  are  now 
across  the  Conewago  and  presumably  familiarizing  themselves  with 
the  nearby  roads  and  woods.  Since  the  two  reliefs  of  this  patrol 
require  eight  men,  you  naturally  assigned  Corpl.  Koenig's  squad, 
making  the  corporal  and  the  No.  2  man  (Butler)  the  patrol  leaders. 

You  may  be  called  upon  for  extra  patrolling  or  may  need  me  a 
for  miscellaneous  purposes.  It  is  well  therefore  to  write  doAvn  the 
names  of  all  men  not  assigned  to  regular  duties,  in  order  that  you 
may  see  at  a  glance  what  men  are  available  without  disarranging 
your  roster.  In  the  sixth  problem  there  were  no  unassigned  men. 
If  Sergt.  Crane  require  any  for  special  use,  he  would  be  obliged  to 
make  a  temporary  readjustment  of  his  roster. 

You  might  be  tempted  to  place  Sergt.  Hill  in  command  at  the 
second  bridge  when  the  post  is  increased  for  the  night  to  a  sentry 
squad.  Your  decision  will  depend  very  largely  upon  your  confi- 
dence in  Corpl.  Nelson.  The  post  is  not  very  far  from  the  picket, 
and  if  Corpl.  Nelson  is  a  reliable  man  it  should  not  be  necessary  to 
.place  a  sergeant  over  him.  If,  for  good  reasons,  you  decide  to  place 
a  sergeant  in  command  of  an  important  sentry  squad,  and  if  you 
are  at  the  same  time  rather  short  of  men,  you  could  retain  the  cor- 
poral and  one  private  with  the  picket.  Ordinarily  you  will  get 
better  results  if  you  arrange  your  roster  with  a  view  to  keeping 
squads  or  half  squads  together. 

SITUATION  V. 

No  change. 

How  do  you  intend  to  post  Corpl.  Nelson's  sentry  squad  after 
dark? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  that  the  squad  shall  be  concealed  on  the  second  bridge, 
behind  the  barricade  and  gap,  with  a  double  sentinel  in  a  suitable 
position  at  the  502  crossroads. 


87 

DISCUSSION. 

The  two  men  actually  on  observation  (a  double  sentinel) "should 
be  concealed  at  the  502  crossroads  in  order  to  give  suitable  warning 
of  the  approach  of  any  hostile  force  on  the  converging  roads.  The 
distance  from  the  bivouac  of  the  picket  to  the  502  crossroads  is  about 
200  yards.  This  distance  is  too  great  to  permit  the  sending  of  sen- 
tinels directly  from  the  picket.  Sentinels  should  be  conveniently 
near  the  reliefs.  This  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  Corpl. 
Nelson's  squad  should  be  conveniently  near  the  sentinels.  A  suit- 
able post  for  the  sentinels  is  the  important  thing.  In  the  present 
case,  the  sentry  squad,  if  it  remains  quietly  behind  the  barricade, 
will  not  be  seen  or  attract  attention  at  night.  In  case  of  attack, 
Corpl.  Nelson  should  have  little  difficulty  in  falling  back  on  the 
picket  without  interfering  with  the  efforts  of  the  picket  to  repel 
the  enemy. 

SITUATION  VI. 

It  is  8  p.  m.  All  parts  of  the  outpost  have  taken  up  their  night 
positions. 

Stake  out  on  the  map,  with  pins,  the  following  bodies  of  troops: 

(a)   The  brigade,  in  camp  between  561  and  D.  Wirt. 

(&)   Companies  C  and  D  of  our  battalion,  at  616. 

(<?)   Company  A,  on  the  ridge  between  your  picket  and  Plain  view. 

(d)  Company  B,  on  the  road  midway  between  616  and  Hershcy 
Mill. 

(e)  A  platoon  of  Cavalry,  at  the  Conewago  crossing  14  miles  south- 
east of  Plainview;  sent  out  by  Maj.  Crosby  from  (b). 

(/)  One  squad  in  observation  1  mile  east  of  616,  on  the  bank  of 
Conewago  Creek,  at  the  east  end  of  the  ford;  sent  out  by  (g). 

(g)  Second  platoon  (Sergt.  Crane),  Company  A,  on  the  bank  of 
the  Conewago,  at  the  west  end  of  the  ford  mentioned  in  (./)  ;  sent  out 

by  (o). 

(h)  A  half  squad  in  observation  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago, 
about  halfway  between  (g)  and  (/)  ;  sent  out  by  (g). 

(i)   Corpl.  Nelson's  squad,  near  502. 

(/)   Your  picket,  in  its  night  position,  south  end  of  first  bridge. 

(k)  A  half  squad  in  observation  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Cone- 
wago, 500  yards  east  of  Hershey  Mill ;  sent  out  by  (I). 

(I)  A  platoon  of  Company  B,  at  the  Hershey  Mill  road  fork;  sent 
out  by  (d). 

(m)  A  squad  in  observation  at  the  bridge  50  yards  north  of 
Hershey  Mill;  sent  out  by  (I). 

(n)  A  squad  in  observation  at  the  bend  in  the  road,  500  yards 
southwest  of  Hershey  Mill;  sent  out  directly  from  (d). 


88 

(o)  A  platoon  of  Infantry  on  the  road  somewhere  between  hill 
712  and  bridge  S.  H.;  sent  out  by  the  brigade  commander  and  not 
under  Maj.  Crosby's  orders. 

Referring  to  the  various  situations  in  the  sixth  and  seventh  prob- 
lems for  further  details  if  necessary,  give  the  correct  names  and 
numbering  of  the  various  bodies  of  troops  enumerated  above. 


(a)  Main  body. 
(6)   Outpost  reserve. 

(c)  Support  No.  1. 

(d)  Support  No.  2. 
(r)   Detached  post. 

(/)  Sentinel  post  No.  1,  outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  1  (a  sentry 
squad). 

(g)  Outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  1  (a  picket). 

(Ji)  Sentinel  post  No.  2,  outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  1  (a  cossack 
post) . 

(i)   Sentinel  post,  outguard  No.  2,  support  No.  1  (a  sentry  squad). 

(j)  Outguard  No.  2,  support  No.  1  (a  picket). 

(k)  Sentinel  post  No.  1,  outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  2  (a  cossack 
post). 

(I)   Outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  2  (a  picket). 

(m)  Sentinel  post  No.  2,  outguard  No.  1,  support  No.  2  (a  sentry 
squad). 

(n)   Outguard  No.  2,  support  No.  2  (a  sentry  squad) . 


DISCUSSION. 

Infantry  Drill  Regulations  685,  687,  and  693  govern  the  number- 
ing of  the  supports,  outguards,  and  sentinel  posts. 

(c)  and  (d)  form  the  line  of  supports;  (g),  (j),  (7),  and  (??)  form 
the  line  of  outguards,  sometimes  called  the  line  of  observation.  The 
latter  term,  however,  is  not  strictly  correct,  since  three  of  the  out- 
guards have  sent  out  squads,  or  half  squads,  to  form  the  real  observa- 
tion groups.  (/),  (A),  (?'),  (/<•),  and  (m)  would  be  called  outguards 
if  they  had  been  sent  out  directly  from  a  support,  but  in  the  present 
case  they  are  merely  sentinel  posts  and  differ  from  the  other  kind  of 
sentinel  posts  only  in  that  the  reliefs  off  duty  are  resting  near  the  seiir 
tinel  position  and  not  at  the  position  of  the  outguard.  If  yoru  picket 
had  a  double  sentinel  in  the  woods  50  or  75  yards  north  of  your 
bivouac  to  watch  an  important  trail,  that  sentinel  position  would  be 
called  sentinel  post  No.  2,  outguard  No.  2,  support  No.  1.  The  only 
difference  between  it  and  Corp.  Nelson's  post  would  be  that  the 


89 

reliefs  for  the  former  remain  with  the  outguard,  whereas,  on  ac- 
count of  distance,  the  reliefs  for  Corp.  Xelson's  post  are  detached 
from  the  outguard  and  remain  near  the  sentinel  post.  Also,  in  this 
case,  Corp.  Nelson's  post  would  be  numbered  (No.  1).  If  an  out- 
guard has  only  one  sentinel  post,  it  need  not  be  numbered. 

You  will  observe  that  neither  size  nor  location  will  determine  the 
correct  name  of  the  outpost  parts.  The  determining  factor  is  the 
relation  of  the  unit  to  the  line  of  outguards  and  to  the  line  of  sup- 
ports, (n)  is  no  larger  than  (/),  (i),  or  (m),  but  it  is  called  an 
outguard  nevertheless  because  in  its  allotted  front  it  provides  the 
sentinels  for  observation  and  is  the  only  body  of  troops  between  the 
enemy  and  support  No.  2.  It  is  one  of  the  units  in  the  line  of 
outguards. 

In  spite  of  many  efforts  to  simplify  the  nomenclature  and  num- 
bering of  the  outpost  parts,  the  matter  still  remains  complicated, 
as  you  have  seen.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  we  can  not  make  an 
outpost  fit  a  diagram.  It  must  fit  the  terrain  and  the  conditions 
with  respect  to  the  enemy  and  our  own  troops. 

A  noncommissioned  officer  must  familiarize  himself  with  the 
various  names  and  what  they  and  the  numbering  system  signify, 
because  one  of  the  duties  of  a  noncommissioned  officer  is  to  explain 
to  his  outguard,  or  sentinel  post,  or  patrol,  how  the  outpost  lies 
with  respect  to  .the  ground  on  which  his  own  men  are  to  operate. 

While  your  pins  are  still  in  place  on  the  map  and  the  whole  situ- 
ation with  reference  to  the  main  body  and  the  outpost  is  fresh  in 
your  mind,  we  advise  you  to  note  carefully  the  position  of  the  de- 
tached post  between  hill  712  and  bridge  S.  H.  and  the  relation  of 
that  post  to  the  rest  of  the  brigade.  The  eleventh  problem  will 
deal  with  that  post. 

SITUATION  VII. 

The  preceding  situation  was  purposely  placed  out  of  its  proper 
sequence  as  to  time  of  day  in  order  to  give  you  a  clearer  picture  of 
the  whole  outpost. 

It  is  now  3.20  p.  m.  The  first  patrols  that  you  sent  out  have 
returned,  and  your  roster  is  ready.  The  Conewago  appears  to  be 
unfordable  along  your  front. 

What  orders  do  you  give  to  Towney  and  Kelley?     (See  roster.) 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

I  give  orders  as  follows: 

Yon  two  men  are  leaders  of  the  visiting  patrol  to  the  south.  Towney  and 
Willis,  first  relief.  Kelley  and  Miller,  second  relief.  I  will  show  you  the  route 
(I  point  it  out  while  we  stand  at  the  southeast  end  of  the  trench).  To-night 


90 

our  picket  will  be  at  that  bridge.  Your  patrol  will  leave  the  bridge,  go  south 
along  the  bank  of  the  Conewago  a  short  half  mile  to  a  cossack  post  called  sen- 
tinel post  No.  2,  outguard  No.  1,  of  our  support ;  then  along  the  Conewago  until 
you  find  that  fence  (the  one  nearest  the  trench)  ;  then  along  the  fence  about 
to  this  trench ;  then  along  the  road  to  the  picket.  Towney,  repeat  that. 

I  cause  each  of  the  men  to  repeat  these  instructions  until  I  am  sat- 
isfied that  they  understand,  then  add: 

Now,  Towney,  take  Kelley  with  you  to  the  bridge  and  go  over  the  route. 

DISCUSSION. 

We  have  already  said  that  your  visiting  patrol  needs  to  go  only 
as  far  as  the  cossack  post;  that  makes  contact  with  the  next  out- 
guard.  It  would  not  be  wrong  to  have  the  patrol  merely  go  back  and 
forth  along  the  creek,  but  we  prefer  the  route  given  in  the  solution 
because  it  is  short  and  easy  to  follow  and  covers  more  ground.  The 
watching  of  the  front  along  the  Conewago  does  not  demand  extreme 
vigilance  on  your  part.  It  is  not  fordable  between  the  bridge  and 
the  cossack  post ;  but  even  so,  a  Red  patrol  of  the  kind  we  shall  study 
in  the  eleventh  problem  may  be  lurking  in  rear  of  our  picket. 

Even  in  deciding  a  question  apparently  so  trivial  as  whether  the 
patrol  shall  go  clockwise  or  contra-clockwise  there  is  frequently  a 
chance  to  display  judgment.  There  are  three  reasons  for  sending  the 
patrol  clockwise — that  is,  to  leave  by  the  Conewago  and  return  by 
the  road:  First,  a  patrol  returning  by  the  road  is  less  likely  to 
compel  a  challenge  from  the  picket  sentinel  or  to  alarm  him.  Second, 
the  fence  seems  to  end  in  the  woods ;  it  is  easier  to  find  the  road  from 
the  fence  than  to  find  the  fence  from  the  road.  Third,  if  during 
the  night  a  Red  patrol  gains  the  rear  of  our  picket — not  as  probable 
a  situation  in  the  present  case  as  in  some  other — its  attention  AY  ill 
be  directed  chiefly  toward  the  picket,  and  therefore  it  will  be  less 
watchful  toward  the  southwest  than  toward  the  northeast. 

SITUATION  VIII. 

At  3.30  p.  m.  you  receive  from  Capt.  Rowen  a  written  message, 
as  follows: 

Send  patrol  at  once  to  see  if  Heidlersburg  is  occupied  by  the  enemy.  A 
Cavalry  patrol  from  the  Cavalry  detached  post  is  going  out  on  the  side  roads 
east  of  Heidlersburg  for  the  same  purpose. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  give  the  following  orders  to  Sergt.  Hill: 

Sergt.  Hill,  take  Brown  and  McGowan  with  you  on  patrol.    You  are  to  go  to 
Heidlersburg  to  see  if  the  town  is  occupied  by  the  enemy.     I  have  no  map  to 


91 

give  you,  but  Heidlersburg  is  on  that  main  road  and  a  mile  and  a  half  northeast 
of  here.  Go  out  by  way  of  our  sentinel  post  at  the  bridge.  North  -of  the 
sentinel  post  there  is  a  large  area  of  woods.  Go  into  those  woods,  and  then  use 
the  wooded  ravines  west  of  the  main  road,  guiding  roughly  by  the  main  road. 
You  remember  the  last  information  we  had  was  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  is 
4  miles  northeast  of  here,  on  the  Harrisburg  Road,  the  same  road  that  Heidlers- 
burg is  on.  You  know,  too,  that  while  you  are  out  you  may  meet  up  with 
Corp.  Koenig's  or  Butler's  patrol  somewhere  north  of  our  sentinel  post.  I 
know  of  no  other  Blue  patrol  or  troops  that  you  are  likely  to  meet,  but  the 
Cavalry  detached  post  southeast  of  here  is  sending  out  a  patrol  on  the  side 
roads  east  of  Heidlersburg.  Come  back  when  you  learn  that  Heidlersburg  is 
not  occupied  or  when  you  find  that  the  Reds,  if  there  are  any  around  Heidlers- 
burg, are  halted  for  the  night  or  are  on  the  march.  You  have  field  glasses1 
and  a  compass.  Have  you  a  note  book  and  pencil?  A  watch?  Here  are  some 
field-message  blanks.  Repeat  your  instructions. 

When  I  am  certain  that  Sergt.  Hill  understands  I  tell  him  to  go 
ahead,  but  I  watch  his  preparations  and  his  departure. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  conduct  of  this  patrol  is  the  subject  of  the  ninth  problem. 

It  would  have  been  more  consistent,  probably,  if  Capt.  Rowen 
had  sent  the  patrol  directly  from  the  support.  Patrols  of  this 
character  are  usually  sent  from  the  support,  unless  the  picket  has 
more  men  than  it  requires  for  sentinels,  sentinel  posts,  and  local 
patrol  duty.  In  any  event  it  is  well  to  know  how  to  send  out  a  recon- 
noitering  patrol  of  the  kind  ordered  by  the  captain. 

"  The  commander  must  have  clearly  in  mind  the  purpose  for 
which  the  patrol  is  to  be  used  in  order  that  he  may  determine  its 
proper  strength,  select  its  leader,  and  give  the  latter  proper  instruc- 
tions." (I.  D.  K,  606.) 

"  If  the  purpose  is  to  gain  information  only,  a  small  patrol  is 
better  than  a  large  one.  The  former  conceals  itself  more  readily 
and  moves  less  conspicuously. 

"  If  messages  are  to  be  sent  back,  the  patrol  must  be  strong  enough 
to  furnish  the  proper  number  of  messengers  without  reducing  the 
patrol  to  less  than  two  men.  If  hostile  patrols  are  likely  to  be  met 
and  must  be  driven  off,  the  patrol  must  be  strong. 

"  In  friendly  territory  a  weaker  patrol  may  be  used  than  would  be 
used  for  the  corresponding  purpose  in  hostile  territory."  (I.  D.  E., 
607.) 

If  Sergt.  Hill  finds  Heidlersburg  occupied,  but  finds  also  that 
conditions  are  such  that  he  ought  to  remain  for  a  while  in  observa- 
tion, he  will,  very  likely,  send  back  a  message.  It  is  not  likely  that 
he  will  be  obliged  to  send  back  two  messages.  He  can  bring  back 
in  person  the  second  important  item  of  information,  if  there  is  a 

1  The  remark  concerning  telephone  equipment  (footnote,  p.  73)  applies  equally  to  the 
issue  of  field  glasses  to  sergeants. 


92 

'second  item,  and  we  have  no  reason  to  suspect  that  his  patrol  will 
'make  more  than  two  important  discoveries.  The  smallest  number 
of  men  that  we  would  consider  for  this  patrol  is,  therefore,  three. 

Sergt.  Hill's  patrol  is  not  of  the  kind  that  is  justified  in  fighting 
in  order  to  get  forward;  therefore,  it  need  not  be  made  strong  in 
order  to  give  it  fighting  strength.  Although  we  are  in  hostile  terri- 
tory, the  ground  over  which  the  patrol  will  probably  pass  is  quite 
free  from  houses  and  appears  to  offer  good  cover.  Hence  there 
would  appear  to  be  no  urgent  necessity  for  making  the  patrol 
stronger.  In  spite  of  these  arguments,  against  increasing  the  size 
of  the  patrol,  we  would,  on  general  principles,  make  a  little  allow- 
ance and  favor  a  patrol  of  four  men  if  the  roster  of  the  platoon  had 
not  used  up  so  many  men.  If  the  patrol  had  been  sent  from  the 
support,  we  should  favor  four  men;  three  is  the  irreducible  minimum 
and  possibly  too  few. 

A  patrol  such  as  the  one  you  are  nowr  sending  out,  is  the  most  im- 
portant and  the  hardest  to  lead  of  any  that  falls  to  infantry,  except, 
perhaps,  the  kind  you  will  meet  in  the  thirteenth  problem.  The 
necessity  for  giving  complete  instructions  must  be  apparent.  You 
will  do  well,  therefore,  to  study  carefully  Infantry  Drill  Regula- 
tions 608  and  609,  while  this  situation  is  fresh  in  your  mind.  Assum- 
ing that  you  will  do  so,  a  discussion  of  the  detailed  instructions  given 
to  Sergt.  Hill  is  unnecessary. 

SITUATION  IX. 

For  the  purpose  of  the  present  situation  we  shall  assume  that  V»MI 
are  Sergt.  Hill,  the  platoon  guide. 

It  is  after  midnight,  and  you  are  awake  and  on  watch  at  the  picket. 
First  Sergt.  Holmes  and  the  commander  of  the  picket  guard  are 
asleep.  At  12.40  a.  m.  you  hear  four  shots,  apparently  fired  by  Corpl. 
Nelson's  sentinel  post  at  crossroads  502.  You  awaken  Sergt.  Holmes 
and  inform  him  of  the  occurrence.  He  listens  a  few  moments,  but 
all  is  quiet.  He  then  tells  you  to  take  Schafer  with  you  and  in- 
vestigate. Going  forward  with  Schafer,  you  find  Corpl.  Nelson 
with  his  sentinels,  and  you  are  informed  as  follows:  There  is  no 
patrol  in  front  at  present.  The  sentinels  saw  moving  figures  in  the 
edge  of  the  road  75  yards  to  the  southeast.  One  of  the  sentinels  sig- 
naled twenty-three,  but  there  was  no  response.  He  then  called, 
"  Halt,  who  is  there?"  but  still  there  was  no  response.  Each  sentinel 
then  fired  two  shots.  Then  they  heard  a  scampering,  and  the  figures 
disappeared. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 


I  intend  to  take  with  me  Schafer  and  one  of  Corpl.  Nelson's  men 
and  go  east  into  the  cornfield;  then  south  very  carefully,  just  close 


93 

enough  to  the  road  to  see  what  is  on  it,  exercising  great  caution  when 
I  pass  the  farm  buildings.  When  I  have  gone  south  about~400 
yards,  I  intend  to  cross  the  road  and  return  by  way  of  the  strip  of 
land  between  the  road  and  the  Conewago. 

SITUATION  X. 

Just  before  you  reach  the-  first  house,  a  slight  noise  on  the  road 
attracts  your  attention.  Approaching  very  carefully,  you  discern  the 
outline  of  several  cows.  On  arriving  in  the  road  you  find  there  are 
three  of  them. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 


I  intend  to  drive  the  cows  to  the  crossroads  and  tie  them  to  a  fence 
near  the  sentinel  post,  using  wire  for  this  purpose  if  nothing  better 
can  be  found.  Then  I  intend  to  return  to  the  picket  and  report. 

mscussiox. 

Many  things  occur  to  alarm  sentinels  on  outpost.  Since  firearms 
were  invented  it  is  probable  that  sentinels  on  outpost  at  night  have 
fired  more  shots  at  animals  than  at  human  beings.  Apparently  such 
occurrences  can  not  be  avoided.  In  campaign  soldiers  soon  learn  that 
every  alarm  at  night  does  not  signify  that  the  enemy  is  coming  or 
that  any  particular  danger  exists.  But  no  matter  how  frequently 
these  minor  alarms  occur,  the  occasion  for  them  must  be  investigated. 
In  the  long  run  you  wall  become  irritated  rather  than  alarmed  when 
you  hear  shots  fired  at  night.  If  it  seems  probable  that  the  men  of 
your  particular  outpost  unit  are  responsible  for  the  alarm,  you  will 
probably  say  to  yourself,  "  The  chances  are  that  it  does  not  amount 
to  a  hill  of  beans  " ;  but,  even  so,  the  matter  must  be  investigated. 

Although  Corpl.  Nelson  has  a  squad  on  the  spot,  the  picket  can 
not  omit  the  investigation  on  the  supposition  that  Corpl.  Nelson  has 
enough  men  to  enable  him  to  look  into  the  matter.  As  far  as  the 
picket  knows,  Corpl.  Nelson  and  his  entire  squad  may  have  been 
surprised  and  captured.  Capt.  Rowen  can  quickly  determine  by 
telephone  whether  the  alarm  was  raised  at  the  picket  itself,  but  a 
picket  can  seldom  be  in  telephonic  communication  with  a  sentinel 
post,  particularly  at  night.  If  Corpl.  Nelson  attempted  to  telephone 
at  night,  it  would  be  hard  for  him  to  prevent  his  voice  from  being 
heard  at  a  great  distance. 

While  you  are  patrolling  away  from  the  sentinel  post  it  is  better 
to  be  on  the  safe  side  of  the  road.  The  safe  side  is  the  one  which 
enables  you  to  make  a  run  in  any  direction.  If  you  find  the  wagori 
road  clear  for  several  hundred  yards^  there  is  relatively  little  danger 
in  returning  by  the  route  mentioned  in  the  solution.  You  may  then 


94 

be  reasonably  sure  that  whatever  alarmed  the  sentinel  post  is  no 
longer  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  In  any  event,  considering  the 
time  that  has.elapsed  since  the  sentinels  fired,  you  will  probably  find, 
if  you  find  anything  at  all,  either  stray  animals  or  a  small  Red  patrol 
that  has  been  sent  out  to  locate  and  fasten  itself  to  one  of  the  elements 
of  our  outpost. 

If  a  part  of  the  bridge  planking  had  not  been  removed,  you  would, 
of  course,  have  driven  the  cattle  back  as  far  as  the  support.  It 
would  not  be  wise  to  arouse  a  detail  of  men  to  relay  the  planking  at 
this  time  of  night. 

There  are  two  good  reasons  for  taking  possession  of  the  cattle. 
First,  they  will  not  disturb  the  outpost  any  more.  Second,  they  are 
strays,  and  fresh  beef  is  good  for  the  soldier. 

Sentinels  who  mistake  cattle  for  an  enemy  and  open  fire  justly 
deserve  rebuke,  even  though  we  recognize  that  such  occurrences  must 
be  expected.  The  form  of  the  rebuke  depends  upon  what  kind  of 
men  the  sentinels  are.  Ordinarily  it  will  suffice  to  let  the  company 
know  what  has  happened.  During  the  ensuing  day  or  two  the  com- 
pany will  attend  to  the  rest  in  a  manner  that  will  not  be  wanting  in 
effectiveness. 

One  other  point  deserves  mention.  The  first  sergeant  sent  you  to 
investigate.  It  wrould  be  wrong  for  him  to  investigate  in  person, 
even  if  he  happened  to  be  on  watch  at  the  time.  He  commands  the 
picket  and  belongs  with  it.  Inexperienced  commanders  are  inclined 
to  wander  off  on  side  issues,  and,  in  consequence,  are  frequently  in 
the  wrong  place  when  a  crisis  occurs.  Side  issues  must  be  left  to 
subordinates. 

******* 

There  are  other  details  connected  with  an  outguard  which  might 
be  made  subject  of  additional  situations  in  this  problem.  To  sum- 
marize in  particular  some  of  the  precautions  that  would  be  taken, 
we  may  say  that  the  men  should  sleep  with  their  belts  and  bayonets 
on  and  their  rifles  alongside.  The  bivouac  should  be  close  to  the 
barricade,  fairly  comfortable  ground  for  sleeping  being  necessary. 
The  men  should  be  told  how  to  form  up  in  case  of  alarm,  and  the 
formation  should  be  drilled  two  or  three  times  after  dark  and  before 
the  men  are  allowed  to  go  to  sleep,  otherwise  confusion  can  hardly 
be  avoided.  It  is  better  to  keep  the  bayonets  in  the  scabbards  and 
later  fix  them  to  the  rifles  as  the  men  run  to  their  positions,  par- 
ticularly if  the  bivouac  and  the  position  to  be  held  in  case  of  alarm 
are  cramped. 


EIGHTH  PROBLEM. 


A  COSSACK  POST  AND  A  SENTRY  SQUAD. 


EXPLANATION. 

In  previous  problems  the  nature  and  purpose  of  cossack  posts  and 
sentry  squads  have  been  made  fairly  clear.  We  might  add  that  their 
first  duty  is  to  observe  and  give  warning.  Their  secondary  duties 
include  the  obligation  to  remain  concealed  from  view,  and  to  in- 
tercept all  strangers  in  the  vicinity  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent 
their  escape. 

A  cossack  post  consists  of  four  men  and  posts  a  single  sentinel.  A 
sentry  squad  consists  of  7,  8,  or  possibly  9  men,  and  posts  a  double 
sentinel ;  that  is,  two  men,  generally  within  whispering  distance  of 
each  other.  In  daytime  a  single  sentinel  is  frequently  sufficient. 
At  night  a  double  sentinel  is  nearly  always  necessary.  We  have 
already  explained  that  a  cossack  post  or  a  sentry  squad  may  be 
either  an  outguard  or  simply  a  sentinel  post  of  an  outguard.  (See 
Situation  VI,  seventh  problem,  and  I.  D.  E.  693.)  It  may  happen 
that  a  sentry  squad  will  be  assigned  to  an  outguard  position  of  such 
importance  and  difficulty  as  to  require  the  detail  of  an  officer  to  com- 
mand it. 

SITUATION  I. 

Based  on  Situation  II,  seventh  problem. 

You  are  Corpl.  Nelson.     Read  First  Sergt.  Holmes's  orders  to  the 
entire  platoon  (p.  91)  and  his  orders  to  you  (p.  92). 
What  arrangements  do  you  make  under  those  orders? 


I  make  sure  that  the  men  understand  the  information  given  as  to 
the  direction  of  the  enemy,  the  local  geography,  and  the  location  of 
the  other  outpost  units  and  of  the  main  camp.  I  repeat  the  orders 
concerning  the  disposition  of  strangers  and  readiness  for  action.  I 
then  announce  the  three  reliefs  of  one  man  each  and  state  that  each 
sentinel  will  be  one  hour  on  duty  and  two  hours  off.  I  then  post 
the  first  relief,  tell  him  to  observe  particularly  the  three  roads  that 

(95) 


96 

converge  at  502,  and  I  see  to  it  that  he  uses  properly  the  covered 
position  assigned  to  him.  The  other  men  are  shown  their  position 
when  not  on  post.  Then  I  send  the  men  of  the  second  and  third  re- 
liefs to  cut  the  wires  and  bring  in  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  houses, 
as  ordered  by  the  first  sergeant. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  impossible  to  locate  on  a  map  the  exact  position  of  a  body 
of  troops  as  small  as  a  cossack  post.  A  little  experience  will  soon 
teach  you  how  much  in  the  way  of  brush  or  other  features  is  re- 
quired for  suitable  cover,  and  the  proper  way  to  use  the  cover  that 
you  find.  One  reason  for  remaining  as  well  concealed  as  possible  is 
the  safety  of  the  men;  another  is  the  prevention  of  definite  informa- 
tion being  received  by  the  enemy;  another  is  the  advantage  that 
cover  gives  you  in  handling  situations  like  the  one  that  follows. 

SITUATION  II. 

The  men  sent  to  cut  wires  have  returned.  At  4.15  p.  m.  the  sen- 
tinel points  up  the  road  to  the  northeast  and  says: 

Red  patrol  coming. 

Looking  cautiously  up  the  road,  you  see,  400  yards  away,  a  single 
Red  cavalryman  trotting  rapidly  toward  you.  About  100  yards  in 
rear  of  him  and  slightly  in  rear  of  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  you  see  the 
upper  part  of  another  horse  and  rider,  halted,  the  rider  apparently 
looking  in  your  direction. 

What  do  you  do  during  the  next  30  seconds,  assuming  that  at  the 
end  of  that  time  the  Reds  advance  with  two  men  riding  about  150 
yards  in  rear  of  the  first  man  ? 


I  order  the  men : 

Oot  ready  under  rover.  A  Red  patrol  is  coining.  When  I  command  "  fire,'* 
jump  into  the  road  and  tire.  I  will  take  the  tirst  man.  The  rest  of  you  take  the 
others. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  order  to  decide  intelligently  the  proper  thing  to  do,  it  is  advan- 
tageous to  know  how  a  cavalry  patrol  generally  operates.  To  cover 
ground  rapidly,  it  is  practically  confined  to  the  use  of  roads,  but  it 
does  not  rush  blindly  along  these  roads.  Let  us  try  to  figure  out 
how  the  patrol  now  in  your  front  is  working.  We  will  suppose  that 
the  patrol  consists  of  four  men.  They  know  that  we  are  on  or  very 
near  the  Harrisburg  Road,  and  they  have  been  sent  out  to  discover 
and  report  our  progress  or  location.  One  or  tAvo  men  usually  lead 


97 

the  way.  Let  us  assume  that  one  man  rides  100  or  200  yards  or  even 
more  ahead  of  the  patrol  leader.  This  lead-off  man  rides  rapidly 
through  Heidlersburg  and  reaches  the  favorable  observation  point 
near  road  fork  545  and  halts  there.  The  patrol  leader  and  the  one 
man  who  is  riding  with  him  advance  to  the  observation  point  and 
the  leader,  using  his  field  glasses,  examines  carefully  the  country 
to  his  front.  The  fourth  man  of  the  patrol  remains  100  yards  or 
more  in  rear  of  the  leader.  The  patrol  leader  finds  no  trace  of  his 
enemy  and  sees  no  suspicious  signs.  He  then  sends  the  lead-off  man 
at  a  fast  trot  to  the  next  ridge,  a  half  mile  northeast  of  crossroads 
502,  and  follows  him  a  moment  later.  On  the  ridge  another  halt  is 
made,  the  country  is  again  carefully  examined,  and  the  lead-off  man 
is  again  sent  forward.  Before  coming  to  a  final  decision  to  cross  the 
Conewago  and  to  reach  the  high  ground  where  Company  A  now 
happens  to  be,  the  Cavalry  patrol,  in  the  manner  described,  makes 
one  more  halt  on  the  ridge  450  yards  northeast  of  crossroads  502. 
From  this  ridge  the  patrol  can  see  the  road  nearly  to  Plainview. 
Apparently  the  Eeds  think  the  road  is  clear,  and  the  lead-off  man 
is  trotting  rapidly  forward ;  while  the  patrol  leader,  who  is  no  longer 
required  to  be  cautious  about  exposing  himself,  halts  where  he 
can  get  a  better  view  while  the  lead-off  man  is  getting  his  distance. 
We  know  that  our  picket  is  entrenching  its  position.  Apparently 
the  Red  patrol  can  not  see  this  on  account  of  the  trees  on  the  island 
and  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago.  If  the  patrol  intends  to 
go  to  Plainview  the  lead-off  man  will  probably  halt  a  moment  at 
crossroads  502,  look  to  the  right  and  left,  and  then  start  to  cross 
the  bridge.  He  may  pass  the  cossack  post  without  seeing  it.  Mean- 
time the  remainder  of  the  patrol  will  be  coming  along  at  various 
distances.  From  head  to  rear  the  patrol  may  be  300  yards  or  more 
in  length. 

With  this  general  idea  of  cavalry  patrolling  clearly  in  your  mind, 
you  understand  why  one  man  was  seen  halted  while  the  other  was 
advancing.  If  the  man  who  halted  saw  anything  suspicious  he 
would  probably  whistle  to  the  lead-off  man  and  call  him  back.  Until 
you  see  this  done  you  may  be  sure  that  the  man  who  halted  was 
merely  waiting  for  the  other  to  gain  his  distance  to  the  front.  It 
would  be  premature,  therefore,  to  open  fire  at  once.  You-  might 
"  get "  one  man,  but  the  others  w7ould  quickly  disappear ;  and,  there- 
after moving  very  cautiously,  they  might  learn  much.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  you  can  break  up  practically  the  whole  patrol  by  "  getting  " 
several  horses  and  men,  the  one  or  two  survivors,  if  there  be  sur- 
vivors, will  be  obliged  to  give*  up  patrolling  and  return  with  scant 
information.  A  fresh  patrol  sent  to  clear  up  the  situation  developed 
by  the  first  one  might  be  stopped  elsewhere  (for  example,  near 
9G7900— 17 7 


98 

Heidlersburg)  by  one  of  our  Cavalry  patrols  or  by  Corp.  Koenig's 
or  Butler's  putrol  if  they  happen  to  be  northeast  of  crossroads  502. 
In  any  event,  whatever  information  the  enemy  finall}^  receives  would 
either  be  late  or  very  indefinite.  You  should  attempt,  therefore,  to 
hurt  the  Red  patrol  enough  to  make  it  stop  patrolling. 

SITUATION  III. 

The  lead-off  man  trotted  past  you  and  reached  the  north  end  of 
the  bridge  nearest  Plainview  and  then  suddenly  turned  about  and 
galloped  back,  meantime  signaling  "halt."  Two  men  of  the  patrol 
are  50  yards  and  another  man  200  yards  northeast  of  crossroads  502. 
They  halt. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPL.  NELSON'S  SOLUTION. 
I  command, 
Fire  at  will. 
I  fire  on  the  horse  of  the  lead-off  man. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  very  evident  that  the  lead-off  man  saw  the  picket  at  work  in 
its  trench.  The  time  has  come  for  you  to  spring  the  trap.  If  you  can 
disable  the  horse  that  you  fired  at,  there  is  little  probability  that  the 
rider  can  escape.  An  examination  of  the  rider  may  result  in  giving 
us  valuable  information.  All  parts  of  an  outpost  seek  information 
of  the  enemy.  Very  frequently  information  can  be  obtained  by 
examining  equipment  and  clothing.  For  this  purpose  a  dead  man  is 
as  good  as  a  live  man,  but  a  live  man  may  be  willing  to  talk.  If 
there  had  been  a  fair  chance  that  the  man  would  escape,  the  situation 
would  have  been  different. 

SITUATION  IV. 

You  disabled  the  horse  that  you  fired  at.  The  rider  fell  with  the 
horse,  but  immediately  arose  and  surrendered.  Looking  in  the  other 
direction,  you  see  two  horses  and  one  man  lying  in  the  road,  motion- 
less. One  of  the  men  nearest  the  crossroads  is  just  disappearing  into 
the  woods  west  of  the  road,  while  the  fourth  man  gallops  over  the 
ridge  and  disappears,  apparently  unhurt. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPL.  NELSON'S  SOLUTION. 
I  order, 

Barry,  disarm  that  prisoner  ami  bring  him  to  me. 

I  put  all  the  men  and  the  prisoner  back  in  our  former  concealment. 


99 

DISCUSSION. 

Although,  it  is  likely  that  you  have  seen  only  an  independent  patrol, 
it  is  possible  that  these  men  constitute  the  point  of  an  advance  guard. 
We  can  never  tell  from  the  size  of  the  first  body  of  hostile  troops  we 
feet  how  large  the  force  behind  it  may  be.  In  the  present  case  there 
may  be  nothing  in  rear  or  there  may  be  a  platoon  of  cavalry  or  a 
troop  or  a  squadron.  In  fact,  the  four  men  may  be  (but  probably  are 
not)  the  leading  element  of  a  large  mixed  force  of  all  arms.  If  there 
is  anything  behind  the  patrol,  other  troops  will  soon  appear  on  the 
ridge,  if  not  to  attack  at  least  to  investigate.  It  is  best,  therefore,  to 
wait  with  all  your  men  concealed.  If  the  enemy  appears  in  strength, 
you  will  warn  the  outpost  by  opening  fire. 

The  outguard  will  undoubtedly  send  a  patrol  to  investigate.  When' 
that  patrol  arrives,  we  can  consider  the  matter  of  searching  for  the. 
man  who  disappeared  and  can  examine  the  man  tying  in  the  road. 
Also  the  patrol  can  take  over  the  prisoner  and  carry  back  your  verbal 
report,  if  First  Sergt.  Holmes  does  not  appear  in  person.  If  at  the 
end  of  several  minutes  no  enemy  appears,  the  matters  mentioned 
can  be  attended  to,  including  an  examination  of  the  ground  for  a 
clue  as  to  whether  the  man  who  disappeared  was  wounded. 

SITUATION  V. 

For  the  purpose  of  comparison,  we  shall  assume  that,  instead  of 
crossing  the  bridge,  the  lead-off  man  turned  southeast  at  the  cross- 
roads, apparently  without  seeing  any  signs  of  Blue  troops  on  the 
road  toward  Plainview.  Also  that  there  is  little  doubt  that  the 
entire  patrol  will  take  the  same  route. 

What  would  be  your  plan  ? 


To  open  fire  Avhen  the  whole  patrol  offered  the  best  target. 

DISCUSSION. 

This  question  is  harder  to  answer  than  the  former  one  (Situation 
IV) .  If  you  are  quite  sure  that  the  hostile  patrol  is  riding  away  from 
the  Blue  outpost  without  having  obtained  any  information,  and  that 
its  future  route,  until  it  returns  to  its  main  body,  will  not  put  it  in 
the  way  of  obtaining  information,  it  would  be  best  to  remain  concealed 
and  let  the  patrol  pass.  But  it  is  not  possible  that  our  brigade  can 
be  so  close  to  its  enemy  and  in  the  enemy's  country  without  the  enemy 
knowing  our  approximate  location.  We  have  been  inarching  to-day, 
but  even  so  the  commander  of  the  Red  force  in  front  of  us  probably 
would  not  be  5  miles  off  in  his  estimate  of  our  present  location.  It  is 
almost  impossible  to  conceal  our  movements  in  the  enemy's  country, 


100 

when  that  country  is  so  populous  and  so  generally  equipped  with  tele- 
phones as  the  country  around  Hunterstown  and  Heidlersburg.  We 
can  only  hope  to  conceal  the  details  as  to  our  strength  and  position. 

The  Red  patrol  in  our  front  may  not  see  your  cossack  post,  but  the 
patrol  leader  may  have  decided  that  he  is  now  getting  so  close  to 
where  our  brigade  is  supposed  to  be  that  it  is  time  for  him  to  get 
off  the  main  road,  and  hereafter  use  the  side  roads.  In  other  words, 
it  is  only  a  question  of  a  few  minutes  before  this  patrol  is  going 
to  run  into  our  outpost,  or  be  told  by  farmers  that  Blue  troops  have 
appeared  at  various  places  along  the  Conewago  within  the  last  hour 
or  two.  We  may  seriously  doubt  that  any  other  part  of  the  outpost 
will  have  as  good  an  opportunity  as  you  to  break  up  this  patrol  and 
make  it  stop  patrolling. 

The  killing,  wounding,  or  capturing  of  four  men  will  have  no 
effect  whatever  upon  the  outcome  of  the  war;  the  object  in  firing 
is  primarily  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  obtaining  information,  and 
secondarily  for  us  to  obtain  information  of  the  enemy  from  the 
clothing,  or  equipment,  or  talk  of  the  members  of  the  Red  patrol. 
The  information  we  would  thus  deny  to  the  enemy  and  obtain  for 
ourselves  may  have  some  influence  on  the  campaign. 

SITUATION  VI. 

At  dark  the  remaining  four  men  of  your  squad  arrived.  You  had 
previously  been  ordered  to  construct  a  barricade  and  post  a  sentry 
squad  for  the  night,  as  mentioned  in  Situation  IV,  seventh  problem. 

How  will  you  divide  up  the  squad  for  its  duties  during  the  night  ? 

CORPL.  NELSON'S  SOLUTION. 

For  double  sentinel:  Six  men  (three  reliefs  of  two  men  each,  one 
hour  on  and  two  hours  off).  One  man  (Humphrey),  second  in 
command.  I  will  remain  awake  until  1  o'clock,  and  Humphrey  will 
remain  awake  from  that  time  until  a  half  hour  before  daylight, 
when  everybody  will  be  awakened. 

DISCUSSION. 

A  sentry  squad  has  several  advantages  over  a  cossack  post.  Of 
course,  it  has  twice  as  much  fighting  strength,  but  aside  from  this  it 
has  a  distinct  advantage  in  having  men  to  perform  sentinel  duty  in 
pairs.  Two  men  hear  more  and  see  more,  and,  on  account  of  in- 
creased confidence,  are  less  likely  to  alarm  the  troops  on  slight 
provocation.  Furthermore,  the  squad  leader  and  the  second  in  com- 
mand can  divide  the  night,  and  thus  there  will  be  always  one  man 
awake  at  the  bivouac  of  the  squad.  It  is  very  difficult  for  one  man 


101 

to  remain  awake  the  entire  night.  In  a  cossack  post  the  commander 
generally  goes  to  sleep  some  time  during  the  night  and  the  sentinel 
calls  him  when  it  is  time  for  the  next  relief  to  be  posted.  This  is 
not  a  satisfactory  arrangement. 

In  garrison  or  camp  guard  it  is  customary  for  a  man  to  walk  his 
post  two  hours  and  then  have  four  hours  off.  The  men  of  a  cossack 
post  or  sentry  squad  get  -very  little  continuous  sleep  in  any  event, 
and  it  is  no  particular  hardship  to  limit  each  period  of  rest  to  two 
hours.  It  is  a  hardship,  however,  to  require  a  man  to  stand  two 
hours  as  a  sentinel.  The  strain  on  eyes,  ears,  and  nerves,  and  the 
discomfort  of  the  concealed  position  are  far  greater  than  in  the  case 
of  a  sentinel  in  a  garrison  or  camp  guard.  All  things'  considered, 
therefore,  the  most  satisfactory  arrangement  is  "  one  hour  on,  two 
hours  off." 


NINTH  PROBLEM. 


A  RECONNOITERING  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

"  Eeconnaissance  is  the  military  term  used  to  designate  the  work 
of  troops  or  individuals  when  gathering  information  in  the  field 
*  *  *."  (F.  S.  R.  11.) 

"  The  chief  duty  of  reconnoitering  patrols  is  to  gather  informa- 
tion. They  habitually  seek  safety  in  concealment  or  flight,  fighting 
only  when  their  mission  demands  it.  The  most  skillful  patrolling 
is  where  patrols  accomplish  their  mission  and  return  without  being 
discovered  by  the  enemy."  (F.  S.  R.  23.) 

The  periodical  patrols  that  have  been  mentioned  in  the  sixth  and 
seventh  problems  are  strictly  local  and  are  intended  to  make  the 
outpost  line  effective.  These  patrols  are  covering  detachments  in 
the  sense  that  they  assist  in  preventing  an  attack  without  due  warn- 
ing and  in  preventing  the  enemy  from  obtaining  information.  A 
reconnoitering  patrol,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in  no  sense  a  covering 
detachment.  When  sent  from  an  outpost  it  generally  goes  a  con- 
siderable distance  beyond  the  outpost  line  and  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  some  desired  information.  If  cavalry  is  available,  an 
infantry  reconnoitering  patrol  will  rarely  have  occasion  to  go  more 
than  2  miles  beyond  the  outpost  line. 

The  following  paragraphs  should  be  studied  in  connection  with 
patrols  sent  on  reconnaissance :  Field  Service  Regulations,  23  to  29, 
inclusive ;  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  604  to  622,  inclusive. 

SITUATION  I. 

Based  on  Situation  VIII,  seventh  problem.  You  will  remember 
that  the  Conewago  is  not  fordable  along  the  front  of  our  outguard. 

You  are  Sergt.  Hill,  and  have  received  instructions  as  given  in  the 
first  sergeant's  solution  (p.  103).  It  is  assumed  that  you  have  or 
have  received  the  special  articles  of  equipment  mentioned  by  him. 

What  do  you  do,  up  to  the  time  you  reach  the  bridge  nearest  Plain- 
view  ? 

(103) 


104 


I  order: 

Brown,  McGowan,  unhook  your  bayonets  and  hook  on  your  canteens.  Lay 
aside  all  but  40  rounds  of  ammunition  and  get  ready  for  patrolling;  then  full 
in  here  for  inspection. 

While  they  make  these  preparations,  I  do  likewise  and  inspect  my 
rifle.  When  they  fall  in  I  inspect  them  and  their  rifles  and  equip- 
ment and  order: 

Empty  your  pockets. 

I  take  from  them  whatever  letters  or  other  articles  they  may  have 
of  a  nature  that  would  give  information  to  the  enemy  and,  with  like 
articles  of  my  own,  turn  them  over  to  First.  Sergt.  Holmes.  I  then 
give  the  following  instructions: 

We  are  going  to  Heidlersburg  to  see  if  the  town  is  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
Heidlersburg  is  on  this  main  road,  and  a  mile  and  a  half  northeast  of  here. 
The  last  information  we  had  was  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  is  four  miles 
northeast  of  here  on  the  Harrisburg  road,  the  same  road  that  Heidlersburg  is 
on.  I  will  tell  you  more  about  our  route  when  we  reach  the  sentinel  post.  We 
come  back  as  soon  as  we  learn  whether  Heidlersburg  is  occupied,  or,  if  we  find 
Reds,  we  come  back  when  we  learn  whether  they  are  halted  for  the  night  or 
are  still  on  the  march.  Brown  is  second  in  command.  Do  both  of  you  under- 
stand? With  ball  cartridges,  load.  Follow  me. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  preliminary  measures  taken  by  you  are  quite  different  from 
those  of  the  flank  patrol  in  Situation  I,  third  problem.  The  reason 
for  this  difference  must  be  apparent.  No  one's  progress  is  dependent 
upon  the  time  you  take  for  your  preparations,  and  it  is  most  im- 
portant that  the  patrol  should  start  in  good  physical  condition  and 
properly  equipped. 

The  mission  of  a  patrol  will  determine  its  equipment.  You  will 
return  before  dark.  You  will  not  fight  except  in  self-defense.  There- 
fore any  articles  of  equipment  except  the  rifle,  canteen  of  water,  and 
a  few  rounds  of  ammunition  would  be  superfluous  and  an  unneces- 
sary burden.  You  would  be  given  a  map  if  one  were  available. 
Apparently  the  first  sergeant  had  none  even  for  himself,  else  lie 
would  have  given  it  to  you  for  a  few  minutes  to  enable  you  to  make 
a  sketch  copy  of  so  much  of  the  country  as  related  to  your  patrol. 

A  reconnoitering  patrol  should  leave  the  outpost  line  without 
being  seen  if  possible.  But  the  Conewago  is  unfordable,  and  you 
are  obliged  to  cross  at  the  bridges.  This  will  enable  you  to  ask  the 
cossack  post  for  late  information,  and  from  the  vicinity  of  the 
cossack  post  you  can  describe  better  your  proposed  route;  but  from 
that  point  the  patrol  must  lose  itself  as  quickly  as  possible  and 


105 

thereafter  avoid  exposure.  If  the  Conewago  were  fordable,  you 
would  go  immediately  into  the  woods  west  of  the  picket,  cro^s^the 
island  at  some  point  west  of  the  bridges,  slip  cautiously  across  the 
road  west  of  crossroads  502,  and  then  go  into  the  big  woods. 

SITUATION  II. 

At  the  cossack  post  you  learn  nothing  new.  You  tell  Corpl. 
Nelson  the  direction  and  purpose  of  your  patrol.  You  explain  to 
Brown  and  McGowan  that  after  passing  through  the  big  woods  to 
the  north  you  expect  to  find  wooded  ravines  leading  toward  Heid- 
lersburg  and  paralleling  the  main  road.  Also,  that  you  know  of 
r»o  Blue  troops  or  patrols  in  your  front  except  a  Cavalry  patrol  on 
the  side  roads  east  of  Heidlersburg.  Also,  that  Corpl.  Koenig's  or 
Butler's  patrol  may  be  encountered  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of 
the  cossack  post.  It  is  now  3.55  p.  m. 

What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  the  patrol  has  advanced  another 
half  mile? 

SERGT.    HILL'S    SOLUTION. 

I  order: 

Brown,  march  out  the  left-hand  road,  along  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road. 
I  will  follow  at  25  yards.  McGowan,  follow  me  at  25  yards. 

When  we  have  advanced  about  400  yards,  I  order : 
By  the  right  flank,  march.     McGowan,  follow  me  at  25  yards. 

I  try  to  march  parallel  to  the  Heidlersburg  road,  the  interval  be- 
tween myself  and  the  other  men  depending  upon  the  density  of  the 
brush. 

DISCUSSION. 

Even  while  going  from  the  picket  to  the  cossack  post,  you  would 
not  expose  your  patrol  any  more  than  necessary,  and,  while  talking 
with  Corpl.  Nelson,  you  would  avoid  revealing  his  position  to  a 
possible  Red  observer,  military  or  civilian.  This  you  could  do  best, 
probably,  by  remaining  in  the  road  and  apparently  talking  to  your 
own  men  while  actually  talking  to  the  corporal. 

As  \ve  have  stated,  the  patrol  was  compelled  to  expose  itself  while 
crossing  the  bridge.  You  would  not  have  gained  anything  if  you  had 
made  a  detour  and  had  crossed  the  Conewago  by  the  ford  800  yards 
south  of  crossroads  502  or  the  ford  1,000  yards  \vest  of  crossroads 
502.  The  woods  north  of  crossroads  502  give  you  an  opportunity 
to  conceal  yourself  and  to  deceive  any  Reds  or  inhabitants  who  may 
have  seen  you  cross  the  bridges.  If  you  had  entered  the  woods  at 
the  crossroads,  anyone  who  had  observed  you  from  the  high  ground 
to  the  northeast  or  east  would  be  on  the  alert  for  your  reappearance 


106 

somewhere  along  the  Heidlersburg  road.  By  marching  rather 
openly  to  the  west,  you  may  escape  further  curiosity  on  the  part  of 
such  observers.  If  you  are  observed  from  the  high  ground  to  the 
west,  your  disappearance  into  the  woods  might  lead  an  observer  to 
look  for  your  reappearance  somewhere  along  the  road  toward  cross- 
roads 609.  At  any  rate,  whether  your  ruse  is  successful  or  not, 
you  have  lost  very  little  time,  and  you  .have  observed  the  principle 
that  if  the  patrol  must  expose  itself  it  should  throw  possible  ob- 
servers off  the  trail  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 

The  formation  used  while  marching  on  the  road  has  been  discussed 
in  previous  problems.  The  formation  used  while  passing  through 
woods  is  quite  similar  to  one  which  will  be  discussed  in  Situation  IV 
of  the  present  problem. 

SITUATION  III. 

At  4.12  p.  m.  you  reach  the  east  edge  of  the  woods  near  the  west 
end  of  the  wire  fence  600  yards  north  of  crossroads  502.  You  see 
two  Red  cavalrymen  and  an  extra  horse  on  the  north  slope  of  the 
ridge  500  yards  northeast  of  crossroads  502,  apparently  far  enough 
down  the  slope  to  be  concealed  from  Corpl.  Nelson's  cossack  post. 
A  third  man  is  walking  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge  toward  the  horses. 
The  corn  is  cut  and  in  shock,  but  the  Reds  do  not  appear  to  be  look- 
ing in  your  direction. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do  ? 


I  decide  to  remain  concealed  and  in  observation  long  enough  to 
determine  whether  the  Reds  seem  to  be  a  patrol,  a  point,  or  a  march 
outpost. 

DISCUSSION. 

Naturally,  you  would  not  open  fire.  You  were  sent  out  to  get  in- 
formation, and  must  under  no  circumstances  reveal  your  location  or 
even  your  existence.  You  remain  in  observation,  not  necessarily 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  to  be  sent  back  at  once  to 
the  picket,  but  for  information  that  will  guide  your  own  further 
movements.  If  the  Reds  remain  halted,  they  may  be  a  march  out- 
post, or  even  a  standing  patrol  well  in  advance  of  an  outpost.  Their 
arrangements  will  probably  indicate  their  character.  If  they  show 
little  curiosity  as  to  the  woods  that  you  are  in,  you  may  be  quite  sure 
that  they  have  not  been  in  their  present  position  very  long,  else  they 
would  have  seen  you  cross  the  bridge.  If  the  Reds  move  and  nothing 
else  is  in  rear  of  them  you  may  take  it  for  granted  that  they  are 
on  patrol.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  they  will  prove  to  be  the 


107 

point  of  a  marching  column.  Even  so,  you  would  not  make  the 
discovery  much  earlier  than  the  outpost  itself.  No  matter*  there- 
fore, what  develops  within  the  next  few  minutes,  you  have  as  yet 
seen  nothing  to  warrant  the  sending  of  a  report  by  messenger. 

SITUATION  IV. 

The  dismounted  Red  soldier  mounted  the  extra  horse,  and  about 
a  minute  later  one  Red  trotted  toward  crossroads  502,  followed  at 
about  200  yards  by  the  other  two.  About  the  same  distance  in  rear 
a  fourth  man  appeared.  You  decided  to  await  the  impending  clash 
with  Corpl.  Nelson's  cossack  post.  A  few  moments  later  brisk  firing 
began,  and  presently  you  saw  one  Red  cavalryman  galloping  toward 
Heidlersburg.  Firing  ceased,  and  after  a  pause  you  were  convinced 
that  the  other  Reds  had  either  been  killed  or  captured,  or  had  escaped 
by  some  other  route.  You  proceeded  north  under  cover  of  the 
woods  and  presently  saw  two  wooded  ravines  leading  northeast  to- 
ward Heidlersburg.  You  chose  the  one  farthest  from  crossroads 
502  and  finally  arrived  400  yards  west  of  road  fork  545,  at  the  point 
where  the  east  edge  of  the  rectangular  patch  of  woods  meets  the 
ravine.  About  half  a  mile  to  the  northeast  you  see  several  house- 
tops. The  houses  in  the  west  end  of  Heidlersburg  are  seen  quite 
clearly.  Three  hundred  yards  north  of  your  present  position  there 
appears  to  be  the  crest  of  a  ridge  which  extends  toward  Heidlers- 
burg. You  see  no  signs  of  Red  soldiers  or  civilians. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  order: 

Brown,  15  yards  on  my  left.    McGowan,  25  yards  in  rear  of  Brown. 

With  the  patrol  in  this  formation  and  guiding  on  me  I  advance 
north  as  deep  in  the  woods  as  possible,  while  still  close  enough  to  the 
edge  to  observe  the  open  country  to  the  east. 

DISCUSSION. 

Sergt.  Hill  told  you  to  go  to  Heidlersburg.  This  must  not  be 
taken  too  literally.  It  means  simply  that  you  should  go  close  enough 
to  the  village  to  determine  with  certainty  whether  there  are  any 
Reds  in  Heidlersburg.  The  village  is  very  small,  and  it  is  not  at  all 
improbable  that  you  will  be  able  to  find  a  point  from  which  you  can 
examine  every  street  and  the  fields  immediately  about  the  village. 

The  ravine  to  the  northeast  will  lead  you  to  low  ground  close  to 
Heidlersburg.  The  narrow  strip  of  cover  in  the  ravine  may  be 
insufficient  cover  for  the  patrol.  The  woods  to  the  north,  on  the 


108 

other  hand,  give  you  excellent  cover  to  the  ridge  that  extends  south- 
west from  road  fork  578.  From  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  this  ridge 
you  may  be  able  to  see  the  village  streets  very  clearly.  Failing  in 
this,  you  would  have  to  decide  where  to  go  next. 

You  probably  remember  that  in  a  previous  problem  we  recom- 
mended a  skirmish  line  with  wide  intervals  as  a  suitable  formation 
for  an  advance  guard  flank  patrol  passing  through  woods.  There 
is  a  good  reason  for  a  different  formation  in  the  present  case.  An 
advance  guard  flank  patrol  seeks  to  cover  as  much  of  the  woods  as 
possible  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  woods  are  occupied  by 
a  hostile  force  strong  enough  to  be  dangerous  to  the  main  column. 
While  the  escape  of  one  or  more  men  of  such  a  patrol  is  desirable,  it 
is  relatively  less  important.  But  a  reconnoitering  patrol  uses  woods 
merely  as  a  covered  way  for  getting  forward.  It  seeks  to  avoid  the 
enemy.  In  your  present  formation  you  personally  march  so  as  to 
observe  toward  Heidlersburg.  Brown  marches  on  your  left  so  as 
to  prevent  the  patrol  from  being  surprised  from  the  north  or  west. 
Finally  McGowan  is  as  far  in  rear  as  easy  communication  and  the 
density  of  the  brush  permit,  and  he  is  in  the  position  to  escape.  If 
the  patrol  is  surprised  and  you  and  Brown  are  unable  to  get  buck 
to  the  outpost,  the  advantage  of  McGowan's  escape  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  fate  of  the  patrol  will  become  known  and  whatever  infor- 
mation you  have  already  gained  will  be  reported.  There  is  also  a 
reason  why  McGowan  should  follow  Brown  instead  of  you.  You 
are  obliged  to  exercise  skill  and  judgment  in  estimating  how  deep 
into  the  woods  you  must  go  to  escape  observation  and  at  the  same 
time  to  be  close  enough  to  the  edge  to  observe  the  open  country.  If 
McGowan  followed  you  he  might  be  less  skillful  or  more  careless 
and  thus  expose  the  patrol. 

SITUATION  V. 

When  you  arrive  on  top  of  the  ridge  you  see  a  farmer  plowing 
in  the  field  east  of  the  woods.  He  is  moving  from  north  to  south 
close  to  the  edge  of  the  woods. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  signal  the  patrol  to  march  by  the  left  flank  and  move 
west.  While  giving  the  farmer  a  chance  to  reach  the  south  end  of 
the  field,  the  patrol  will  go  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  and  take 
a  look  in  that  direction. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  warfare  in  civilized  countries  the  local  inhabitants  generally 
seem  unwilling  to  suspend  any  of  their  work,  even  though  armies 


109 

are  close  by.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  they  are  disturbed  as  little  as 
possible;  but,  naturally,  we  must  give  them  no  opportunity  to  injure 
us  by  conveying  information  to  troops  of  their  own  army. 

Even  if  you  managed  to  capture  the  farmer  without  attracting 
the  attention  of  some  one  that  you  have  not  yet  seen  you  would 
merely  have  a  white  elephant  on  your  hands.  The  farmer  would  be 
unwilling  to  give  you  any  information,  and  probably  knows  very 
little  in  any  event.  You  could  not  release  him  after  questioning  him. 
You  can  not  spare  a  man  to  guard  him  or  to  take  him  to  the  picket 
while  the  rest  of  the  patrol  continues,  and  you  can  not  tie  him  up 
or  kill  him.  He  will  soon  be  out  of  your  way  if  you  let  him  alone, 
but  give  him  a  chance  to  be  far  away. 

SITUATION  VI. 

When  you  reach  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  you  see,  in  the  ravine 
200  yards  south  of  the  southwest  corner  of  the  orchard,  a  Red  soldier 
walking  rapidly  northeast  toward  the  house  on  the  road.  After 
watching  him  a  moment  you  notice  that  he  has  spurs  but  no  hat  or 
rifle. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 


I  intend  to  avoid  being  seen  and  to  return  at  once  to  the  east 
edge  of  the  woods. 

DISCUSSION. 

Having  read  the  preceding  problem,  you  probably  suspect  that 
the  Red  soldier  belongs  to  the  patrol  that  clashed  with  Corpl.  Nel- 
son's cossack  post,  and  that  he  escaped.  He  is  more  dangerous  than 
the  farmer,  inasmuch  as  he  will  be  the  bearer  of  information  to  the 
Red  commander  if  he  succeeds  in  returning.  But  it  is  not  likely 
that  his  information  will  add  materially  to  what  is  already  known  of 
our  brigade.  He  is  apparently  unarmed,  and  it  would  probably  be 
very  easy  to  capture  him  and  to  prevent  him  from  reporting  what 
little  he  knows,  but  he  would  be  as  much  of  a  white  elephant  as  the 
farmer.  Furthermore,  you  are  not  going  to  settle  the  war  by  picking 
up  single  men  here  and  there.  When  you  are  given  a  distinct  and 
important  task,  you  should  not  permit  any  trivial  thing  to  lead  you 
from  the  direct  prosecution  of  that  task.  At  the  present  moment 
you  are  an  imporant  part  of  the  brigade  commander's  team,  and  he 
wants  teamwork.  He  wants  you  to  obtain  for  him  a  certain  thing; 
information  as  to  what,  if  anything,  is  in  Heidlersburg.  Do  not 
start  your  own  little  war  or  campaign,  but  do  all  in  your  power 
to  get  the  desired  information. 


110 

SITUATION  VII. 

When  you  are  about  halfway  through  the  woods,  yon  heard  hoof- 
beats  on  the  road  to  the  north,  apparently  three  or  four  horses.  You 
now  arrive  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  about 
300  }7ards  southwest  of  road  fork  578.  There  appear  to  be  several 
Red  cavalrymen  halted  near  road  fork  545,  but  the  trees  in  the 
ravine  make  it  difficult  to  distinguish  them.  The  road  that  runs 
west  from  Heidlersburg  is  clear  of  the  enemy,  but  near  the  main 
crossroad  of  the  village  you  see  a  hundred  or  more  dismounted  cav- 
alrymen holding  their  horses.  After  watching  them  for  a  few  mo- 
ments you  realize  that  the  horses  are  being  watered. 

It  is  now  4.55  p.  m. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  write  the  following  message : 

No.  1.  Sgt.  If  ILL'S  PATROL, 

i  mile  W.  of  HEIDI. KKSIIURG. 

-}..}J  P.  M. 

Two  or  more  troops  Cavalry  in  HEIDLEBSBTJRG.  Now  halted  and  watering' 
horses.  Red  patrols  on  roads  to  west  and  southwest  of  in:mi.i:i:snri;<;. 

HILL,  RgtJ 

I  call  Brown  and  say: 

Read  this  message.  Now,  tell  me  what  the  contents  are,  without  look-i 
ing  at  it. 

When  he  has  done  so,  I  add : 

Go  back  by  the  route  we  canae  and  give  the  message  to  Sergt.  Holmes.  Tell 
him  I  remain  here. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  written  messages  or  orders  geographical  names  are  always 
written  in  capital  letters  as  a  precaution  against  error. 

There  are  two  things  frequently  found  in  messages,  but  omitted 
in  the  one  you  sent  back.  First,  the  message  itself  does  not  indicate 
the  person  for  whom  it  is  intended.  But  Brown  knows,  and  if  it 
falls  into  the  hands  of  a  stranger  it  is  better  that  the  stranger  should 
not  know.  It  would  be  absurd,  for  example,  to  address  the  message, 
"  Sergt.  Holmes,  outguard  No.  2,  support  No.  1,  Plainview  Bridge." 
In  this  form  the  message  would  contain  information  of  no  possible 
value  to  Sergt.  Holmes,  but  of  considerable  value  to  the  enemy,  if 
Brown  should  be  intercepted.  Second,  the  message  does  not  state 
what  your  further  movements  will  be.  This  information  can  also 
be  given  verbally  to  Sergt.  Holmes.  If  it  is  included  in  the  mes- 


Ill 

sage  and  the  message  falls  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  you  may  be 
hunted  out  of  your  position.  It  is  even  doubtful  whether  you  should 
write  on  the  message  "  J  mile  west  of  Heidlersburg.71  It  would  serve 
your  purpose  just  as  well,  and  possibly  better,  if  Brown  were  ordered 
to  tell  First  Sergt.  Holmes,  "  I  am  a  half  mile  west  of  Heidlersburg, 
and  shall  remain  here."  At  all  events,  you  should  remember  that 
a  message  should  not  contain  anything  that  is  of  value  to  the  enemy 
and  of  no  value  to  your  own  commander,  or  that  may  be  given  orally 
just  as  well.  Also  the  messenger  should  know  the  contents  of  the 
message,  unless  there  are  good  reasons  to  the  contrary,  in  order  that 
he  may  convey  the  information  in  case  he  should  lose  the  message  or 
be  obliged  to  destroy  it.  We  would  not  advise  you  to  trust  the  mes- 
senger's memory  with  a  verbal  message  in  the  present  case.  The 
message  is  too  long  to  be  delivered  accurately. 

The  regulations  say  that  in  the  enemy's  country  important  mes- 
sages should  be  sent  by  two  messengers  or  in  duplicate  by  two  single 
messengers  returning  by  different  routes.  But  your  patrol  was  made 
small  because  it  was  foreseen  that  this  principle  does  not  apply  in 
your  case.  Yours  is  not  a  distant  patrol.  Your  route  affords  excel- 
lent cover,  and  your  messenger  is  not  obliged  to  pass  farmhouses, 
settlements,  trails,  or  roads. 

You  probably  have  no  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of  sending  back 
the  information  you  have  obtained  so  far  nor  as  to  the  necessity  for 
continuing  your  observation.  It  would  be  unnecessary  to  attempt  to 
cross  the  road  to  the  north  in  search  of  a  more  advantageous  observa- 
tion point.  You  have  a  good  station,  and,  under  the  circumstances, 
you  might  defeat  the  object  of  your  further  reconnaissance  by  at- 
tempting to  cross  the  road  in  search  of  a  better  observation  point. 

SITUATION  VIII. 

At  5.10  p.  m.  the  Bed  Cavalry  mounted  and  rode  west  through  road 
fork  578,  with  an  advance  guard  of  about  a  troop.  Your  patrol  was 
well  concealed,  and  you  were  able  to  time  the  main  body  as  it  trotted 
past  road  fork  578  in  column  of  twos.  It  required  the  main  body 
2  minutes  and  20  seconds  to  pass  the  road  fork.  The  group  that 
appeared  to  be  a  patrol  near  road  fork  545  has  disappeared,  but  you 
were  unable  to  see  where  it  went.  The  enemy  did  not  send  a  patrol 
along  the  ridge  on  which  you  are  stationed.  While  the  main  body  of 
the  Red  cavalry  was  passing  road  fork  57G,  you  heard  firing  about  a 
mile  to  the  south,  by  less  than  a  dozen  rifles  and  for  less  than  a  minute. 
The  tail  of  the  Cavalry  main  body  has  now  disappeared  and  is  about 
north  of  you.  The  sound  indicates  that  the  Cavalry  is  still  trotting. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 


112 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  observe  Heidlersburg  at  least  five  minutes  longer. 

DISCUSSION. 

An  Infantry  column  would  probably  patrol  the  woods  in  which 
you  are  located.  Cavalry  generally  patrols  farther  to  the  flanks  and 
pays  less  attention  to  minor  places  of  concealment  along  the  route 
of  march.  It  would  be  out  of  place  to  discuss  the  reason  for  this,  but 
the  fact  explains  why  you  were  not  molested. 

We  can  imagine  circumstances  under  which  you  would  return  at 
once  with  the  information  you  have  received.  For  example,  if  this 
were  a  column  of  Infantry  and  Artillery,  you  could  arrive  at  the  out- 
post with  your  information  in  time  to  make  the  information  of  real 
importance.  In  the  present  case  there  are  two  reasons  why  you  should 
remain  in  observation.  First,  if  the  hostile  party  intends  to  attack 
any  part  of  the  outpost  for  the  purpose  of  determining  its  location 
or  strength,  it  will  strike  our  outguards  before  you  can  return  with 
your  information.  Second,  the  Cavalry  may  be  in  advance  of  an 
Infantry  column.  If  you  remain  in  your  present  position  a  short 
time,  you  may  be  able  to  discover  signs  that  will  settle  this  question. 
Even  if  the  leading  Infantry  element  of  such  a  column  were  now  as 
much  as  2  or  3  miles  northeast  of  Heidlersburg,  there  would  be  more 
or  less  activity  between  the  Infantry  column  and  its  independent  or 
advance  guard  Cavalry  (as  the  Cavalry  would  then  be  called)  which 
has  just  passed  you.  Of  course,  a  Cavalry  column  operating  alone 
may  be  followed  by  patrols  which,  on  account  of  having  tieeii  sent 
to  the  flanks,  have  lost  distance;  but  many  of  these  will  have  rejoined 
during  the  long  halt  in  Heidlersburg.  Furthermore,  a  Cavalry  main 
body  does  not  travel  as  rapidly  as  its  flank  patrols,  and  these  local 
patrols  usually  rejoin  quickly. 

You  might  very  properly  have  sent  Brown  to  the  west  edge  of  the 
woods  to  observe  the  enemy's  direction  of  march.  The  advisability 
of  doing  so  depends  upon  the  exact  character  of  the  woods  and  under- 
brush, and  in  reality  the  question  could  be  decided  correctly  only  on 
the  ground. 

SITUATION  IX. 

Although  3^011  remain  in  observation  10  minutes  longer,  3^011  observe 
no  further  signs  of  Red  troops  in  or  around  Heidlersburg  except 
about  20  troopers  who  followed  the  main  body  by  about  a  half  mile, 
apparently  a  small  rear  guard.  You  have  seen  a  few  civilians  in  the 
village.  The  sun  set  a  half  hour  ago  and  it  will  be  dark  in  another 
half  hour.  Naturally  you  decide  to  return. 

1.  What  route  do  you  select? 

2.  What  report  do  you  make  ? 


113 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 

1.  To  the  west  edge  of  the  woods ;  then  south  to  the  first  stream ; 
then  along  this  stream  to  crossroads  502 ;  then  to  the  picket. 

2.  I  report  to  Sergt.  Holmes : 

A  Red  squadron  halted  in  Heidlersburg  for  about  20  minutes  and  left  there 
at  5.10  p.  m.,  marching  west  at  a  trot,  with  an  advance  guard  of  one  troop.  It 
took  the  main  body  2  minutes  and  20  seconds  to  pass  a  given  point  in  column 
of  twos  at  a  trot.  No  other  troops  were  in  Heidlersburg  when  I  left  there  at 
5.25  p.  m. 

DISCUSSION. 

You  went  first  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods,  not  only  to  get  a  final 
glimpse  of  the  Red  Cavalry,  if  possible,  but  also  for  your  own  safety. 

Two  hundred  cavalrymen  in  column  of  fours  will  trot  by  a  given 
point  in  one  minute ;  in  column  of  twos,  in  two  minutes.  A  troop  of 
our  Cavalry  will  have,  roughly,  75  men  in  ranks.  But  if  there  is  any 
doubt  as  to  the  organization  of  the  enemy's  Cavalry,  you  can  at  least 
say  that  its  main  body  contains  about  225  troopers. 

******* 

For  comparison  with  Sergt.  Hill's  patrol,  we  recommend  that  you 
sstudy  the  leading  of  "An  Infantry  Patrol,"  page  99  (original  edi- 
tion), Studies  in  Minor  Tactics,  1915.  This  patrol  has  a  different 
mission,  a  longer  route,  and,  because  of  the  time  of  day  and  the 
duration  of  the  patrol,  it  carries  a  different  equipment. 
96790°— 17 8 


TENTH  PROBLEM. 


A  VISITING  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

The  preceding  problems  have  probably  shown  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  visiting  patrols.  A  brief  recapitulation,  however,  will 
be  made.  % 

Visiting  patrols  consist  of  two  or  more  men  each.  They  are  sent 
out  from  supports  or  pickets,  or  both,  to  keep  up  communication 
with  adjoining  outguards. 

"  For  patrolling  between  the  groups  or  along  the  lines  of  an  out- 
post, or  for  the  simpler  patrols  sent  out  from  a  covering  detachment, 
the  average  soldier  will  be  a  competent  leader."  (I.  D.  R.  608.) 

We  have  seen  that  these  patrols  are  not  necessary  in  daytime  when 
all  the  ground  along  the  line  of  observation  can  be  observed  by  senti- 
nels. At  night,  however,  visiting  patrols  are  indispensable.  They 
inform  us  as  to  conditions  along  the  front  and  at  our  sentinel  posts 
and  outguards.  By  using  them  properly  we  lessen  the  likelihood  of 
the  unobserved  approach  of  the  enemy,  between  sentinel  posts,  in 
a  force  larger  than  a  patrol,  and  frequently  we  are  able  to  discover 
and  drive  off  hostile  patrols.  Visiting  patrols  are  the  means  of  ex- 
changing the  latest  information  among  the  elements  of  the  outpost 
and,  in  many  cases,  they  take  over  strangers  detained  by  outlying 
posts  and  deliver  them  to  the  picket  or  support  commander.  Visit- 
ing patrols  also  give  lonely  cossack  posts  or  sentry  squads  the  feeling 
that  there  is  cooperation  and  mutual  support  among  the  outpost 
elements. 

SITUATION  I. 

Based  on  Situation  VII,  seventh  problem.  You  are  Pvt.  Towney, 
in  charge  of  the  first  relief.  Read  the  instructions  given  you  by 
the  first  sergeant  (p.  102).  You  have  been  over  the  route  once  by 
daylight,  and  three  times  with  Willis  after  dark.  It  is  now  12.30 
a.  m.  You  and  Willis  have  been  awakened  and  are  about  to  start 
out  again. 

(115) 


116 

1.  What  preparations  do  you  make? 

2.  What  formation  do  you  adopt  while  advancing  toward  the  cos- 
sack  post  southeast  of  your  picket  ? 


1.  I  carry  only  my  belt,  rifle,  and  bayonet;  the  bayonet  fixed  to 
the  rifle.     I  inspect  these  articles  to  see  that  they  are  in  working 
order.    Then  I  inspect  Willis  to  see  that  he  is  equipped  in  the  same 
manner  and  that  his  equipment  is  in  working  order.    Then  I  direct 
him  to  follow  me  at  8  paces. 

2.  The  formation  will  be  single  file,  with  myself  in  the  lead  and 
Willis  8  paces  in  rear. 

DISCUSSION. 

Your  patrol  does  not  require  the  same  equipment  that  Sergt.  Hill 
used  in  the  ninth  problem.  Even  the  canteen  may  be  left  behind; 
it  may  rattle  and  is  sometimes  troublesome,  and  your  trip  is  short. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  carry  materials  for  writing  messages,  since  you 
will  carry  back  in  person  whatever  information .  you  get.  A  small 
electric  flash  lamp,  however,  is  a  convenient  article  for  you  at  night. 
A  company  will  probably  have  many  of  these  lamps  in  time  of  war. 

The  patrol  leader  should  be  in  front  on  account  of  the  fact  that 
things  frequently  happen  suddenly  and  require  quick  decision. 
Although  the  other  man  is  only  8  paces  in  rear,  that  distance 
makes  a  great  difference  in  the  ability  to  see.  The  exact  distance 
between  yourself  and  Willis  would  depend  upon  how  far  you  can  see 
at  night.  As  far  as  the  ability  to  see  is  concerned,  there  is  a  much 
greater  difference  between  one  night  and  another  than  there  is  be- 
tween one  day  and  another.  On  account  of  the  fact  that  nearly  the 
entire  route  lies  through  woods,  or  along  the  edge  of  woods,  we 
assumed  that  the  distance  would  be  quite  short.  On  a  clear  night 
and  in  open  country  or  roads  the  distance  might  be  as  great  as  20 
paces.  If  the  patrol  were  larger,  so  that  two  men  could  march  in 
the  lead,  the  distance  could  be  even  greater  than  20  paces,  provided, 
of  course,  that  the  leading  men  could  be  seen  easily. 

The  outguard  commander  arranged  only  two  reliefs  for  your 
patrol.  You  are  obliged  to  leave  the  outguard  every  two  hours  and 
your  sleep  will  be  very  much  broken  up.  Even  so,  you  are  better 
off  than  the  sentinels  who  are  one  hour  on  and  two  hours  off.  Your 
patrol  can  cover  the  route  in  a  half  hour.  The  patrol  that  crosses 
the  Conewago  has  twice  the  distance  that  you  have,  but  since  it  can 
use  the  roads  it  may  be  able  to  cover  its  3,500-yard  route  in  40 
minutes.  If  a  visiting  patrol  has  a  very  long  route  and  if  there 
are  enough  men  available  the  outguard  commander  will  naturally 
organize  the  patrol  into  three  reliefs. 


117 

SITUATION  II. 

You  are  now  in  the  patch  of  woods  500  yards  southeast  of  the 
picket,  and  you  hear  four  shots,  apparently  fired  in  the  vicinity  of 
our  sentinel  post  at  crossroads  502. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do,  assuming  that  no  other  shots  are  fired  ? 

TOWNEY'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  halt  and  listen  for  a  short  time,  then  continue  on  my 

DISCUSSION. 

In  a  preceding  problem  we  have  stated  that  much  of  the  firing 
which  occurs  at  night  along  an  outpost  line  has  no  special  signifi- 
cance. Your  only  object  in  halting  and  listening  would  be  to  gain 
information.  From  your  present  position  you  may  be  able  to  hear 
something  that  would  amount  to  useful  information  to  the  outguard 
commander  on  your  return.  For  example,  if  you  heard  several 
horses  galloping  along  the  road  across  the  Conewago  from  where 
you  now  are,  that  information  would  assist  the  outguard  commander 
in  clearing  up  the  situation. 

SITUATION  III. 

Continuing  along  the  bank  of  the  Conewago  you  arrive  at  a  point 
which  you  know  from  your  previous  trips  is  30  or  40  yards  from 
the  cossack  post  sentinel. 

What  do  you  do? 


I  halt  and  give  the  signal  twenty-three,  and  then  listen  for  the 
answer. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  not  wise  to  appear  suddenly  within  sight  of  an  outpost  sen- 
tinel. Sentinels  are  sometimes  nervous.  If  it  so  happened  that  no 
night  signal  had  been  prescribed  you  could  call  out,  "  Towney's 
patrol,"  but  only  loud  enough  to  be  heard  by  the  sentinel  if  he  actu- 
ally is  where  you  think  he  is.  Of  course,  signals  or  calls,  even 
though  given  very  carefully,  may  attract  the  attention  of  an  enemy 
who  might  be  near  by,  but  this  would  happen  very  seldom.  In  the 
long  run  a  signal  or  call  will  give  better  results;  it  is  good  insurance 
against  a  rifle  shot,  which  may  not  only  hurt  some  one  unnecessarily 
but  which  may  also  reveal  the  location  of  the  cossack  post  to  an 
enemy  far  beyond  the  hearing  of  your  signal  or  call. 


118 

SITUATION  IV. 

Your  signal  was  answered,  and  after  you  advanced  you  were  rec- 
ognized -by  the  sentinel. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  while  you  are  at  the  cossack  post? 


I  intend  to  ask  the  sentinel  what  he  knows  about  the  firing  and 
whether  he  heard  anything  after  the  firing.  I  intend  to  ask  him  for 
other  news  and  to  tell  him  the  latest  news  from  our  picket.  Then 
I  shall  start  on  the  return  trip. 

DISCUSSION. 

If  the  commander  of  the  cossack  post  is  not  awake,  there  is  noth- 
ing to  be  gained  by  awakening  him.  The  sentinel  knows  all  that  the 
commander  knows,  and  perhaps  more,  as  far  as  the  events  of  the  last 
half  hour  are  concerned.  When  you  exchange  news  with  the  sentinel, 
you  would  limit  yourself  strictly  to  business,  and  talk  in  as  low  a 
voice  as  possible ;  then  leave  at  once. 

SITUATION  V. 

You  have  passed  through  the  patch  of  woods  500  yards  southeast 
of  the  picket,  and  you  are  now  advancing  along  the  fence  toward  the 
trench,  with  the  patch  of  woods  about  50  yards  behind  you.  You 
hear  footsteps  in  front  of  you  and  halt,  crouching  to  the  ground.  A 
moment  later  the  figure  of  a  man  looms  up. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

TOWNEY'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  let  the  man  approach  until  he  is  so  close  that  he  can  not 
escape;  then  challenge  him. 

DISCUSSION. 

There  would  be  no  object  in  warning  the  man  by  using  the  night 
signal,  even  if  you  suspected  that  other  men  might  be  following  him. 
If  he  or  his  party  is  friendly,  your  challenge  will  serve  the  purpose 
just  as  well.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  or  his  party  is  hostile,  or  if  he 
is  an  unauthorized  stranger,  and  you  use  the  night  signal  as  soon  as 
you  hear  his  footsteps  or  first  see  the  outline  of  his  figure,  you  are 
simply  warning  him  in  time  to  let  him  escape.  You  remember  that 
one  of  the  important  duties  of  a  visiting  patrol  is  to  pick  up  all 
strangers  in  the  vicinity  of  the  outpost.  If  you  permit  th-em  to  escape, 
you  may  claim  that  you  have  driven  them  off,  but  it  is  much  more 


119 

important  to  capture  strangers  than  to  drive  them  off.  Comparing 
this  situation  with  the  one  which  precedes  it,  you  will  observe^  that 
there  are  times  when  night  signals  should  be  used,  and  other  times 
when  they  should  not  be  used.  Experience  and  a  little  common  sense 
will  enable  you  to  decide  a  doubtful  case. 

Sergt.  Hill's  patrol  (ninth  problem)  and  the  patrol  that  we  shall 
study  in  the  thirteenth  problem  are  obliged  to  dodge  any  strangers 
they  may  meet,  because  these  patrols  are  seeking  information.  Your 
visiting  patrol  is  of  the  kind  that  may  be,  and  sometimes  is,  called  a 
covering  patrol;  that  is,  they  make  the  outpost  line  as  tight  as  pos- 
sible in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  or  strangers  from  penetrating  it 
in  either  direction. 

SITUATION  VI. 

The  man  you  challenged  made  no  effort  to  escape.  He  was  dressed 
in  the  uniform  of  a  private  of  the  Blue  army.  You  searched  him  for 
weapons  and  found  that  he  had  none. 

In  answer  to  your  questions  he  states  that  he  is  a  member  of  Com- 
pany D  of  your  regiment,  and  that  his  company  is  in  the  outpost 
reserve.  He  also  states  that  he  is  on  his  way  to  Conewago  Creek  to 
take  a  bath.  Neither  you  nor  Willis  remember  having  seen  the  man 
before. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 

TOWNEY?S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  take  the  man  with  me  to  the  picket,  ordering  him  to 
march  quietly  in  front  of  Willis. 

DISCUSSION. 

By  asking  questions  you  might  easily  satisfy  yourself  whether  the 
man  really  belongs  to  Company  D.  You  might  ask  him  to  name  his 
officers,  his  first  sergeant,  and  other  noncommissioned  officers,  the 
cooks,  the  company  clerk,  etc.,  confining  your  questions  to  persons 
that  you  or  Willis  know,  and  that  no  private  would  be  likely  to  know 
unless  he  belonged  to  Company  D.  However,  your  orders  are  strict. 
All  the  men  of  the  picket  were  told  to  bring  in  all  persons  picked  up 
by  patrols  except  members  of  Company  A,  patrols  from  Company  B, 
and  officers  whom  you  are  sure  you  know.  There  is  no  use  wasting 
time  trying  to  find  out  whether  the  man  is  really  a  Blue  soldier  or 
some  stranger  disguised  as  a  soldier.  If  you  will  leave  this  to  the 
sergeant  on  watch  at  the  picket,  you  will  get  a  few  minutes  more  sleep 
before  you  start^out  again  on  patrol. 


ELEVENTH  PROBLEM. 


A  DETACHED  POST. 


EXPLANATION. 

A  detached  post  is  one  which,  on  account  of  distance  or  the  road 
net  or  location  with  respect  to  the  line  of  resistance,  is  separated 
from  the  general  outpost  line. 

A  detached  post  may  be  sent  out  by  the  outpost  commander  or 
by  the  main  body  commander;  it  depends  upon  the  situation  and 
terrain.  If  sent  out  by  the  outpost  commander,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  he  considers  the  post  a  necessary  part  of  the  line  intrusted  to 
him,  but  too  distant  or  inconveniently  located  to  be  under  the  com- 
mand or  supervision  of  one  of  the  support  commanders.  If  sent 
out  by  the  main  body  commander,  it  may  be  assumed  that  he  con- 
siders the  post  necessary,  but  too  distant  or  inconveniently  located 
to  be  placed  under  the  command  or  supervision  of  the  outpost  com- 
mander. In  Situation  VI,  seventh  problem,  both  kinds  of  detached 
posts  were  referred  to. 

The  duties  of  a  detached  post  are  ordinarily  the  same  as  those  of 
an  element  of  the  outpost  proper.  Its  size  and  location  determine 
whether  it  will  resemble  a  cossack  post,  sentry  squad,  picket,  or  sup- 
port. Naturally  the  outpost  is  between  the  enemy  and  our  main 
body.  A  detached  post,  if  used  at  all,  is  ordinarily  on  a  flank. 

In  the  present  problem  we  shall  deal  very  briefly  with  a  detached 
post  sent  out  by  the  main  body  to  illustrate  the  fact  that  such  a 
post  adopts  practically  the  same  means  for  security  as  an  element  of 
the  outpost  proper. 

SITUATION  I. 

In  the  seventh  problem  you  were  reminded  to  note  the  detached 
post  between  hill  712  and  Bridge  S.  H. 

It  will  simplify  matters  if  we  use  names  with  which  we  are 
already  familiar.  For  convenience,  therefore,  we  shall  restate  the 
situation  in  such  manner  as  to  use  the  first  platoon,  Company  A. 
You  are  First  Sergt.  Holmes,  in  command  of  that  platoon. 

Our  brigade  has  been  marching  northeast  from  Gettysburg  on  the 
McElheny-Plainview-Heidlersburg  road,  in  the  enemy's  country. 

(121)  • 


122 

It  has  been  reported  that  the  enemy  is  several  miles  to  the  northeast/ 
and  that  our  brigade  will  halt  south  of  Conewago  Creek  until 
to-morrow  or  the  day  after  to  await  recnforcements. 

The  Conewago  is  reported  to  be  fordable  only  at  the  fords  shown 
on  the  map.  It  is  November  1,  and  the  corn  is  in  shock. 

The  second  battalion  and  machine-gun  company  of  our  regiment, 
with  a  troop  of  cavalry,  form  the  advance  guard.  Our  battalion  has 
marched  at  the  head  of  the  main  body  and  is  now  halted  near  cross- 
roads 561.  The  brigade  adjutant  arrives  and  consults  Maj.  Crosby. 
He  then  sends  for  you  and  says : 

Take  this  map  and  examine  it  [he  points  out  on  the  map  or  on  the  ground 
the  places  to  which  he  refers  later].  The  enemy  is  on  the  Harrisburg  I  load 
about  4  miles  northeast  of  Plainview.  Our  brigade  is  going  into  camp  about 
where  it  is  now  halted.  The  first  battalion  and  machine-gun  company  of  your 
regiment  and  one  platoon  of  cavalry  will  form  our  outpost  a  mile  northeast  of 
here  astride  the  road  through  Plainview  and  the  road  to  Hersliey  Mill.  March 
your  platoon  over  that  hill  (712-707)  and  establish  a  detached  post  covering 
the  Conewago  crossings  near  Bridge  S.  H.  Three  mounted  orderlies  will  report 
to  you  very  soon  for  duty  with  the  detached  post.  You  will  be  connected  with 
brigade  headquarters  by  telephone.  Your  battalion  conimnnder  will  insport 
your  position  later. 

What  security  would  you  provide  for  the  march  toward  Bridge 
S.  H.,  assuming  that  the  mounted  orderlies  do  not  join  before  you 
start? 


I  send  Sergt.  Hill  and  one  squad  as  advance  guard,  with  instruc- 
tions to  patrol  off  the  road  when  necessary,  the  remainder  of  the 
platoon  to  follow  at  400  yards. 

DISCUSSION. 

It  is  our  purpose  to  deal  with  your  detached  post  in  the  briefest 
manner  possible,  to  avoid  details  that  are  included  in  preceding 
problems. 

We  must  assume  that  the  map  given  you  by  the  brigade  adjutant 
is  one  of  the  kind  that  is  ordinarily  available  in  time  of  war  and 
does  not  show  the  many  details  which  we  find  on  the  map  we  are  now 
using.  From  the  crossroads,  therefore,  you  have  only  a  general  idea 
of  the  country  to  the  west  and  northwest.  You  will  be  obliged  to 
march  about  a  mile  on  a  road  that  the  advance  guard  may  have 
patrolled;  but  as  far  as  you  know,  there  are  now  no  Blue  troops  in 
that  direction.  The  distance,  together  with  the  fact  that  you  may 
need  flank  reconnaissance  and  can  not  plan  it  in  advance,  make  it 
unwise  to  send  the  squad  forward  as  a  point.  You  will  remember 
that  a  point  is  a  patrol  that  leads  the  way,  but  does  not  leave  the 
road.  If  it  becomes  necessary  to  send  out  flank  patrols,  these  patrols 


123 

could  not  be  sent  from  your  main  body  and  be  of  any  use  unless  the 
main  body  halted  until  the  patrols  reached  the  places  to  which  they 
were  sent.  If  you  merely  tell  Sergt.  Hill  that  his  squad  will  march 
out  as  point,  he  may  assume  that  he  is  not  to  leave  the  road.  It  is 
better  to  call  the  squad  the  advance  guard,  and,  to  be  doubly  sure 
of  a  complete  understanding  and  proper  protection,  it  is  well  to  add 
that  he  will  take  care  of  flank  reconnaissance.  He  can  send  out  two 
patrols  of  two  men  each  and  still  have  five  men  on  the  road.  It  is 
not  likely  that  he  will  be  obliged  to  use  more  than  two  patrols. 

All  the  officers  of  the  brigade  will  be  busy  for  the  next  half  hour 
or  more  getting  the  men  off  their  feet  and  into  camp  with  as  little 
effort  and  loss  of  time  as  possible.  This  is  their  most  important 
duty  at  this  particular  time.  Hence  both  Maj.  Crosby  and  the 
brigade  adjutant  are  too  busy  now  to  go  with  you  and  see  that  your 
detached  post  is  well  placed  with  respect  to  the  ground  and  the  out- 
post and  main  camp.  The  fact  that  an  officer  has  been  ordered  to 
inspect  your  dispositions  is  no  reflection  on  your  ability.  Outpost 
elements  are  always  inspected  by  some  one  higher  in  authority,  and 
the  inspector,  who  in  your  case  represents  the  brigade  commander, 
is  supposed  to  order  whatever  changes  he  thinks  are  necessary. 

SITUATION  II. 

Assuming  that  you  have  arrived  on  the  ground  and  that  the 
mounted  orderlies  have  reported;  also,  that  you  have  made  your 
preliminary  reconnaissance  and  have  found  that  the  Conewago  is 
not  fordable  except  as  shown  on  the  map,  describe  briefly  the  day 
position  of  the  detached  post. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION. 

The  platoon  entrenches  just  off  the  road  and  east  of  it,  350  yards 
southeast  of  Bridge  S.  H.,  so  as  to  cover  the  bridge  nearest  Bridge 
S.  H.  A  cossack  post  is  placed  at  the  bridge  nearest  Bridge  S.  H. 
and  another  cossack  post  is  placed  in  or  near  the  west  end  of  the 
orchard  300  yards  northwest  of  712.  Two  mounted  orderlies  are 
placed  as  a  standing  patrol  on  hill  586,  1,500  yards  northwest  of 
Bridge  S.  H.  The  other  mounted  orderly  remains  with  me. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  position  selected  for  the  trench  enables  the  platoon  to  fire 
effectively  on  the  first  bridge.  After  the  trench  is  completed,  the 
men  would  not  occupy  it  except  when  the  enemy  must  be  opposed. 
It  is  difficult  to  determine  on  the  map  the  best  resting  place  for  the 
platoon.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  you  would  place  the  men  in 


124 

the  woods  across  the  road  from  the  trench.  By  cutting  the  fences 
and  placing  a  screen  of  brush  from  the  edge  of  the  woods  to  the  end 
of  the  trench,  the  three  squads  would  be  able  to  occupy  the  trench 
in  a  very  short  time,  and  without  exposure.  Your  sentinels,  par- 
ticularly the  two  men  on  hill  586,  would  give  you  ample  warning  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy. 

In  the  seventh  problem,  we  placed  the  cossack  post  at  the  second 
bridge  northeast  of  Plain  view  on  account  of  the  fact  that  it  was 
necessary  to  guard  against  the  destruction  of  both  bridges  by  Red 
patrols.  The  brigade  expects  to  use  those  bridges  when  reinforce- 
ments arrive  and  the  advance  is  resumed.  In  the  present  situation, 
however,  the  bridges  northwest  of  Bridge  S.  H.  have  not  the  same 
importance.  It  may  not  be  wrong  to  send  the  cossack  post  to  the 
second  bridge,  but  we  prefer  the  position  nearer  the  platoon.  The 
bridges  are  useful  to  Blue  patrols,  but  if  the  second  bridge  is  wrecked, 
there  still  remains  the  ford  a  half  mile  west  of  it. 

The  ford  just  mentioned  is  easily  seen  by  the  standing  patrol  on 
hill  586;  hence,  it  is  not  necessary  to  place  a  cossack  post  in  that 
direction.  The  question  arises  as  to  the  action  of  the  platoon  in  case 
the  enemy  advances  by  way  of  the  ford.  The  platoon  would  move 
in  that  direction  and  resist  to  the  best  of  its  ability.  It  can  not  be  in 
two  places  at  once,  and,  in  any  event,  it  will  have  accomplished  its 
purpose  when  it  has  given  the  brigade  ample  warning  of  the  enemy's 
advance.  The  outpost  near  Plainview  is  squarely  in  front  of  the 
enemy,  and  is  expected  to  hold  the  line  of  resistance,  which  is  the 
same  line  as  the  line  of  supports.  In  view  of  the  cavalry  and  out- 
post reconnaissance,  it  is  not  likely  that  a  large  Red  force  can  pass 
unobserved  around  one  of  our  flanks.  A  small  Red  force  may  be 
able  to  do  so,  but  in  this  case  a  detached  post  can  warn  the  brigade 
in  time  to  permit  the  deployment  of  a  force  large  enough  to  stop  the 
enemy.  Detached  posts,  therefore,  are  primarily  warning  detach- 
ments, although  they  resist  to  the  best  of  their  ability. 

"  For  observing  from  some  point  in  plain  view  of  the  command 
*  *  *  two  men  are  sufficient."  (I.  D.  R.,  607.)  Mounted  men 
make  useful  sentinels  at  favorable  observation  points  which  are  too 
far  away  to  be  used  by  dismounted  men.  They  are  usually  posted 
in  pairs.  From  hill  586,  the  sentinels  have  an  extended  view  in  every 
direction.  If  the  enemy  approaches,  the  fact  can  be  signaled  directly 
to  the  picket,  and  the  sentinels  can  mount  up  quickly  and  retire  by 
way  of  the  ford  or  the  bridges  if  necessary.  The  other  orderly  will 
be  useful  to  you  as  a  messenger. 

The  cossack  post  near  the  orchard  northwest  of  712  has  an  ex- 
tended view  to  the  west  and  northwest.  It  can  not  see  the  bridge 
near  Fidler,  but  it  can  see  the  road  northwest  and  southeast  of  the 
bridge. 


125 

One  squad  should  furnish  both  cossack  posts;  this  makes  it  easier 
to  keep  a  company  duty  roster.  The  corporal  should  take  the  cossack 
post  at  the  bridge,  and  No.  2  of  the  squad  should  take  the  other. 

It  is  now  evident  that  the  platoon  itself  must  have  two  sentinels  in 
daytime ;  one  in  or  near  the  trench  to  keep  the  Bridge  S.  H.  cossack 
post  and  the  country  to  the  east  in  sight,  and  one  in  the  west  edge  of 
the  woods  to  keep  the  other  cossack  post  and  the  standing  patrol  on 
hill  586  in  sight. 

On  your  right  flank  you  will  locate  the  left  element  of  the  outpost 
proper.  On  your  left  flank  you  must  be  satisfied  if  you  provide  se- 
curity as  far  as  the  ford  southeast  of  hill  586.  The  Fidler-588 
road  is  too  far  away  for  you  to  cover,  except  indirectly,  by  observa- 
tion from  a  distance,  as  already  mentioned.  If  that  road  is  important 
and  requires  more  attention  to-night  than  Cavalry  patrols  can  give  it, 
the  brigade  commander  will  probably  send  another  detached  post  in 
that  direction. 

SITUATION  III. 

The  left  element  of  the  outpost  proper  is  a  small  outguard  near 
the  bend  in  the  road  600  yards  southwest  of  Hershey  Mill.  When 
Maj.  Crosby  arrived  to  inspect  your  detached  post  he  approved  your 
dispositions  and  asked  whether  you  had  considered  a  plan  for  night 
positions. 

What  plan  would  you  suggest? 


I  would  withdraw  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586;  combine  the 
two  cossack  posts  and  send  them  as  a  sentry  squad  about  50  yards 
northwest  of  the  road  fork  1,000  yards  west  of  Bridge  S.  H.,  with 
double  sentinel  toward  the  ford,  and  move  the  platoon  forward  to 
the  south  side  of  the  Conewago,  at  the  first  bridge,  posting  a  double 
sentinel  directly  from  the  platoon  to  watch  the  bridge,  the  road  to 
Beatrick,  and  at  the  same  time  serve  as  picket  sentinels;  the  first 
bridge  to  be  barricaded,  and  a  part  of  the  planking  of  both  bridges 
to  be  removed.  One  visiting  patrol  (three  reliefs)  would  go  from 
the  platoon  bivouac  to  Beatrick ;  then  follow  the  fences  southeast  400 
yards,  northeast  300  yards,  and  southeast  400  yards  to  the  outguard ; 
then  southwest  along  the  farm  road  to  main  road;  then  northwest 
on  the  main  road  to  the  platoon  bivouac.  Another  patrol  (three  re- 
liefs) would  go  west  500  yards  along  the  Conewago  and  another  500 
yards  along  the  farm  road ;  then  to  the  sentry  squad ;  then  to  the  road 
fork  200  yards  northwest  of  the  ford ;  then  east  and  southeast  along 
the  main  road  to  the  platoon  bivouac. 


126 

DISCUSSION. 

In  a  previous  problem  we  have  stated  the  reasons  that  would 
prompt  you  to  move  the  platoon  to  the  bridge.  The  move  results  in 
placing  your  platoon  rather  far  from  the  supporting  troops,  but  this 
can  seldom  be  avoided  when  we  deal  with  detached  posts.  The 
sentry  squad  near  the  ford  is  also  rather  far  away.  The  outpost 
proper  ordinarily  would  not  place  small  detachments  so  far  apart. 

The  enemy  can  not  make  a  rush  attack  by  way  of  the  bridges  on 
account  of  missing  planks  and  the  barricade.  A  double  sentinel  at 
the  platoon  bivouac  will  therefore  serve  the  double  purpose  of  ob- 
serving the  first  bridge  and  acting  as  bivouac  guard,  thus  saving  at 
least  four  men. 

We  would  not  recommend  sending  a  fresh  squad  to  the  ford.  By 
combining  the  two  cossack  posts  the  squad  that  is  used  will  get  credit 
for  a  complete  tour  of  outpost  sentinel  duty. 

Naturally,  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586  is  useless  at  night.  If 
the  members  of  this  patrol  and  their  horses  have  an  uninterrupted 
night's  rest  they  will  be  in  condition  to  return  to  the  hill  shortly 
after  daylight.  Two  or  more  reliefs  for  this  patrol  are  unnecessary. 
The  men  themselves  can  arrange  to  divide  the  time,  one  man  on  ob- 
servation being  enough,  while  the  other  holds  the  horses  under  cover. 
Their  meals  can  be  sent  to  them  from  the  platoon. 

In  this  situation  the  routes  of  the  visiting  patrols  are  so  long  that 
two  reliefs  would  not  give  the  men  enough  rest. 

SITUATION  IV. 

Sergt.  Hill  made  an  outpost  sketch.  By  visiting  the  standing 
patrol  on  hill  586  he  was  able  to  extend  the  sketch  to  show  creeks, 
farmhouses,  roads,  and  woods  north  of  the  Conewago  as  far  as  the 
587-554-582  road.  An  impressed  guide,  who  lives  near  crossroad 
666,  furnished  Sergt.  Hill  the  names  of  the  farmers  whose  houses 
appeared  on  the  sketch.  Farm  buildings  near  the  Conewago  have 
been  vacated. 

The  night  passed  quietly.  Shortly  after  daylight  you  resumed 
your  day  positions.  After  breakfast,  you  were  called  to  the  tele- 
phone and  told  as  follows: 

This  is  Capt.  Hall,  the  brigade  quartermaster.  Take  paper  and  pencil  and 
make  note  of  the  following:  A  farmer  named  Bream  has  a  farm  about  a  mile 
northwest  of  Bridge  S.  H.  and  on  the  main  road  just  southwest  of  Friends 
Grove  S.  H.  It  is  reported  that  he  has  a  fine  herd  of  10  or  20  cattle.  The 
brigade  commander  directs  that  you  send  a  patrol  at  once  to  bring  them  in. 

What  do  you  do? 


127 


To  Corpl.  Clark: 

Get  your  squad  ready  for  patrol.     Carry  belt,  rifle,  and  canteen  only. 

While  Corpl.  Clark  is  making  his  preparations,  I  write  the  fol- 
lowing on  a  piece  of  paper. 

Nov.  2. 

Received  of  Mr.  Bream  head  of  cattle,  taken  by  order  of  brigade  com- 
mander. Account  payable  by  quartermaster. 

HOLMES, 
1st  Sergt.  Co.  A,  1st  Inf. 

When  Corpl.  Clark's  squad  is  ready,  I  lead  it  to  the  road  and  give 
the  corporal  the  following  orders  in  the  presence  of  the  whole  squad : 

Examine  this  sketch  and  make  a  copy  of  what  you  need.  A  mile  and  a 
quarter  out  this  road  to  the  northwest  there  is  a  crossroad.  Just  north  of  it 
there  is  a  school  called  Friends  Grove  School.  A  short  distance  west  of  the 
crossroad,  on  the  road  leading  west,  there  is  a  farmer  named  Bream.  It  is 
reported  that  he  has  10  or  20  head  of  cattle.  Go  out  and  bring  the  cattle  in. 
Bring  Bream  or  a  member  of  his  family  with  you.  If  there  is  no  one  on  the 
farm,  fill  out  the  blank  space  in  this  receipt  and  leave  it  at  the  house.  Repeat. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  brigade  commander's  orders,  transmitted  through  a  staff  offi- 
cer, the  quartermaster,  was  purposely  made  less  definite  than  wrould 
ordinarily  be  the  case  in  order  to  bring  more  forcibly  to  your  atten- 
tion some  important  matters  relating  to  the  taking  of  private  prop- 
erty in  hostile  country. 

When  we  march  through  hostile  country,  we  generally  find  that 
the  enemy  has  removed  many  of  the  supplies  we  would  find  there 
under  other  conditions.  Nevertheless,  we  search  the  country  for 
such  supplies  as  are  useful  to  us  in  order  to  lessen  the  amount  that 
must  be  hauled  to  the  troops  by  railroad,  autotrucks,  and  wagons, 
and  to  give  the  men  and  animals  a  variety  of  food  which  on  account 
of  bulk  of  rapid  deterioration  can  not  be  hauled  at  all.  It  is  im- 
portant for  every  soldier  to  understand  that  if  we  take  such  sup- 
plies and  do  not  pay.  for  them  or  do  not  pay  a  fair  price  for  them, 
the  inhabitants  will  remove  or  carefully  hide  whatever  they  possess. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  pay  a  liberal  price,  the  fact  soon  becomes 
known  to  the  inhabitants,  and  we  shall  probably  have  the  benefit 
of  a  great  many  desirable  things  found  locally.  The  soldier's  con- 
dition and  well-being  would  suggest  to  him  the  advantage  of  seeing 
to  it  that  the  owner  of  supplies  is  properly  protected.  You  must 
remember  that  the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country  can  not  sell  sup- 
plies to  us  without  being  liable  to  severe  punishment  by  their  own 
Government.  The  supplies  must  be  taken  away  from  them  against 


128 

their  will,  and  it  is  not  against  the  law  of  their  own  country  to 
accept  payment  for  supplies  taken  in  this  manner.  If  we  avoid 
unauthorized  looting  and  if  we  pay  generously  for  what  we  take, 
we  shall  find  that  many  inhabitants  will  place  their  property  where 
we  can  see  it,  or  they  may  even  inform  us  secretly  that  they  have 
it.  In  the  present  case,  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  Farmer  Bream 
has  heard  rumors  that  we  have  good  discipline ;  that  we  do  not  take 
property  except  under  competent  orders;  and  that  we  pay  gener- 
ously; and  for  these  reasons  he  has  left  his  cattle  in  a  field  or  pas- 
ture, where  they  have  been  seen  by  one  of  our  Cavalry  patrols. 

The  best  plan  would  be  to  have  Bream  come  to  the  outpost  with 
his  cattle.  A  supply  sergeant  could  meet  him  there  later  and  pay 
him  or  deliver  to  him  the  formal  receipts  of  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  (p.  128,  Rules  of  Land  Warfare).  The  objection  to  using  or 
encouraging  receipts  of  the  kind  you  prepared,  lies  in  the  fact  that 
some  of  our  men  are  not  always  scrupulous,  and  if  such  informal  re- 
ceipts are  customary,  unscrupulous  men  might  offer  fictitious  and 
unauthorized  receipts  in  exchange  for  small  plunder.  The  owner  of 
the  property  might  be  deceived  by  the  receipt  if  it  is  generally  under- 
stood in  the  community  that  informal  receipts  are  in  use.  If  it  is 
not  so  understood,  he  might  make  up  his  mind  to  follow  the  plun- 
derers and  report  them.  The  plunderers  would  merely  use  such  re- 
ceipts to  allay  the  owner's  suspicions  and  thus  escape  detection. 

It  would  be  well  to  let  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586  know  that 
Corpl.  Clark's  patrol  is  going  out.  but  we  would  not  send  an  ordinary 
message  to  this  effect  by  semaphore  or  wigwag.  If  Corpl.  Clark 
passes  near  the  hill,  he  may  be  able  to  communicate  with  the  sentinels, 
but  it  is  more  important  for  him  to  avoid  exposure.  Since  several 
infantry  or  cavalry  patrols  may  go  out  from,  or  through,  your  post, 
it  would  be  a  good  plan  to  have  a  simple  set  of  prearranged  signals. 
For  example :  "  Eight  canteens  "  could  mean  "  8  men  going  out  by 
way  of  the  bridges."  "  Three  cups  "  could  mean  "  3  men  going  out 
by  way  of  the  ford."  Patrols  that  must  move  cautiously  may  be 
mistaken  for  the  enemy  by  our  own  sentinels.  It  is  a  decided  advan- 
tage to  all  concerned  to  inform  sentinels  when  patrols  are  likely  to 
be  near  them. 


•;i; 

TWELFTH  PROBLEM. 


A  REQUISITIONING  DETACHMENT  OR  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

The  name  "  patrol "  ordinarily  conveys  the  idea  of  a  detachment 
sent  out  to  gain  information,  or  to  cover  a  road  or  area  that  needs 
watching.  "  In  special  cases  patrols  may  be  given  missions  other 
than  these."  (I.  D.  R.  605.) 

"  The  term  patrols  is  used  to  designate  small  detachments  em- 
ployed for  a  variety  of  purposes,  the  name  of  the  detachment 
indicating  its  duty,  as  visiting,  connecting,  combat,  exploring,  recon- 
noitering,  flanking,  harassing,  pursuing  patrols,  etc."  (Footnote, 
F.  S.  R.,  p.  IT.) 

A  patrol  or  detachment  sent  out  by  our  local  commander  to  seize 
property  or  supplies  that  will  be  useful  to  our  troops,  operates  legiti- 
mately under  the  laws  of  war.  (Rules  of  Land  Warfare,  347.)  It 
is  an  entirely  different  matter  when  a  group  of  soldiers  seize  such 
property  or  supplies  in  the  enemy's  country  on  their  own  responsi- 
bility. We  would  not  call  the  latter  a  requisitioning  detachment  or 
patrol. 

SITUATION  I. 

You  are  Corpl.  Clark  and  have  received  orders  to  take  your  squad 
on  patrol  as  indicated  in  the  first  sergeant's  solution,  eleventh  prob- 
lem (p.  145). 

What  preparations  do  you  make? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

I  order  the  squad  to  form  for  inspection  with  rifle,  belt,  and  ammu- 
nition, and  canteen  of  water.  In  addition,  I  order  McGowan  to 
carry  his  wire  cutter  and  I  borrow  for  myself  an  extra  wire  cutter 
and  the  first  sergeant's  field  glass  and  compass.  I  then  make  a 
copy  of  so  much  of  Sergt.  Hill's  sketch  as  shows  the  country  between 
Bridge  S.  H.  and  the  line  Bream — Friends  Grove  S.  H.  I  then  in- 
spect the  men  and  their  equipment  and  explain  the  first  sergeant's 
orders  to  the  squad. 

96790—17 9  (129) 


130 

DISCUSSION. 

In  the  whole  range  of  military  affairs  correct  preparation  means 
a  successful  start  and  generally  means  a  successful  finish.  Through- 
out these  problems  we  have  laid  special  emphasis  on  preparation. 
There  is  another  point  worth  mentioning  in  this  connection :  If  your 
first  sergeant,  or  lieutenant,  or  captain  gives  you  a  patrol  to  handle, 
or  any  other  task,  for  that  matter,  and  observes  that  you  then  make 
the  correct  preparations  in  a  businesslike  way,  he  will  probably  >:\y 
to  himself,  "  Clark  certainly  knows  how  to  start  this  thing.  I  will 
not  worry  about  his  ability  to  finish  it."  If  a  man  really  knows  how 
to  handle  a  task,  he  knows  enough  to  make  the  correct  preparations, 
which  is  nearly  the  same  as  saying  that  if  a  man  makes  the  correct 
preparations  it  is  a  sign  that  he  knows  how  to  handle  the  task.  In 
the  present  situation  you  may  have  little  use  for  a  compass  or  field 
glass,  but  suppose  you  had  started  to  march  off  without  wire  cutters. 
The  first  sergeant  would  have  suspected  that  you  intended  to  drive 
the  cattle  through  gates  and  along  highways,  regardless  of  what  the 
ground  might  be.  We  doubt  that  a  first  sergeant  who  has  shown 
enough  ability  to  be  instructed  with  the  command  of  an  important 
detached  post  would  fail  to  observe  your  omission.  In  fact,  we 
believe  that  he  would  have  mentioned  wire  cutters  in  his  orders, 
but  in  this  problem,  as  in  all  peace-time  exercises,  we  prefer  to  give 
noncommissioned  officers  an  opportunity  to  think  for  themselves. 

SITUATION  II. 

You  have  made  your  preparations  and  have  received  your  final 
orders. 

What  formation  and  route  do  you  intend  to  use  up  to  the  time 
that  you  reach  the  north  bank  of  the  Conewago,  assuming  that 
nothing  occurs  to  interfere  with  your  plans? 


I  intend  to  have  the  squad  follow  me  in  column  of  twos  through 
the  woods  along  the  west  side  of  the  road  as  far  as  the  cossack  post. 
After  telling  the  commander  of  the  cossack  post  where  I  am  going 
and  asking  him  for  the  latest  information,  I  intend  to  send  the  men 
in  pairs,  at  about  50  yards  distance  between  pairs,  across  the  bridge 
and  then  off  the  road  to  the  right,  going  as  far  as  the  woods  at  the 
south  end  or  the  second  bridge,  where  the  squad  will  assemble. 
From  this  point  the  squad  will  use  the  same  formation  in  crossing 
the  second  bridge,  and  the  squad  will  reassemble  in  the  woods  west 
of  the  north  end  of  the  bridge. 


131 

DISCUSSION. 

If  you  march  down  the  road  to  the  cossack  post  you  might  be 
observed  from  a  distance,  and  the  observer's  curiosity  as  to  your 
future  movements  and  intentions  might  finally  result  to  your  disad- 
vantage. Likewise,  in  crossing  the  two  bridges  you  should  avoid 
attracting  attention.  If  the  Conewago  were  easily  fordable  you 
would  cross  it  near  the  mouth  of  Opossum  Creek  and  thus  avoid 
exposure.  There  would  be  no  advantage  in  crossing  at  the  ford. 
The  distance  is  greater  and  you  would  be  obliged  to  cross  long  open 
spaces. 

SITUATION  III. 

The  squad  has  reassembled  as  planned  in  the  last  solution.  You 
have  seen  no  signs  of  the  enemy  or  of  Red  inhabitants. 

What  formation  and  route  do  you  intend  to  use  up  to  the  time 
that  you  reach  the  587-554-582  road? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

I  intend  to  follow  the  wooded  creek  (Opossum  Creek)  that  paral- 
lels the  534-554  road,  marching  in  the  wroods,  but  close  to  the  west 
edge,  so  as  to  avoid  being  seen  from  the  houses  along  the  road.  I 
intend  to  send  two  men  ahead  as  point,  then  myself  and  three  other 
men,  in  single  file  with  myself  in  the  lead,  following  the  point  at 
about  To  yards,  then  a  rear  point  following  us  at  about  50  yards. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  the  previous  problem  the  first  sergeant  provided  for  flank 
reconnaissance  for  the  platoon  during  its  march  from  cr/ossroads 
561  toward  Bridge  S.  H.  The  present  case  is  not  similar.  You 
are  advancing  with  as  much  secrecy  as  possible,  and  do  not  require 
flank  patrols.  Naturally  you  will  watch  your  flanks,  but  you  will 
not  detach  men  from  the  column  for  its  protection.  The  safest 
method  is  to  depend  upon  the  concealment  afforded  by  the  woods, 
but  a  point  in  front  and  another  in  rear  will  probably  prevent  the 
squad  from  being  surprised  as  a  whole. 

SITUATION  IV. 

When  the  point  reached  the  bridge  between  Bream  and  crossroads 
554  you  signaled  it  to  halt.  The  remainder  of  the  patrol  advanced 
to  the  bridge. 

You  now  observe  that  the  bridge  stringers  are  only  3  feet  above  the 
ground;  that  from  the  east  end  of  the  bridge  an  observer  can  see 
the  Heidlersburg  Road  as  far  as  the  house  400  yards  east  of  cross- 
roads 55.4  and  the  higher  points  of  the  road  to  the  north  as  far  as 


132 

J.  Fohl;  that  the  road  to  the  west  can  be  seen  as  far  as  the  bridge 
800  yards  from  where  you  are ;  that  a  herd  of  12  cattle  is  about  300 
yards  north  of  Bream's  house  grazing  in  the  stubble  field. 
What  do  you  do? 


Orders  to  Pine: 

Pine,  take  Stone  with  you ;  pass  under  this  bridge  and  post  yourself  near  the 
east  end  of  it,  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  where  you  can  see  the  roads  to  the  east 
and  north.  If  Reds  approach,  go  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  and  signal  the 
fact  to  the  rest  of  the  squad,  then  hide  and  watch  the  Reds,  and  signal  o.  k. 
when  they  have  disappeared.  Repeat. 

Orders  to  Brown: 

Brown,  take  Hagen,  MeGowan,  and  Schafer  with  you  to  drive  the  cattle  to 
this  bridge.  Going  out,  pass  under  the  bridge  ami  through  the  woods  along 
the  creek  to  that  fence  along  the  north  side  of  the  field  (400  yards  north  of 
Bream's  house).  Drive  the  cattle  east  to  the  woods,  then  to  iliis  bridge,  where 
I  shall  meet  you.  Detail  a  man  to  watch  toward  this  bridge  for  signals  from 
Pine  and  to  watch  toward  Bream's  house  for  signals  from  me.  If  we  signal 
Enemy  in  sight,  get  into  the  woods  and  hide  until  \ve  signal  o.  J:.,  then  resume 
your  job.  If  we  fire,  join  us  at  once  by  the  shortest  route.  Repeat. 

Then  I  add: 

Ames  and  I  are  going  to  visit  that  house  (100  yards  west  of  the  bridge)  and 
then  the  second  house,  which  is  Bream's,  to  cut  out  their  telephones.  Watoh 
the  occupants  and  see  Bream  or  his  family. 

DISCUSSION. 

Your  orders  hardly  require  discussion.  They  indicate  that  security 
and  warning  are  necessary  and  that,  if  Reds  appear,  the  patrol  will 
hide  as  best  it  can  until  the  danger  is  past ;  also  that  the  whole  patrol 
must  assemble  in  case  of  discovery  and  a  fight  in  self-defense. 

When  we  are  in  the  enemy's  country  telephones  are  a  constant 
source  of  annoyance  and  apprehension  for  our  patrols  or  small 
detachments.  In  the  present  situation,  for  example,  it  may  be  that 
the  enemy  has  a  Cavalry  detachment  that  is  using  Heidlersburg, 
or  Center  Mills,  or  some  other  near-by  point  as  a  base  from  which 
patrols  are  sent  out.  Such  a  detachment  may  have  a  man  at  the 
local  telephone  exchange,  and  farmers  may  have  been  forewarned 
to  call  up  the  telephone  exchange  whenever  any  Blues  appear  in 
their  vicinity. 

The  success  of  your  patrol  depends  largely  upon  secrecy.  Never- 
theless you  are  now  obliged  to  expose  at  least  six  men,  but  you 
should  not  on  that  account  be  careless  and  do  imprudent  things. 
For  example,  you  should  not  cut  the  fences  at  the  bridge  until  the 
cattle  are  actually  there  and  ready  to  be  driven  south.  Such  action 


133 

would  result  in  needless  exposure.  The  occupants  of  the  houses  to 
the  west  might  divine  your  intentions  before  their  telephone  con- 
nection was  destroyed. 

SITUATION  V. 

You  found  Bream  at  home  and  brought  him  with  you  to  the 
bridge.  Here  the  patrol  assembled.  The  cattle  are  in  the  southeast 
corner  of  Bream's  field,  near  the  west  end  of  the  bridge. 

What  route  and  formation  do  you  intend  to  use  on  the  return  trip  ? 

CORPL.  CLARK'S  SOLUTION. 

I  shall  cut  the  fences  near  the  west  end  of  the  bridge  and  return 
by  the  same  route  that  we  used  in  coining  out,  except  that,  from 
the  bridge  near  534  we  shall  use  the  road.  The  herd  will  be  driven 
in  the  open  field  as  close  as  possible  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods 
that  line  Opossum  Creek. 

Two  men  with  wire  cutters  will  precede  the  herd  by  50  yards  as 
far  as  the  bridge  near  534.  Bream  and  three  men  will  drive  the 
cattle,  Bream  taking  the  most  exposed  (west)  flank.  Three  men, 
including  myself,  will  follow  the  herd  at  200  yards.  From  the 
bridge  near  534,  Bream  and  one  man  will  drive  the  herd  along  the 
road  to  our  detached  post.  The  rest  of  the  squad  will  remain  near 
534  until  the  herd  reaches  the  north  bridge  across  the  Conewago,  and 
then  follow. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  map  indicates  that  there  is  brush  in  the  woods  along  Opossum 
Creek.  The  effort  to  conceal  the  patrol  as  much  as  possible  can 
hardly  be  carried  to  the  extreme  of  attempting  to  drive  the  herd 
through  such  woods.  The  woods  will  screen  the  herd  on  the  east 
side,  and  the  high  ground,  on  the  south  end  of  which  we  have  a 
standing  patrol  (586),  will  screen  it  on  the  west  side. 

Your  formation  resembles  that  of  a  convoy  on  a  small  scale.  If 
we  were  to  change  the  formation  at  all  we  would  reduce  the  point 
to  one  man  and  the  drivers  to  two  men,  thus  making  five  men  avail- 
able for  the  rear  guard.  You  can  readily  see  that  the  rear  guard 
has  become  the  most  important  element  in  case  a  small  Red  party 
discovers  what  you  are  doing,  and  attempts  to  interfere  with  you 
before  you  reach  the  protection  of  the  detached  post.  For  this 
reason,  also,  you  may  dispense  with  a  point  when  you  reach  534 
and,  since  two  men  can  drive  a  herd  along  a  road  lined  with  fences, 
the  entire  squad  is  available  to  prevent  interference  before  the  herd 
reaches  the  island  in  the  Conewago. 


134 

While  you  were  marching  toward  Bream's  house  you  could  have 
no  excuse  for  fighting  except  in  self-defense.  But  on  the  return 
trip  you  would  fire  on  any  Red  party,  if  by  doing  so  you  could  pre- 
vent a  discovery  of  your  real  operation,  or  could  prevent  inter- 
ference with  it.  For  example,  if  a  Red  patrol  arrived  at  crossroads 
554  from  the  east  or  north,  you  would  drive  it  off  if  its  further  prog- 
ress threatened  the  success  of  your  little  convoy.  Therefore,  one 
man  of  your  small  rear  guard  should  march  close  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  the  ground  east  of  Oppossum  Creek. 


THIRTEENTH  PROBLEM. 


A  CONTACT  PATROL. 


EXPLANATION. 

The  patrols  that  we  have  studied  heretofore  in  connection  with  the 
Plainview  outpost  are  of  the  kind  that  are  intended  to  warn  us  if  the 
enemy  approaches.  It  is  frequently  just  as  important  to  know 
whether  the  enemy- is  going  away.  When  two  armies  are  in  close 
contact  and  one  feels  obliged  to  retreat,  the  start  is  frequently  at- 
tempted at  night.  For  example,  if  at  night  our  outpost  line  faces  the 
enemy's,  and  during  the  preceding  day  the  enemy  has  been  badly 
defeated,  or  we  have  been  heavily  reinforced,  the  enemy  may  decide 
that  it  is  dangerous  or  unwise  to  remain.  If  he  begins  his  retreat 
during  the  night  (as  Lee  did  at  Gettysburg),  and  without  our  knowl- 
edge, he  will  have  a  good  start  by  the  time  we  discover  his  move,  and 
we  shall  lose  the  great  advantage  of  a  close  pursuit.  Toward  morn- 
ing we  shall  be  in  contact  wTith  a  mere  skeleton  of  his  original  out- 
post, possibly  only  a  line  of  small  outguards.  The  main  body,  and 
even  the  outpost  reserve  and  supports,  may  be  gone.  Hence,  when 
we  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  may  retreat  during  the 
night,  we  should  get  our  patrols  behind  the  enemy's  line  of  observa- 
tion, as  near  the  larger  bodies  of  troops  as  possible.  A  patrol  that 
arrives  in  a  favorable  position  fastens  itself  to  the  body  of  troops 
which  it  has  found,  and  remains  there  in  hiding  and  in  observation 
as  long  as  possible.  It  attempts  to  send  or  bring  back  information 
if  it  discovers  any  definite  signs  of  the  enemy's  intention  to  leave. 
Such  a  patrol  might  well  be  nicknamed  "  night  leech."  It  is  a  diffi- 
cult patrol  to  lead,  because  if  the  enemy  intends  to  retreat  he  will 
naturally  try  to  make  his  line  of  observation  impenetrable — "hog 
tight,*'  as  the  farmers  say  when  they  refer  to  their  strongest  fences. 
The  return  trip  of  messengers,  or  of  the  whole  patrol,  may  be  as 
difficult  as  the  trip  out. 

If  the  enemy  is  some  distance  away  the  Cavalry  usually  furnishes 
these  contact  patrols.  A  Cavalry  patrol  will  leave  its  horses  in 
hiding,  in  charge  of  two  or  more  men,  while  the  others,  on  foot, 
attempt  to  penetrate  the  enemy's  outpost  or  detached  posts.  But 

(135) 


136 

when  contact  is  close — for  example,  where  the  opposing  sentinels  are 
only  a  few  hundred  yards  apart — Infantry  patrols  make  the  attempt 
along  this  front,  while  Cavalry  patrols  may  be  sent  to  make  similar 
attempts  on  the  flanks. 

SITUATION  I. 

Continuation  of  sixth  to  tenth  problems,  inclusive : 

In  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  problems  we  arbitrarily  borrowed  the 
first  platoon  for  convenience.  We  shall  now  return  it  to  its  original 
position  and  assume  that  it  has  been  there  since  we  concluded  the 
tenth  problem. 

You  are  Sergt.  Hill,  of  the  first  platoon.  The  first  platoon  formed 
the  picket  near  the  bridges  northeast  of  Plain  view  and  first  occupied 
its  position  on  the  afternoon  of  November  1.  It  is  now  8  p.  m.,  No- 
vember 2,  and  it  has  been  dark  since  5.45  p.  m. 

Important  things  have  happened  to-day.  Shortly  after  noon  the 
enemy  made  a  sudden  attack  against  our  front  along  the  Conewago, 
from  the  bridges  where  our  platoon  has  been  stationed  to  the  Cavalry 
detached  post  11  miles  southeast  of  our  platoon.  The  enemy  failed 
to  force  a  crossing  at  our  two  bridges,  but  he  captured  the  fords  800, 
1,300,  and  2,500  yards  to  the  southeast  of  us.  The  outpost  battalion 
was  soon  deployed  on  the  east  slopes  of  the  616  and  the  Plainview 
spurs,  but  it  was  in  serious  danger  nevertheless.  The  main  body  of 
the  brigade,  however,  went  forward  in  counterattack  along  both  sides 
of  the  watercourse  that  runs  almost  east-northeast  from  road  fork 
535.  But  the  enemy  was  well  equipped  with  artillery,  while  we  had 
none,  and  the  counterattack  was  stopped  when  it  reached  a  line 
parallel  to  and  a  short  distance  east  of  the  616 — 544  road.  Red  troops 
continued  to  cross  at  the  fords  and  severely  hammered  our  long  line 
until  4  o'clock,  until  which  time  matters  looked  very  serious  for  us. 
At  that  hour,  however,  the  first  of  our  reinforcements  arrived;  a 
full  regiment  of  Artillery  that  had  trotted  ahead  of  the  Infantry 
brigade  with  which  it  had  been  marching.  The  regiment  carried  as 
many  infantrymen  as  its  guns  and  carriages  could  accommodate,  and 
three  troops  of  Cavalry  rode  in  front  and  patrolled  the  flanks. 
When  our  Artillery  opened  fire  the  enemy  was  through.  If  our  brig- 
ade had  not  been  so  roughly  handled  and  exhausted  we  might  have 
greatly  damaged  the  enemy.  But  he  maintained  a  stubborn  firing 
line  on  our  side  of  the  Conewago  until  it  was  practically  too  dark 
for  us  to  see  it.  Under  cover  of  this  line,  the  other  Reds  on  our  side 
of  the  Conewago  recrossed  the  creek.  At  dark,  when  the  firing  line 
of  our  brigade  finally  reached  the  creek,  the  men  found  that  the 
enemy  had  very  ingeniously  stretched  more  than  100  lines  of  rope 
across  the  Conewago,  fastening  the  ends  to  trees.  That  explained 
why  we  caught  so  few  Red  prisoners  at  the  fords. 


137 

The  second  brigade  arrived  at  dark,  but  the  hour  was  then  too 
late,  and  our  brigade  was  to  disorganized  to  permit  a  change  oi 
outpost  troops  for  to-night.  The  first  platoon  lost  seven  men.  The 
second  platoon  (Sergt.  Crane)  lost  even  more.  These  two  platoons 
were  consolidated  and  stationed  as  a  picket  at  the  old  post  of  the  first 
platoon ;  that  is,  near  the  barricade  of  tjie  first  bridge,  with  a  sentry 
squad  at  the  south  end  of  the  second  bridge.  The  second  bridge, 
however,  was  badly  wrecked  during  the  fighting.  The  other  changes 
made  in  the  outpost  have  not  yet  been  reported  to  the  picket. 

Yesterday  afternoon  three  rowboats  were  found  by  another  picket 
near  Hershey  Mill.  One  boat  was  turned  over  to  our  picket  last 
night,  and  has  been  kept  out  of  sight  on  the  south  bank  of  the  west 
end  of  the  large  island  on  which  our  sentry  squad  is  posted. v 

First  Sergt.  Holmes,  the  picket  commander,  now  (8  p.  m.)  calls 
you  and  says: 

Get  yourself  and  Butler,  Quinn,  and  Walinski  ready  for  patrol  through  the 
enemy's  outpost,  and  then  report  to  me  for  orders. 

When  you  are  ready,  the  first  sergeant  gives  you  the  following 
orders : 

The  enemy  has  sentinel  posts  at  various  points  along  the  road  that  follows 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  Conewago.  There  is  one  near  the  crossroads  in  front 
of  us  (502).  We  do  not  know  whether  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  has  halted 
across  the  Conewago  for  the  night  or  has  marched  off.  Our  picket  is  no  longer 
sending  patrols  on  the  roads  just  across  the  creek.  Other  patrols  like  yours 
may  be  sent  on  other  roads,  but  I  know  of  none  and  you  are  not  likely  to  meet 
any.  Take  your  patrol  through  the  enemy's  outpost  line  and  follow  the  Heidlers- 
burg  road  to  locate  the  outpost  support  or  reserve.  If  you  find  none  between 
here  and  Heidlersburg,  come  back  at  once.  If  you  find  one,  keep  it  in  sight  and 
come  back  if  it  marches  off.  In  any  case,  be  back  here  at  daylight.  You  have 
already  been  in  that  direction  on  patrol  and  know  the  country  as  well  as  I 
do.  Cross  at  the  ford  or  by  the  ropes  southeast  of  here,  or  take  the  boat  at  the 
west  end  of  the  island.  Let  me  know  which  you  choose.  Repeat. 

In  the  open  you  can  see  a  man  at  about  100  yards  distance  if  he 
is  on  the  skyline  and  standing;  otherwise,  about  25  yards  if  he  is 
standing,  and  about  10  yards  if  lying  down. 

1.  What  equipment  will  the  patrol  carry? 

2.  What  route  do  you  intend  to  follow  ? 

3.  What  formations  will  the  patrol  use? 


1.  Each  man  will  carry  a  rifle,  belt  with  40  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion, and  canteen.     In  addition,  I  personally  shall  carry  a  wire  cutter, 
watch,  electric  flash  lamp,  and  note  book  and  pencil ;  also,  of  course, 
the  compass,  which  is  a  part  of  my  unit  equipment. 

2.  I  intend  to  cross  by  means  of  the  boat ;  cross  the  road  about  mid- 
way between  crossroads  502  and  the  road  fork  TOO  yards  northwest 


138 

thereof;  pass  through  the  big  woods  so  as  to  get  in  touch  with  the 
Heidlersburg  road  at  a  point  not  less  than  200  yards  northeast  of 
crossroads  502;  then,  using  the  telegraph  or  telephone  poles  as  a 
guide,  advance  along  the  west  side  of  the  road  and  75  or  100  yards 
from  it,  but  swinging  around  the  ridges  so  as  not  to  appear  on  the 
skyline,  and  swinging  around  any  farmhouse  that  may  be  along  the 
road. 

3.  After  landing  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Conewago,  the  patrol 
will  proceed  in  single  file,  with  10-pace  distances,  and  myself  in  the 
lead;  on  hands  and  knees  or  crawling  when  necessary.  When  the 
patrol  is  some  distance  inside  the  big  woods,  it  will  be  formed  with 
one  man  from  3  to  10  paces  on  my  left  (exact  distance  depending 
upon  the  amount  of  light)  ;  behind  this  man  will  march  another  at 
the  same  distance,  and  then  a  fourth  man  at  the  same  distance  behind 
the  third.  The  same  formation  will  be  used  after  the  patrol  leaves 
the  big  woods. 

DISCUSSION. 

The  first  sergeant's  orders  indicate  that  you  are  probably  in  for 
a  hard  night's  work.  Fortunately,  such  patrols  are  not  a  daily 
occurrence. 

First,  we  desire  to  say  a  word  about  the  equipment.  It  is  Novem- 
ber 2,  and  therefore  the  nights  are  cold,  but  we  have  not  gone  into 
details  as  to  the  clothing  of  the  troops.  If  the  troops  have  their 
overcoats,  the  members  of  your  patrol  would  wear  theirs.  Other- 
wise, you  would  try  to  rustle  an  extra  flannel  shirt  and  sweater  for 
each  of  the  men,  so  that  each  man  could  wear  two  flannel  shirts  and 
two  sweaters.  Failing  in  this,  we  would  recommend  that  you  carry 
blankets.  Under  no  circumstances  should  you  fail  to  make  pro- 
visions for  keeping  the  men  fairly  comfortable.  You  might  dis- 
pense with  these  articles  if  the  patrol  were  to  march  continuously, 
but  it  is  likely  that  you  will  be  obliged  to  remain  inactive  and  con- 
cealed for  several  hours  and  you  should  prepare  accordingly. 

The  men  of  the  visiting  patrol  in  the  tenth  problem  carried 
bayonets,  but  you  will  remember  that  this  patrol  was  obliged  to 
challenge  anyone  it  met,  and  to  make  prisoners  of  all  strangers. 
You,  on  the  other  hand,  should  under  no  circumstances  attempt  to 
fight,  except  in  self-defense  as  a  last  resort.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, we  believe  that  a  patrol  such  as  yo\irs,  which  should  march 
stripped  of  all  unnecessary  equipment,  will  be  better  off  without 
bayonets.  For  the  same  reason,  you  need  very  little  ammunition, 
but  the  length  of  time  that  your  patrol  will  be  out  makes  it  advisable 
to  carry  canteens  of  water.  The  wire  cutter  can  be  carried  in  the 
pocket  and  may  be  very  useful.  The  flash  lamp  will  be  a  great 
convenience  in  case  you  have  to  examine  your  watch  or  compass,  or 
have  to  write  a  message.  In  using  it,  however,  you  should  lie  close 


139 

to  the  ground  and  carefully  cover  your  hands  and  the  lamp  with  your 
hat  or  overcoat. 

The  first  sergeant  very  properly  made  no  reference  to  crossroads 
502  as  a  starting  point  for  your  patrol,  even  assuming  that  you 
could  pick  your  way  across  the  bridge  wreckage.  The  Red  sentinel 
post  would  stop  you  at  the  very  beginning.  The  same  objection 
may  be  offered  with  respect  to  the  ford  TOO  yards  southeast  of  our 
picket.  Although  the  ford  is  not  near  the  road,  it  is  quite  certain 
that  the  enemy  has  it  under  observation.  The  lines  of  rope  might 
enable  your  patrol  to  cross  without  being  observed,  but  the  men 
would  be  soaked,  and  the  night  will  probably  be  a  long  and  cold  one. 
However,  the  final  reason  for  choosing  to  cross  by  means  of  the  row- 
boat,  is  the  fact  that  it  places  the  patrol  on  the  most  favorable  side 
of  the  Heidlersburg  road,  as  we  shall  see  later.  To  tell  the  truth, 
we  forced  the  situation  when  we  allowed  the  first  sergeant  to  leave 
to  you  the  choice  of  your  crossing  place. 

In  addition  to  the  Red  sentinel  post  near  crossroads  502,  you 
may  as  well  take  it  for  granted  that  there  is  another  Red  sentinel 
post  at  the  road  bend  TOO  yards  northwest  of  crossroads  502,  and  that 
frequent  patrols  pass  between  these  two  points.  You  will  be  obliged 
to  use  the  utmost  care  when  you  enter  the  boat,  paddle  it  across,  and 
leave  it.  You  can  not  use  the  oar  locks.  When  you  reach  the  op- 
posite bank,  you  must  hide  the  boat  as  well  as  you  can  and  make  note 
of  some  near-by  landmark. 

On  our  map  it  is  impossible  to  decide  upon  the  exact  route  to  the 
big  woods,  but  it  is  quite  probable  that  you  will  be  obliged  to  ap- 
proach the  road  on  your  hands  and  knees  and  then  cross  it  by  crawl- 
ing. You  must  lead  the  way,  and  each  of  the  other  men  must  do 
exactly  as  the  man  in  front  of  him  does;  that  is,  advance  on  his 
hands  and  knees,  or  crawl,  or  lie  still.  If  the  road  were  lined  with 
woods  on  both  sides,  we  would  recommend  that  the  patrol  cross  in 
skirmish  line ;  but  you  are  obliged  to  approach  the  road  over  ground 
that  is  as  open  to  view  as  the  road  itself.  It  matters  little  at  what 
point  you  strike  the  woods.  The  main  thing  is  to  get  into  the  woods 
undiscovered.  Once  you  are  in  the  woods,  the  first  thing  to  do  is 
to  get  safely  away  from  the  road  that  you  have  just  crossed,  and  then 
try  to  find  the  Heidlersburg  road  at  a  point  that  is  a  safe  distance 
from  the  sentinel  post  at  crossroads  502.  Your  object  now  is  to  use 
the  road  as  a  guide. 

As  soon  as  you  are  clear  of  the  woods  you  will  see  the  great  ad- 
vantage of  being  on  the  west  side  of  the  road  instead  of  the  east 
side.  The  greater  part  of  the  road  will  appear  on  the  skyline;  the 
tops  of  telegraph  or  telephone  poles  will  almost  certainly  appear  on 
the  skyline  throughout  the  distance  to  Heidlersburg.  Your  patrol 
will  be  either  on  a  down  slope  or  on  low  ground  with  a  dark  back- 


140 

ground  when  viewed  from  the  road.  Hence  your  patrol  can  walk 
parallel  to  the  road  and  100  yards  away  from  it  and  still  see  the 
poles  and,  in  many  places,  any  man  that  might  be  on  the  road.  A 
person  on  the  road,  however,  would  be  unable  to  see  you,  though 
he  might  be  able  to  hear  you.  It  becomes,  then,  merely  a  question 
of  how  quietly  you  advance.  Of  course,  you  may  stumble  across  a 
patrol,  or  even  a  sentinel,  off  the  road.  To  reduce  the  chance  of  mis- 
hap on  this  score,  you  would  loop  around  the  spurs  that  run  west- 
ward from  the  road  in  order  not  to  appear  on  some  one  else's  skyline, 
but  the  road  is  still  the  guide. 

^  When  you  have  a  long  distance  to  go  at  night,  and  must  avoid 
discovery,  the  surest  method  is  to  find  a  road  or  railroad  or  a  com- 
bination of  roads  to  follow.  Study  carefully  the  road  or  combina- 
tion of  roads  that  will  lead  you  to  your  destination  and  then  if  pos- 
sible choose  the  low  side  for  your  advance  so  that  the  poles,  or  even 
the  trees  or  fences  alongside,  if  there  are  no  poles,  may  be  on  the  sky- 
line. Even  in  daytime  the  tops  of  a  line  of  poles  are  an  excellent 
guide  for  a  patrol  that  must  avoid  being  seen  from  the  road. 

Under  no  circumstances  would  we  consent  to  the  route  you  fol- 
lowed when  you  patrolled  toward  Heidlersburg  yesterday  afternoon 
(ninth  problem).  You  are  now  looking  for  the  camp  or  bivouac  of 
one  of  the  larger  outpost  bodies.  You  will  find  such  bodies  on  or 
near  a  road,  particularly  at  night;  and  you  are  ordered  to  confine 
your  attention  to  the  Heidlersburg  Road.  A  patrol  easily  loses  its 
way  at  night.  It  will  be  hard  enough  to  guide  on  the  road  when  you 
consider  the  ridges  around  which  you  must  pass,  and  the  farmhouse 
squarely  between  the  ridges.  Farmers'  dogs  are  especially  trouble- 
some. 

The  formation  of  the  patrol  while  advancing  parallel  to  the  road 
is  determined  by  the  ground.  The  task  of  examining  the  country 
along  the  road  falls  on  you.  The  man  on  your  left  must  watch  the 
other  flank  and  guide  on. you.  The  other  men  follow  him  because 
he  is  farthest  from  the  road  and  nearest  to  the  low  ground,  which  is 
the  safe  ground.  The  same  principle  is  observed  as  in  the  formation 
of  your  patrol  in  Situation  IV,  ninth  problem. 

SITUATION  II. 

When  you  reach  the  cornfield  400  yards  north  of  crossroads  502 
and  are  midway  between  the  watercourse  and  the  road  you  see  on 
the  road  east  of  you  against  the  skyline  three  men  marching  toward 
crossroads  502. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGT.  HILL'S  SOLUTION. 

Lie  down  and  wait  until  the  Reds  are  safely  out  of  the  way.  then 
continue  toward  Heidlersburg. 


141 

DISCUSSION. 

As  long  as  you  have  a  decided  advantage  of  position,  it  would  be 
foolish  to. attempt  to  move.  The  three  Reds  probably  form  a  visiting 
patrol,  or  they  may  be  a  relief  of  sentinels  going  out  to  be  posted; 
it  does  not  matter.  They  can  not  see  you,  but  they  may  hear  you  if 
you  move.  If  your  patrol  is  properly  instructed  the  men  will 
naturally  lie  down  when  you  do  so.  No  signal  or  sound  is  'necessary. 

SITUATION  III. 

As  you  continued  toward  Heidlersburg  you  were  able  to  examine 
the  road  where  it  crosses  the  spur  a  half  mile  northeast  of  crossroads 
502.  In  the  vicinity  of  the  farmhouse  you  experienced  greater  diffi- 
culty, but  observing  no  signs  whatever  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  ground  in  that  vicinity  is  very  low,  you  decided  that  there  was 
no  large  outpost  body  on  or  near  that  part  of  the  road.  Continuing 
your  advance  you  passed  through  the  cornfield  west  of  the  house 
and  circled  around  the  west  slope  of  the  low  spur  in  front  of  you. 

You  are  now  300  yards  northwest  of  the  house,  and  about  ready 
to  make  your  way  back  toward  the  road  when  you  observe  through 
the  woods  a  number  of  small  fires  apparently  200  yards  northeast  of 
your  present  position. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 


I  intend  to  approach  carefully  until  I  can  see  whether  there  are  any 
men  around  the  fires. 

SITUATION  IV. 

You  arrive  at  the  point  where  the  fence  enters  the  woods  (400  yards 
west  of  road  fork  545)  and  remain  in  observation  for  several  minutes. 
There  appear  to  be  20  or  30  very  small  fires,  and  occasionally  men 
pass  between  you  and  some  of  these  fires.  Also,  you  catch  the  hum 
of  low  conversation.  From  other  signs  you  decide  also  that,  from 
time  to  time,  men  are  coming  to  the  fires  from  the  direction  of  the 
road  to  the  east  and  others  are  leaving  the  fires  and  going  toward  the 
road. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 


I  intend  to  remain  in  observation  in  or  near  my  present  position  as 
long  as  the  present  activity  continues. 

DISCUSSION. 

In  an  outpost  the  building  of  fires  is  generally  prohibited.    In  that 
case,  how  can  we  account  for  the  small  fires  that  you  have  discov- 


142 

ered  ?  The  explanation  is  probably  as  follows :  The  enemy  has  been 
as  late  as  we,  or  later,  in  getting  his  outpost  established.  The  Reds 
have  had  nothing  to  eat  since  before  noon.  The  night  is  cold.  The 
men  need  hot  coffee  and  food.  After  a  battle  there  is  always  a  tem- 
porary disorganization  of  messing  arrangements.  It  is  probable  that 
the  Red  outpost  can  not  be  served  with  hot  coffee  and  food  from 
some  point  farther  back,  and  there  must  be  some  reason  why  the 
troops  immediately  in  front  of  you  can  not  use  indoor  fires  in  Heid- 
lersburg.  Hence,  the  officer  responsible  for  the  fires  has  selected  a 
ravine  screened  by  a  strip  of  woods  and  has  ordered  individual  cook- 
ing, probably  by  squads  and  in  relays.  Under  all  the  conditions  the 
necessity  for  hot  coffee  and  food  outweighs  the  necessity  for  complete 
concealment  at  a  point  so  far  (1  mile)  in  rear  of  the  Red  line  of 
observation.  Whether  this  explanation  is  correct  or  not,  your  dis- 
covery has  undoubtedly  revealed  the  fact  that  you  have  located  a 
large  outpost  body,  probably  a  strong  support,  on  the  road  east,  or 
nearly  east,  of  where  you  now  are.  With  the  aid  of  our  map  wo 
would  conclude  that  the  support  is  at  road  fork  545,  but  it  is  not 
likely  that  your  knowledge  of  the  ground  with  respect  to  your  pres- 
ent position  would  be  definite  enough  to  enable  you  to  locate  the  sup- 
port so  precisely.  It  is  sufficient  to  know  that  you  have  probably 
located  an  important  outpost  element. 

The  next  question  is,  Can  you  approach  nearer  to  Heidlersburg  or 
improve  your  present  position?  We  would  not  recommend  such  an 
attempt  for  the  present.  Of  course,  you  will  obtain  the  best  results 
if  you  can  locate  the  enemy's  main  body,  because  the  enemy  may 
march  off,  leaving  supports  in  position  as  well  as  outguards.  But 
there  are  times  when  we  must  let  well  enough  alone.  You  can  not 
approach  nearer  to  Heidlersburg  unless  you  make  a  wide  detour 
through  the  woods  to  the  north.  As  we  have  said  before,  a  patrol 
easily  loses  its  way  at  night,  particularly  in  woods,  and  you  may 
eventually  come  out  of  the  woods  at  a  point  where  your  discovery 
is  almost  certain.  Even  if  it  exercises  the  greatest  care  and  skill,  a 
patrol  passing  through  woods  and  underbrush  at  night  has  many 
collisions  with  dry  branches  and  other  unseen  obstacles.  On  a  still 
night  its  progress  may  be  detected  by  sound  at  a  great  distance. 
******* 

Our  discussion  has  indicated  what  the  future  action  of  the  patrol 
would  be  under  ordinary  circumstances.  It  is  therefore  unnecessary 
to  carry  the  problem  further.  One  point  only  deserves  attention: 
At  night  it  is  unwise  to  send  back  information  or  messages  by  a 
single  messenger.  Ordinarily,  when  you  have  information  important 
enough  to  be  sent  back,  the  conditions  will  be  such  that  the  entire 
patrol  may  return  at  once;  but  if  you  desire  to  send  a  message  and 
remain  in  observation  you  should  send  two  messengers. 


REMARKS   ON   THE  PLAINVIEW  OUTPOST. 


These  remarks  are  inserted  here  in  the  hope  that  they  will  be  of 
interest  to  officers  who  have  followed  the  preceding  eight  problems 
and  who  may  have  inquired  into  the  larger  aspects  of  the  protection 
given  the  brigade.  It  is  a  further  object  of  these  remarks  to  en- 
courage carefully  prepared  and  complete  situations,  using  the  minor 
parts  as  bases  for  problems  for  noncommissioned  officers.  There  are 
several  interesting  points  in  connection  with  the  Plainview  outpost. 
Some  of  these  points  will  be  discussed.  Officers  may  derive  much 
value  from  studying  their  own  problems  in  like  manner. 

It  was  assumed  that  the  brigade,  with  one  troop  of  Cavalry,  was 
advancing  to  the  northeast  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Conewago  until 
to-morrow  or  the  next  day,  when  reinforcements  would  arrive  and 
a  further  advance  would  be  made.  Our  information  indicated  that 
the  enemy  is  inactive  for  the  present,  and  after  noon  to-day  our 
Cavalry  located  him  in  camp  about  4  miles  northeast  of  Plainview. 
Our  advance  guard  battalion  and  one  platoon  of  Cavalry  constitute 
our  outpost.  The  remainder  of  the  Cavalry  is  relieved  from  further 
duty  with  the  advance  guard,  and  after  reconnaissance  beyond  the 
Conewago  will  withdraw  to  the  main  body. 

Outpost  Cavalry,  if  too  weak  to  camp  in  advance  of  the  outpost 
proper,  is  usually  assigned  to  the  reserve  or  support,  or  divided 
between  two  or  more  supports,  sending  patrols  from  the  element  to 
which  it  is  assigned.  Why,  then,  did  Maj.  Crosby  order  the  outpost 
Cavalry  to  a  detached  post  on  the  flank  ? 

Several  reasons  may  be  given  for  this  decision.  The  platoon  is, 
of  course,  too  small  to  be  posted  across  the  Conewago.  The  picket 
and  supports  are  connected  with  the  reserve  by  telephone;  this  does 
away  with  the  necessity  for  mounted  messengers,  and  therefore  no 
troopers  need  be  detached  for  messengers.  The  river  is  unfordable, 
except  at  well-known  places.  The  enemy  is  likely  to  send  strong 
patrols  to  the  Conewago,  particularly  at  night,  to  watch  the  im- 
portant crossings  at  Hershey  Mills  and  northeast  of  Plainview. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  just  as  easy  to  send  Cavalry  patrols 
from  the  detached  post.  The  extra  distance  by  way  of  side  roads 
is  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  fact  that  these  roads  and  the 
Conewago  crossing  which  leads  to  them  will  be  less  carefully  watched. 

(143) 


144 

Finally,  a  detached  post  at  the  point  selected  is  necessary.  The 
post  selected  is  rather  distant  for  an  Infantry  platoon.  All  things 
considered,  it  is  a  good  position  for  the  outpost  Cavalry.  A  short 
distance  to  the  southwest  ample  cover  will  be  found  for  the  horses. 

If  the  brigade  commander  has  not  indicated  that  he  would  send  a 
detached  post  from  the  main  body  toward  Bridge  S.  H.,  would  Maj. 
Crosby  have  been  obliged  to  extend  his  outpost  far  enough  to  cover 
that  road? 

Maj.  Crosby's  orders  were  to  establish  the  outpost  on  the  general 
line  of  the  ridge  southeast  of  Hershey  Mill  and  northeast  of  Plain- 
view.  An  order  in  this  form  implies  that  the  outpost  will  prepare 
to  resist  on  the  approximate  line  mentioned,  but  the  outpost  must 
reach  beyond  that  line  if  an  extension  is  .necessary  for  protection, 
although  the  elements  thus  placed  on  the  flanks  may  be  able  only 
to  warn  and  not  to  resist.  How  far  beyond  the  general  line  should 
an  outpost  thus  extend? 

The  question  is  not  always  easy  to  answer.  In  the  present  case, 
however,  it  is  evident  that  the  outpost  must  be  ready  to  resist  any 
hostile  advance  by  way  of  Hershey  Mill,»the  bridges  northeast  of 
Plainview,  and  the  fords  east  of  Plainview.  It  is  also  evident  that 
the  main  body  should  at  least  be  warned  in  case  of  a  hostile  advance 
by  way  of  Bridge  S.  H.,  or  the  crossing  at  which  the  cavalry  has 
been  posted.  Therefore,  if  the  brigade  commander  had  not  placed 
a  detached  post  on  the  Bridge  S.  H.  road,  Maj.  Crosby  would  have 
been  obliged  to  do  so. 

Has  the  brigade  sufficient  protection  on  its  east  flank? 

The  country  around  Woodside  S.  H.  is  fairly  open  to  view  from  the 
main  camp  and  the  outpost,  especially  from  the  reserve  and  the 
cavalry  detached  post.  What  with  patrols  and  the  ordinary  daytime 
activities  of  a  large  camp,  we  may  fairly  assume  that  the  brigade  is 
amply  protected  during  daylight.  At  night,  however,  there  should 
be  a  detached  post  near  544.  The  present  outpost  comprises  one- 
ninth  of  the  \vhole  command,  and  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand.  Under 
these  circumstances,  Maj.  Crosby  is  justified  in  requesting  the  brigade 
commander  to  send  a  detached  post  from  the  main  body.  If  Maj. 
Crosby  prefers  not  to  make  this  request,  or  if  the  brigade  commander 
disapproves  the  request,  another  detached  post,  not  less  than  a 
platoon,  must  be  sent  from  the  outpost  reserve,  unless  the  brigade 
commander  assumes  the  responsibility  for  leaving  that  flank  open. 

Why  are  machine  guns  not  assigned  to  the  outpost  ? 

Machine  guns  were  omitted  for  the  purpose  of  the  problem.  The 
machine  gun  company  of  our  regiment  should  be  assigned  to  the  out- 
post. Until  Maj.  Crosby  has  inspected  the  outpost  line  and  has 
decided  where  the  machine  guns  are  needed  most,  he  would  probably 
leave  them  with  the  reserve.  His  inspection  would  probably  prompt 


145 

him  to  send  a  platoon  (two  guns)  to  each  of  the  outguards  of  sup- 
port No.  1. 

Why  do  the  outguards  intrench  a  day  position  some  distance 
from  the  defiles  that  they  cover,  and  then  move  forward  to  these 
defiles  at  night? 

Let  us  assume  that  the  enemy  makes  a  vigorous  attack  in  daytime 
against  the  picket  which  covers  the  ford  east  of  Plainview.  If  the 
picket  lined  the  west  bank  with  a  firing  line,  the  enemy,  in  greatly 
superior  numbers,  would  line  the  east  bank  and  smother  the  fire  of 
the  picket.  With  sufficient  force,  the  enemy  would  have  little  diffi- 
culty in  crossing  the  ford  quickly.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
picket  intrenched  in  the  woods  J-00  yards  west  of  the  ford  and  cleared 
a  field  of  fire  to  the  island,  the  woods  that  line  the  west  bank,  to- 
gether with  the  distance  and  the  trenches,  will  greatly  reduce  the 
effect  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  the  picket  may  be  able  to  concentrate 
on  any  troops  that  attempt  to  cross  the  ford.  At  night  the  situa- 
tion is  different.  The  enemy  will  not  be  able  to  fire  effectively,  even 
at  the  short  distance  which  separates  the  two  banks.  The  picket 
would  be  at  the  mouth  of  the  defile,  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy's 
narrow  front  with  fire  and  bayonet.  If  the  picket  remained  in  its 
trench,  the  enemy  could  cross  under  cover  of  darkness  and  form  a 
line  on  the  west  bank  before  advancing. 

*  -'f  v  -'•  -'.-  #  ff 

In  a  previous  discussion  the  statement  was  made  that  in  most  cases 
reasons  will  be  found  for  intrenching  a  picket.  To  illustrate  a  situ- 
ation that  would  make  intrenching  unnecessary,  let  us  assume  that 
our  brigade  arrived  in  its  present  position  so  late  in  the  afternoon 
that  the  outguards  arrived  in  their  day  positions  an  hour  or  less 
before  the  time  for  moving  into  the  night  positions  and  assume,  in 
addition,  that  it  is  definitely  known  that  the  brigade  will  resume  the 
march  at  daylight  to-morrow. 
96790°— 17 10 


FOURTEENTH  PROBLEM. 


A  SMALL  OUTGUARD. 


SITUATION  I. 

We  are  in  enemy  country.  Our  battalion  has  been  at  Biglerville, 
guarding  the  railroad.  This  afternoon  several  companies  of  Reds 
came  from  the  south  and  attempted  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge 
1.000  yards  east  of  Stiner.  Our  battalion  left  Biglersville  at  once, 
defeated  the  enemy  north  of  Stiner  just  before  dark,  and  drove  him 
south  on  the  Carlisle  road.  Our  battalion  pursued  with  Company  A 
as  advance  guard;  the  first  platoon  as  advance  party. 

It  is  now  a  half  hour  after  dark.  Except  against  the  sky  line,  a 
man  can  be  seen  at  a  distance  of  only  30  or  35  yards.  The  battalion 
has  halted.  The  advance  party  is  at  Texas  crossroads.  The  point 
(Sergt.  Hill  and  the  first  squad)  is  probably  75  yards  south  of  Texas 
crossroads. 

You  are  Corpl.  Adams,  third  squad. 

Capt.  Rowen  has  assembled  the  noncommissioned  officers  of  the 
advance  party  and  now  says: 

No  further  news  of  the  enemy.  The  main  body  of  the  battalion  halts  for  the 
night  at  the  bridge  that  we  crossed  a  half  mile  north  of  here.  Company  A 
will  be  the  outpost  and  will  bivouac  at  these  crossroads.  Second  squad,  go  500 
paces  west  on  this  road  and  establish  outguard  No.  1.  Third  squad,  go  500 
paces  south  on  this  road  and  establish  outguard  No.  2.  Send  back  the  con- 
necting files  and  the  point  as  you  pass  them.  Fourth  squad,  go  500  paces  east 
on  this  road  and  establish  outguard  No.  3.  Night  signal :  Forward  march,  and 
Attention  to  orders  (to  be  whistled).  Posts. 

What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  you  pass  the  point  ? 
CORPL.  ADAMS'S  SOLUTION. 

I  return  to  my  squad  and  order: 

The  battalion  will  camp  at  the  bridge  a  half  mile  north  of  here.  The  com- 
pany bivouacs  at  these  crossroads  as  outpost  for  the  battalion.  This  squad 
goes  500  paces  down  the  road  to  the  south  to  establish  outguard  No.  2.  Every- 
body march  quietly.  Kelley,  take  Miller  and  move  out  as  point.  The  squad 

will  follow  you  at  30  yards. 

(147) 


148 

When  Kelley  ami  Miller  have  gained  about  25  yards  distance,  I 
add: 

Towney.  tell  me  when  we  have  gone  500  paces.    Follow  me  (to  the  squad). 

I  follow  Kelley  and  Miller  at  as  great  a  distance  as  possible  with- 
out losing  sight  of  them.  As  I  pass  the  connecting  files  and  the  ad- 
vance guard  point,  I  inform  them  that  they  are  to  return  to  the 
crossroads.  I  count  my  paces. 

DISCUSSION. 

Speaking  of  marches,  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  say  that,  if 
the  distance  to  be  covered  necessitates  either  breaking  camp  before 
daylight  or  making  the  camp  after  dark,  it  is  better  to  do  the  former. 

There  are,  of  course,  many  disadvantages  in  making  camp  after 
dark,  but  the  necessity  for  doing  so  is  frequently  imposed  upon  us 
by  the  enemy,  as  in  the  present  case.  Making  camp  in  the  dark  is 
difficult  and  irritating.  Posting  a  new  outpost  in  the  dark  in  un- 
familiar country,  if  not  difficult  and  irritating,  is  at  least  an  unsatis- 
factory proceeding.  It  involves  a  long  and  careful  reconnaissance 
in  the  dark  by  the  outpost  and  support  commanders.  The  elements 
of  the  outpost,  after  the  men  have  settled  themselves  in  a  position 
which  they  hope  to  occupy,  are  likely  to  be  called  upon  to  move.  The 
establishment  of  routes  for  visiting  patrols  becomes  much  more  diffi- 
cult. It  will  frequently  happen  that  the  outpost  dispositions,  when 
examined  by  daylight  the  next  morning,  will  be  found  very  defective 
in  the  light  of  conditions  that  could  not  be,  or  were  not,  discovered 
at  night. 

Capt.  Rowen  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  each  of  the  three  out- 
guards  would  find  a  suitable  outguard  position  on  its  own  road  and 
exactly  500  paces  from  Texas  crossroads.  But  Capt.  Rowen  must 
inspect  the  outguard  positions  at  once,  and  his  experience  has  taught 
him  that  he  will  save  a  great  deal  of  time  and  annoyance  if  he  knows 
exactly  where  he  will  find  each  outguard.  Only  the  sentinels  may  be 
awake,  or  close  enough  to  see  the  road.  For  some  reason,  possibly 
lack  of  training,  sentinels  sometimes  permit  unrecognized  persons  to 
pass  by  them  without  challenge.1  Any  officer  who  has  posted  out- 
guards  at  night,  especially  when  the  outguards  are  small  and  in 
dense  country,  has  learned  the  advantage  of  first  sending  them  an 
arbitrary  distance  from  a  known  starting  point.  During  his  inspec- 
tion he  discovers  landmarks  to  guide  himself  and  others  to  the  final 
position  of  the  outguard,  or  he  may  fix  the  position  approximately 
by  pacing. 

In  the  present  case,  you  are  expected  to  do  the  best  you  can  in  the 
matter  of  establishing  your  outguard  when  you  have  arrived  500 

1  During  the  Philippine  insurrection  this  mishap  befell  the  writer  twice  in  one  month 
and  resulted  in  a  useless  search  far  bej-ond  the  outguard  position. 


149 

paces  south  of  the  crossroads,  and  then  await  the  arrival  of  Capt. 
Rowen. 

At  night,  the  distance  between  parts  of  a  marching  column  are 
greatly  reduced.  You  probably  observed  that,  in  the  statement  of 
the  situation,  the  advance  guard  point  was  about  75  yards  ahead  of 
the  advance  party ;  also  that  there  were  connecting  files  between  the 
point  and  the  advance  party,  in  spite  of  the  short  distance.  When 
you  marched  your  squad  toward  the  outguard  position,  you  needed 
a  point  as  security  in  front,  but  instead  of  sending  this  point  100 
or  200  or  even  300  yards  as  you  would  have  done  in  daytime,  you  sent 
it  only  as  far  as  you  could  see.  If  you  had  sent  it  farther  ahead, 
you  would  have  been  obliged  to  use  connecting  files  in  sight  of  each 
other  or  lose  control  over  the  point. 

The  enemy's  fire  will  have  no  effect  unless  the  men  firing  can  see 
their  target.  If  your  point  encounters  a  party  of  Reds  in  the  road, 
these  Reds  may,  of  course,  see  }Tour  point,  but  they  can  not  see  your 
squad.  You  need  only  a  few  seconds  warning.  If  there  is  a  large 
hostile  force  near  by.  you  will  probably  hear  it  before  you  see  it. 
If  it  is  merely  a  patrol,  you  may  not  hear  it  before  you  see  it,  but  in 
that  case,  a  sudden  meeting  is  no  disadvantage  to  you,  since  it  gives 
you  an  opportunity  to  drive  off  the  patrol  instead  of  giving  the 
patrol  an  opportunity  to  escape  unobserved  and  remain  in  your 
vicinity.  Of  course,  your  squad  will  march  as  quietly  as  possible. 

In  a  former  problem  we  advised  outguard  commanders  to  march 
out  to  their  positions  as  soon  as  possible,  and  we  pointed  out  the 
fact  that  much  of  the  information  to  be  given  the  members  of  the 
outguard  can  best  be  given  at  the  outguard  position.  In  practice, 
your  judgment  must  determine  what  may  best  be  told  the  men  before 
starting  out.  For  example,  in  the  present  case,  we  prefer  to  tell  the 
squad,  before  leaving  the  crossroads,  that  the  company  will  be  at  that 
particular  point  during  the  night,  and  the  battalion  will  camp  at  the 
bridge  a  half  mile  to  the  north.  The  point  to  be  emphasized  is  that 
your  departure  should  not  be  delayed  by  a  long  and  unnecessary  ex- 
planation of  what  the  squad  is  to  do. 

In  this  problem  we  have  used  another  system  of  night  signaling. 
Recruits  may  not  be  able  to  whistle  the  simple  bugle  signals,  but  we 
assume  that  your  men  are  not  recruits. 

The  call  is— 

Forward,  march. 

The  answer  or  acknowledgment  is — 

Attention  to  orders. 

Although  there  are  but  few  short  bugle  signals,  the  number  is  large 
enough  to  permit  many  combinations. 


150 

SITUATION  II. 

You  arrived  500  paces  (about  440  yards,  taking  the  average  sol- 
dier's pace)  and  found  yourself  100  yards  south  of  the  farmhouse. 
We  assume  that  you  watched  the  house  and  barn  closely  and  passed 
them  quietly.  The  map  is  not  detailed  enough  to  indicate  how  the 
outguard  and  its  sentinel  post  should  be  posted  or  to  bring  out  any- 
thing new  relative  to  the  posting  of  the  outguard. 

When  Capt.  Rowen  arrived  he  moved  the  outguard  back  to  the 
point  300  yards  south  of  the  crossroads,  where  the  rail  fence  on  the 
west  side  meets  the  road.  The  house  and  barn  were  investigated  and 
were  found  to  be  temporarily  deserted.  The  sentinels  were  posu-d 
at  the  point  indicated  by  Capt.  Rowen,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
outguard  was  placed  in  the  cornfield  20  yards  north.  The  captain's 
final  instructions  were: 

At  daylight  move  to  the  best  observation  point  wit  Ma  300  yards  to  the  south. 

Where  do  you  post  the  outguard  at  daylight? 

(NOTE. — The  corn  is  little  less  than  knee  high.) 


I  place  the  sentinel  near  the  southwest  corner  of  the  farmyard  (the 
fence  corner),  about  400  yards  south  of  Texas  crossroads,  and  place 
the  remainder  of  the  squad  a  short  distance  north  of  the  sentinel  and 
along  the  west  fence  of  the  farmyard,  the  exact  spot  depending  upon 
the  cover  that  can  be  found  or  provided. 


First,  we  may  explain  why  Capt.  Rowen  moved  the  outguard  back 
from  the  position  where  it  first  halted.  Within  certain  limits  the 
distance  between  a  support  and  one  of  its  otitguards  is  not  important. 
The  important  thing  is  the  ability  to  observe  and.  in  the  case  of  a 
picket  that  must  resist,  a  suitable  defensive  position.  The  sentinels 
posted  near  the  first  position  of  your  outguard  were  on  the  down 
slope  of  a  ridge  and  had  a  shallow  ravine  or  draw  in  their  front. 
The  range  of  their  vision  was  limited  to  about  30  yards  in  every 
direction,  except  to  the  north  and  northwest,  in  which  directions  the 
sky  line  enabled  them  to  see  the  crest  of  the  ridge  on  which  the  farm- 
house stands.  But  the  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  to  the  south.  If 
other  conditions  permit,  a  sky  line  within  100  yards  of  a  sentinel's 
front  is  an  advantage.  The  ridge  450  yards  south  of  the  farmhouse 
is  too  far  away  to  form  a  skyline  at  night.  Capt.  Rowen's  choice  lay 
between  the  position  finally  selected  and  a  position  on  the  road  about 
TOO  yards  south  of  Texas  crossroads.  Either  position  might  be  satis- 
factory. 


151 

At  daylight  your  sentinel  post  must  be  moved  forward,  and  natur- 
ally the  whole  squad  would  also  go  forward  in  order  to  be  reason- 
ably near  the  sentinel  post.  From  the  new  day  position  the  sentinels 
can  see  hill  TOT  and  the  roads  east  and  west  of  that  hill.  Capt.  Eowen 
will  undoubtedly  inspect  the  outguard  again  as  soon  after  daylight 
as  possible,  and  may  decide  to  send  a  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad  as 
far  as  hill  TOT,  unless  the  march  is  resumed  early  in  the  day. 

At  night  an  outguard  sent  out  to  watch  a  road  must  be  on  or  very 
near  that  road.  After  daylight,  however,  the  outguard  need  not  re- 
main near  the  road,  but  it  must  be  able  to  see  the  road.  Frequently 
a  position  will  be  found  some  distance  away  from  the  road,  from 
which  position  not  only  the  road  but  other  parts  of  the  terrain  can 
be  observed.  In  the  present  case,  however,  the  controlling  reason  for 
leaving  the  road  is  to  get  away  from  the  house  and,  at  the  same  time, 
obtain  a  good  observation  position. 

In  the  sixth  and  seventh  problems  the  outguards  moved  forward 
at  dark  and  back  at  daylight.  In  the  present  problem  we  find  that 
the  outguard  should  move  forward  at  daylight  and  back  at  night. 
If  you  study  a  hundred  situations,  all  different,  you  might  conclude 
that  in  the  majority  of  cases  the  night  and  day  positions  of  an  out- 
guard are  the  same;  that  is,  no  change  is  made.  Even  so,  it  would 
be  just  as  wrong  to  say  that  the  rule  is  to  make  no  change  as  to  say 
that  the  rule  is  to  move  forward  or  the  rule  is  to  move  back.  The 
only  correct  thing  to  say  is,  "  The  facts  concerning  the  enemy  and  our 
own  troops  are  so  and  so ;  the  facts  concerning  the  terrain  are  so  and 
so.  Now,  what  is  the  sensible  thing  to  do  ?  "  Kules  are  sometimes 
poor  guides. 

Perhaps  it  is  unfortunate  that  we  have  used  as  examples  in  pre- 
vious problems  two  strong  outguards,  both  of  which  moved  forward 
at  night  (sixth  and  seventh  problems).  We  may  make  the  matter 
clearer  by  saying  that  a  picket  changes  its  position  at  dark  and  again 
at  daylight,  when  the  change  makes  it  easier  for  the  picket  to  resist. 
Sentinel  posts,  and  therefore  cossack  posts  and  sentry  squads,  which 
ordinarily  are  merely  the  combined  reliefs  of  particular  sentinel 
posts  placed  under  a  commander  and  near  the  sentinel  post  for  con- 
venience, change  their  positions  at  night  and  again  at  daylight  only 
when  the  change  makes  it  easier  for  the  sentinels  to  observe.  If  in 
daytime  the  men  of  a  sentinel  post  are  posted  and  relieved  directly 
from  a  picket,  but  the  post  of  the  sentinels  is  poor  for  observation  at 
night,  while  the  position  of  the  picket  itself  is  satisfactory,  the  latter 
would  not  change  its  position,  but  would  change  the  sentinel  post, 
making  it  a  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad  if  the  new  position  is  far 
from  the  picket,  as  it  generally  would  be  at  night. 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION. 

[See  note  following  preface,  p.  4.] 


Since  this  book  is  designed  to  serve  in  part  as  a  guide  to  com- 
pany commanders,  this  concluding  chapter  is  presented  in  the  belief 
that  it  describes  a  useful  method  of  combat  instruction. 

From  recruit  drill,  drill  in  close  order,  and  drill  in  the  mech- 
anism of  extended  order  (I.  D.  R.  6b),  company  commanders 
frequently  pass  immediately  to  complete  field  exercises  (I.  D.  R.  6c). 
The  writer  has  found  that  by  employing  an  intermediate  step 
better  results  are  obtained. 

A  field  exercise  (I.  D.  R.  Gc)  is  based  on  an  assumed  situation 
to  which  the  appropriate  tactical  principles  and  formations  are 
applied.  It  may  be  an  advance  guard,  rear  guard,  outpost,  attack, 
defense,  convoy,  etc.  A  combat  exercise  (I.  D.  R.  6d)  is  also  a 
field  exercise,  but  it  is  one  which  involves  attack  or  defense  only. 

Our  limitations  as  to  observation  and  memory  are  such  that  in 
a  complete,  uninterrupted  combat  exercise  many  important  things 
escape  correction  and  proper  elucidation.  Frequently  the  result 
is  a  lack  of  the  true  discipline,  understanding,  particularity,  and 
care  which  form  the  foundation  for  Infantry  leading  and  control 
in  battle. 

The  proper  combat  instruction  of  the  compan}^,  and  particularly 
of  lieutenants  and  noncommissioned  officers,  includes  an  under- 
standing of  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  the  forms  which  make 
up  the  prescribed  drill  movements  in  extended  order  and  firings. 
This  is  best  accomplished  by  conceiving  separate  phases  of  com- 
bat and  designing  exercises  to  illustrate  correct  leading  and  con- 
duct thereunder. 

The  examples  which  follow  will  illustrate  the  application  of 
forms  to  separate  phases  of  combat  under  conditions  which  per- 
mit intelligent,  detailed  criticism  and  solid  instruction.  A  study 
of  these  examples  will  probably  lead  the  reader  to  suspect  that 
a  company  commander  must  be  a  lecturer  in  a  small  way.  If  so, 
the  reader  has  caught  our  idea  exactly.  The  training  of  lieuten- 
ants and  noncommissioned  officers  is  half  of  the  game,  and  it  can 
not  be  successful  and  complete  without  intelligent  and  pertinent 
explanation  of  concrete  examples. 

(153) 


154 

Battalion,  regimental,  and  brigade  commanders  and  inspectors  by 
devising  and  using  exercises  of  this  kind  can  more  quickly  and 
accurately  judge  the  tactical  training  and  skill  of  a  company  than 
by  any  other  means  known  to  the  writer.  Drill  is  a  necessary  part 
of  an  inspection,  and  an  excellent  drill  is  prima  facie  evidence  of 
efficiency,  but  it  is  not  conclusive  as  to  field  efficiency.  A  complete 
field  exercise,  on  the  other  hand,  generally  moves  too  rapidly  for 
minute  inspection. 

FIRST    EXAMPLE. 

The  company  is  in  camp  near  Plainview.  The  captain  has  found 
it  necessary  to  clear  up  the  situation  as  to  the  purpose  and  proper 
leading  of  platoon  columns.  The  company  is  brought  to  the  farm- 
yard 300  yards  northwest  of  Plainview,  and  the  captain  announces 
to  the  assembled  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers— 

The  enemy  is  intrenched  jusi  south  of  the  road  that  you  sec  yonder  through 
the  trees  and  about  2,000  yards  north-northwest  of  here  (the  601) — G2G — (5.">i>— 
587  road).  He  has  artillery.  Our  brigade  attacks  from  this  ridge  (indicating 
the  Plainview — 712  ridge).  Another  brigade  is  on  our  right.  We  have  artil- 
lery. The  creek  in  front  is  easily  fordable.  There  are  troops  on  the  right 
and  left  of  our  battalion.  Face  as  I  face  (the  captain  faces  road  fork  026). 
At  2,000  yards  a  house,  barn,  and  small  on-hard.  The  house  is  at  a  road 
fork.  Take  the  house  as  reference  point.  Nine  o'clock.  Four  lingers.  An- 
other road  fork.  Our  battalion  objective  is  the  enemy's  trench  between  the 
two  road  forks  mentioned.  Take  the  house  as  reference  point  again.  Seven- 
thirty  o'clock.  Two  fingers.  The  roof  of  a  house  (8(M)  yards  south  of  road 
fork  626).  Across  the  road  from  the  roof  and  to  the  right  of  it  a  patch  of 
woods.  The  battalion  will  move  first  to  that  patch  of  woods  without  tiring. 
This  company  is  on  the  right  and  is  base  company.  Company  B  on  our  left. 
Companies  C  and  D  in  support.  Any  questions?  Posts. 

He  then  forms  the  company  in  skirmish  line  under  cover  on  the 
south  slope  of  the  ridge  and  commands — 

Platoon  columns,  march. 

When  about  a  third  way  from  the  house  to  the  creek  he  halts 
the  company,  assembles  the  platoon  leaders  and  guides,  and  with 
them  examines  the  location  of  each  platoon.  From  time  to  time 
he  makes  criticisms  and  suggestions  which  we  shall  sum  up  and 
condense  later.  The  company  then  continues  the  advance  for  an- 
other hundred  yards,  and  the  location  of  the  platoon  columns  is 
examined  as  before.  A  final  halt  and  examination  is  made  just 
south  of  the  creek. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  reproduce  here  the  remarks  of  the 
captain  exactly  as  made  by  him.  The  sum  and  substance  of  them  is  as 
follows : 

The  company  is  somewhat  restricted  in  its  advance.  We  can  not  move  very 
much  to  the  right  or  left  without  running  foul  of  other  troops.  The  whole 


155 

brigade  has  to  move  forward  in  a  rough  line,  each  unit  using  the  formation  best 
suited  to  escape  artillery  fire.  The  best  formation  for  each  depends  upon 
the  ground  that  it  must  cover.  Our  battalion  can  use  platoon  columns  because 
of  the  numerous  trees  on  this  sloping  ground.  If  each  platoon  leader  will 
remember  that  the  enemy's  artillery  has  to  see  its  target  in  order  to  fire  upon 
it  effectively,  he  will  realize  that  all  he  has  to  do  in  order  to  escape  artillery 
fire  is  to  keep  out  of  sight.  On  this  down  slope  a  platoon  leader  should  not 
have  much  trouble  marching  his  platoon  so  that  the  foliage  of  one  tree  after 
another  serves  as  a  screen.  Behind  the  enemy's  front  line,  and  perhaps  in  the 
line,  there  are  buildings  or  high  points  at  which  the  artillery  \vill  station 
observing  parties,  connected  with  the  guns  by  telephone.  If  these  observing 
parties  see  you,  you  may  draw  fire.  The  thing  to  do,  then,  is  to  keep  a  sharp 
lookout  and  see  to  it  that  the  platoon  is  exposed  as  little  as  possible  to  a  view 
from  any  of  the  buildings  or  high  points  that  might  be  used  by  the  enemy 
as  artillery  observation  stations.  A  platoon  does  not  have  to  march  in  a 
straight  line.  The  platoons  do  not  have  to  keep  abreast  of  each  other.  They 
should  zigzag  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  get  the  cover  of  the  tree  foliage. 
It  would  not  be  seriously  objectionable  if  one  platoon  marched  behind  another 
for  a  short  distance,  if  it  can  not  otherwise  get  cover. 

The  foregoing  remarks  contain  nothing  but  what  is  important  for 
the  platoon  leaders  and  guides  to  know.  The  captain  avoids  a  dis- 
cussion of  matters  that  concern  only  the  higher  commanders. 

When  the  company  reaches  the  creek  the  captain  sends  it  back 
to  the  beginning  point,  under  the  first  lieutenant  to  repeat  the  ad- 
vance. This  time,  however,  the  original  platoon  guides  are  assigned 
as  platoon  leaders  while  the  captain  and  the  original  platoon  leaders, 
except  the  first  lieutenant,  go  to  the  patch  of  woods  800  yards  south 
of  626.  From  this  high  ground  they  observe  the  advance  of  the 
company  with  a  view  to  further  criticism  and  suggestion.  Mean- 
time, each  platoon  guide  has  an  opportunity  for  practice  in  seeking 
cover  for  an  advancing  platoon. 

If  time  permits  and  further  instruction  is  desirable,  both  the 
starting  point  and  the  battalion  objective  can  be  changed  slightly 
and  the  exercise  repeated. 

SECOND  EXAMPLE. 

This  is  a  continuation  of  the  first  example. 

The  captain  marches  the  company  to  the  bend  in  the  road  400 
yards  east  of  Hershey  Mill,  halts  it  facing  north,  and  announces : 

The  firing  line  of  the  battalion  (our  company  and  Company  B)  reached  this 
creek  in  platoon  columns,  crossed  to  the  north  bank,  and  halted  under  cover 
of  the  bank,  in  skirmish  line.  You  notice  that  the  open  country,  between  this 
point  and  the  patch  of  woods  that  we  are  headed  for,  is  easily  seen  from  various 
points  on  the  big  hill  in  front  of  us  (Chestnut  Hill).  The  enemy's  artillery 
may  have  observation  parties  at  one  or  more  of  those  points.  If  we  advance 
by  platoon  columns  or  in  ordinary  skirmish  lines,  we  shall  probably  draw  artil- 
lery fire.  You  notice,  however,  that  the  enemy's  infantry  in  the  trenches 
probably  will  not  see  us  until  we  occupy  the  north  edge  of  that  patch  of  woods. 


156 

The  battalion  commander  has  ordered  the  tiring  line  to  advance  in  thin  lines 
to  the  patch  of  woods.  When  the  company  flag  is  up  you  will  assume  that 
you  are  under  artillery  fire ;  otherwise,  you  are  not  under  fire.  As  skirmishers, 
guide  right,  march. 

The  skirmish  line  is  then  moved  back  to  its  covered  position  under 
the  north  bank  of  the  Cone w ago,  the  right  of  the  company  at  the  road 
bend.  The  captain  then  orders: 

The  company  will  advance  to  the  woods  by  half  platoons  from  the  right ;  the 
half  platoons  deploy  with  10-pace  intervals.  Mr.  Allen  (the  first  lieutenant) 
starts  out  with  the  first  and  second  squads. 

The  half  platoons  are  sent  in  successive  lines  about  150  yards  apart. 
The  captain  goes  forward  with  the  fourth  line.  After  a  brief  exami- 
nation of  the  assumed  enemy's  line,  he  announces  to  the  platoons 
that  have  already  arrived : 

Target :  Trench  along  the  crest.  First  and  second  platoons,  from  the  right 
end  of  the  orchard,  then  3  o'clock  to  the  road.  Overlap.  Third  and  fourth 
platoons,  from  the  right  end  of  the  orchard  to  the  left  end.  Overlap.  What 
is  the  range? 

The  target  designation  is  repeated  to  those  platoon  leaders  who 
arrive  later.  When  the  range  finders  have  reported  the  captain 
orders : 

Range,  seven-fifty.  Leave  rifles  in  place,  sighted  on  the  target.  Platoon 
leaders  and  guides,  inspect  sight-setting  and  distribution. 

We  shall  assume  that  the  following  incidents  were  observed  and 
noted  by  the  captain  : 

1.  Lieut.  Allen  marched  the  first  and  second  squads  directly  for- 
ward, and  did  not  form  thin  line  until  he  reached  the  road.     The 
second  line  was  forewarned  to  deploy  under  cover  of  the  creek  bank 
before  advancing.     Thereafter,  each  line  deployed  under  cover  as 
soon  as  the  preceding  line  advanced. 

2.  After  crossing  the  road,  the  first  line  alternated  between  double 
and  quick  time,  although  the  company  flag  was  down  throughout  the 
exercise.     The  second  line  did  the  same.     The  other  lines  were  then 
forewarned  not  to  do  so  unless  the  company  flag  was  up,  indicating 
effective  Artillery  fire. 

3.  Each  of  the  lines  had  a  tendency  toward  closing  on  its  center, 
particularly  the  fifth  line,  which  approached  the  woods  with  less 
than   five-pace  intervals  between  men. 

4.  The  first,  second,  and  third  lines,  upon  arriving  in  the  woods, 
properly  reduced  the  intervals  between  men,  but  when  the  captain 
arrived  he  found  these  six  squads  lying  dowrn  in  the  north  edge  of 
the  woods,  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view.     He  left  two  men  as  lookouts 
and  ordered  the  line  back  under  cover.     Later,  he  gave  the  orders 
relative  to  target  and  range,  quoted  above. 

5.  In  other  respects  the  exercise  was  satisfactory. 


157 

While  the  company  rests,  the  captain  assembles  the  officer  and 
noncommissioned  officers  and  says: 

This  is  another  example  illustrating  how  a  firing  line  may  advance,  without 
firing,  to  a  position  as  near  as  possible  to  the  enemy's  trench,  from  which  position 
the  firing  line  makes  its  preparations  to  start  a  vigorous  fire  and  an  energetic 
advance  when  the  proper  time  comes.  Platoon  leaders  report  accurate  sight 
setting  and  correct  aiming  for  distribution.  Some  other  things  were  not  so 
good. 

The  first  line  should  have  deployed  as  skirmishers,  at  10-pace  intervals  and 
with  the  right  skirmisher  as  base  (i.  e.,  guide  right),  before  the  line  left  the 
cover  afforded  by  the  creek  bank.  But  that  is  too  evident  to  require  further 
comment 

At  no  time  was  the  company  flag  up  to  indicate  that  you  were  under  Artillery 
fire.  If  you  are  not  under  fire,  there  is  no  necessity  for  double  timing.  Quick 
time  is  good  enough,  and  saves  the  men  unnecessary  fatigue.  If  special  con- 
ditions require  a  faster  gait,  even  though  we  are  not  under  fire,  the  major 
will  tell  me  beforehand  and  I  will  tell  you.  The  advance  by  rushes  in  the 
fire  attack  is  an  entirely  different  thing,  though  even  in  rushes  I  have  seen  a 
combination  of  long  distance  and  good  cover  that  made  it  wise  to  reduce  the 
gait  temporarily. 

You  must  correct  the  inclination  of  the  men  to  close  toward  the  center  and 
thus  "  bunch  up  "  the  line.  It  was  particularly  bad  in  the  fifth  line.  Get  it 
clearly  in  your  mind  what  thin  lines  are  for.  When  we  came  down  that  hill 
in  platoon  columns,  we  tried  to  avoid  casualties  by  preventing  the  enemy  from 
seeing  us.  But  from  the  creek  to  these  woods  we  could  not  do  it  that  way. 
We  had  to  cover  the  ground  so  thinly  with  men  that,  although  the  men  were 
visible  to  the  enemy,  the  target  was  too  poor  to  shoot  at.  The  enemy  is  not 
going  to  fire  unless  he  can  get  results  that  are  worth  as  much  as  the  ammu- 
nition used.  If  we  keep  our  formation  thin  enough,  he  will  let  us  alone  and 
save  his  ammunition  for  a  more  critical  time  and  a  better  target,  unless  he  has 
less  sense  than  he  ought  to  have,  or  more  ammunition  than  he  needs.  Probably 
no  one  ever  had  so  little  sense  or  so  much  ammunition.  But  I  am  talking  now 
about  Artillery  fire.  Thin  lines  are  not  good  against  Infantry  fire,  after  we  get 
so  close  to  the  enemy  that  our  men  can  easily  be  aimed  at  individually. 

The  best  that  a  3-inch  shrapnel  can  do  is  to  spatter  an  oval-shaped  piece  of 
ground  about  30  yards  at  its  widest  dimension  and  about  150  yards  at  its 
longest.  The  shrapnel  has,  roughly,  250  bullets.  Even  if  you  are  somewhere 
in  the  exact  area  covered  by  a  shrapnel  burst,  there  is  only  one  chance  in  twelve 
that  you  will  be  hit.  At  that  rate  we  can  make  our  lines  so  thin  that  it  would 
take  all  the  ammunition  of  an  entire  battalion  of  3-inch  guns  to  put  20  per  cents 
of  our  one  company  out  of  commission.  But  even  this  percentage  of  casualties 
would  not  result  unless  we  exposed  ourselves  for  the  length  of  time  necessary 
to  fire  that  much  ammunition.  It  will  probably  never  be  necessary  to  expose 
the  company  that  long.  So,  remember  that,  if  your  line  is  thin,  you  will 
probably  escape  Artillery  fire ;  but,  if  your  men  "  bunch  up,"  they  simply  invite 
the  enemy  to  fire.  The  enemy's  best  play  is  to  sweep  the  line  on  which  our 
successive  lines  halt  and  reform.  But  here  again  we  outplay  him  by  halting  and 
reforming  where  shrapnel  can  not  reach  us.  These  woods  give  us  good  cover 
against  shrapnel.  A  ditch,  or  dike,  or  stone  wall,  or  a  very  steep  reverse 
slope  would  do  just  as  well. 

Now,  just  a  word  about  unnecessary  exposure.  I  found  the  first  3  lines  in 
the  north  edge  of  these  woods  visible  to  the  enemy.  Remember  that  Artillery 
observers  have  good  stations  and  powerful  field  glasses.  Take  it  as  a  fixed 


158 

rule  that  when  you  are  in  a  firing  position  your  men  must  be  as  completely 
covered  or  hidden  as  possible  until  you  want  thoin  to  creep  forward  to  locate 
the  target  or  other  thing  that  you  may  be  describing,  or  to  fire,  or  to  advance. 
If  you  have  completed  your  talk,  and  do  not  intend  to  fire  or  advance  immedi- 
ately, or  if  you  cease  firing  for  a  while,  simply  caution,  "  cover,"  and  see  that 
The  men  slide  hack  again  and  lake  cover. 

I  hear  that,  in  some  companies  last  summer,  the  first  thin  line,  on  reaching 
a  position  like  this  and  in  a  situation  like  this,  would  generally  open  fire  simply 
because  the  enemy  was  in  sight  just  where  he  was  expected  to  be.  That,  of 
course,  is  all  wrong.  Sergt.  Holmes,  when  may  the  first  line,  or  the  first  several 
lines,  open  fire  on  their  own  initiative?  Correct!  In  self-defense,  or  to  drive 
back  small  advanced  detachments  or  patrols.  Any  questions? 

We  shall  assume  that  the  second  lieutenant  asks  whether  the  ad- 
vance by  half  platoons  is  better  than  by  lines  consisting  of  one  man 
from  each  squad,  as  prescribed  in  Infantry  Drills  Regulations  (218). 
The  captain  replies: 

It  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  far  as  concerns  vulnerability  and  the  likeli- 
hood of  being  subjected  to  Artillery  fire.  Drill  Regulations  do  not  insist  on 
any  prescribed  form.  Paragraph  218  is  merely  a  suggestion.  The  method  we 
used  is  better  in  our  particular  case  for  the  following  reasons:  The  ground 
between  the  creek  and  the  cover  afforded  by  the  low,  wooded  ridge  where  we 
now  are,  is  so  open  and  devoid  of  cover  that  there  is  no  intermediate  line  on 
wliich  the  company  can  halt  and  re-form  its  skirmish  line.  In  other  words,  we 
can  not  very  well  make  the  advance  in  two  or  more  M  hitches."  That  being  the 
case,  we  advance  in  a  single  "  hitch."  But  the  distance  is  great,  and  it  finally 
brings  us  dangerously  close  to  the  enemy.  In  fact,  if  anyone  insists  that  we 
have  gone  too  far  in  one  "hitch,"  I  can  only  answer  that  he  may  be  right.  In 
the  last  analysis  our  safety  in  this  particular  case  would  depend  on  the  kind 
of  progress  the  other  battalions  are  making  on  our  right  and  left,  and  upon  how 
we  coordinate  our  progress  with  theirs. 

In  any  event,  from  the  standpoint  of  leadership  and  control,  it  will  be  better 
if  we  arrange  it  so  that  each  line  consists  of  complete  units,  if  such  an  arrange- 
ment is  possible.  What  makes  it  possible  in  our  case?  It  is  made  possible  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  the  fraction  selected  (a  half  platoon)  can  deploy  its  thin 
line  under  cover  of  the  bank  of  the  creek  before  advancing  and  can  close  to 
normal  intervals  under  cover  when  it  arrives  here.  In  that  way  we  gradually 
build  up  our  strength  in  these  woods  with  the  least  disorganization.  First,  we 
have  a  platoon  leader  and  two  squads;  less  than  two  minutes  later  we  have  a 
complete  platoon;  then  a  platoon  and  a  half;  then  two  platoons,  and  so  on. 
Although  the  same  in  numbers,  one  complete  platoon  is  better  and  stronger  than 
a  line  consisting  of  two  men  from  each  of  16  squads.  But  there  are  times  when 
we  must  use  thin  lines  consisting  of  one  or  two  men  of  each  squad,  or  even 
single  men  from  alternate  squads.  Assume  that  the  distance  to  be  covered  is 
600  or  800  yards,  and  that  the  ground  is  covered  with  weeds  and  brush,  which 
will  conceal  the  men  if  they  select  their  position  skillfully  and  hug  the  ground 
closely.  Such  cover  may  afford  protection  against  accurate  artillery  fire.  We 
might  then  find  it  best  to  advance  with  a  man  from  each  squad  and  in  two  or 
more  "hitches";  that  is,  we  may  send  the  first  line  forward,  say  200  yards, 
where  it  will  halt.  When  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the  lines  have  arrived  in  the 
new  position,  we  would  send  the  first  line  forward,  say  another  200  yards. 
Naturally,  in  such  a  case  we  could  not  use  half  platoons  in  thin  lines :  there 
would  be  too  much  deploying  and  closing  in  by  the  flank  in  plain  view  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  observation  stations.  And  if  we  attempted  to  make  the  whole 


159 

distance  in  a  single  "  hitch,"  the  first  line  or  two  may  eventually  be  so  close 
to  the  enemy  that  he  might  seize  the  opportunity  to  smash  us  with  a  counter 
attack  at  a  time  when  the  company  is  badly  scattered  and  beyond  real  control. 
"  In  a  few  minutes  we  shall  return  to  the  road  bend  from  which  we  started. 
Then  the  company  will  begin  an  attack  from  the  same  starting  point  and  with 
the  same  objective,  but  with  all  other  conditions  different  from  what  they  are  in 
the  present  situation.  With  the  contrast  fresh  in  your  mind,  I  shall  try  to 
explain  some  things  that  you,  particularly  the  platoon  leaders  and  guides, 
should  know."  (See  third  example.) 

THIRD  EXAMPLE. 

This  is  a  variation  of  the  second  example. 

The  captain  sends  two  men  to  post  themselves,  about  60  yards 
apart  and  kneeling,  in  the  best  firing  position  obtainable  just  south 
of  the  orchard  and  barn  near  road  fork  626.  He  then  leads  the  com- 
pany to  the  road  bend  400  yards  east  of  Hershey  Mill  and  announces : 

This  is  an  entirely  different  situation.  The  enemy  is  in  position  more  than 
a  mile  northeast  of  here,  near  the  town  of  Heidlersburg.  Our  regiment  has 
reached  this  point  and  is  about  to  advance  to  that  high  ground  to  the  north 
(hill  586),  from  which  place  it  will  attack  toward  the  east.  It  will  then  be  on 
the  left  flank  of  our  attack,  with  other  regiments  on  its  right.  Our  company, 
however,  has  been  ordered  out  as  a  covering  detachment  (or  combat  patrol)  on 
the  left  and  will  go  to  an  east  and  west  road  a  little  less  than  a  mile  north  to 
that  mill  (Hershey  Mill).  Our  patrols  report  that  there  is  a  hostile  detachment 
posted  near  a  road  fork  less  than  a  mile  north  of  the  mill,  where  the  road  from 
the  mill  meets  the  east  and  west  road.  The  company  will  drive  off  any  hostile 
detachments  encountered. 

The  company  marches  off  with  the  first  platoon  as  advance  guard. 
The  advance  guard  commander  is  told  that  as  soon  as  he  comes  in  sight 
of  the  two  men  posted  south  of  the  road  fork  (626)  he  will  assume  that 
they  outline  the  enemy  and  that  he  is  fired  upon  by  20  or  30  rifles,  and 
he  will  act  accordingly,  one  man  in  each  squad  using  blank  ammuni- 
tion. The  route  is  by  way  of  the  road  as  far  as  the  wooded  ridge  700 
yards  north  of  Hershey  Mill  and  thereafter  in  the  fields  west  of  and 
close  to  the  road.  The  main  body  follows  at  400  yards. 

We  assume  that  after  the  advance  guard  has  disappeared  in  the 
draw  midway  between  Hershey  Mill  and  road  fork  626  (near  the 
farmhouse)  it  opens  fire.  The  captain  then  leads  the  main  body  off 
the  road  and  to  the  left,  to  the  trees  about  100  yards  southwest  of 
the  farmhouse,  and  orders: 

Second  and  third  platoons,  as  skirmishes,  2  paces,  guide  right,  march.  March 
direction:  The  big  barn  (pointing  toward  road  fork  626).  Fourth  platoon  in 
support ;  halt  in  the  woods. 

During  the  development  the  captain  calls  a  corporal  of  the  fourth 
platoon  and  says  to  him : 

Take  three  men  of  your  squad  in  that  direction  (pointing  northwest)  about 
a  half  mile  to  the  high  ground  you  see  there,  as  a  combat  patrol  on  our  left 
flank. 


160 

Our  map  does  not  give  the  detailed  information  of  the  ground 
necessary  to  a  complete  statement  of  the  captain's  orders.  However, 
we  shall  make  the  following  assumptions :  The  support  is  ordered  to 
follow  the  left  flank,  the  distance  depending  upon  cover.  The  two 
deployed  platoons  advance  to  the  wire  fence  that  runs  west  from 
the  road.  Here  the  advance  guard  is  overtaken.  The  advance  con- 
tinues another  50  yards.  Then  the  necessary  orders  are  given,  and 
the  whole  line  opens  fire.  A  moment  later  the  captain  signals  cease 
firing.  The  combat  patrol  is  recalled,  the  company  is  assembled, 
arms  are  stacked,  and  the  men  fall  out.  The  captain  then  assembles 
the  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  says: 

Any  one  of  you  men  may  bo  called  upon  any  day  to  command  a  company  or 
half  company  or  one  platoon  in  a  detached  and  independent  attack  like  the  one 
we  have  just  started.  1  want  you  to  understand  why  this  attack  is  so  radi- 
cally different  from  the  previous  one  (second  example),  although  our  beginning 
point  and  our  objective,  or  enemy's  position,  arc  exactly  the  same  in  both  <-ases. 

We  did  not  go  to  the  wooded  ridge  in  thin  lines  for  three  reasons:  First, 
there  were  no  other  troops  on  our  right  or  left,  and  we  were  free  to  consider 
only  our  own  convenience,  speed,  and  safely:  second,  there  was  no  danger  or 
probability  of  artillery  fire;  third,  thin  lines  take  lime,  and  we  had  a  chance 
to  save  time. 

We  might  have  marched  in  column  of  squads  and  with  an  advance  guard 
straight  across  fields  to  that  wooded  ridge  near  the  farmhouse,  but  a  march 
by  the  road  is  easier  and  quicker.  If  we  had  had  reason  to  fear  artillery  fire, 
we  still  would  have  marched  in  column  and  with  an  advance  guard,  but  our 
route  in  that  case  would  probably  have  been  by  way  of  the  creek  bed  to  those 
woods  (southwest  of  the  farmhouse),  in  order  to  escape  being  seen  by  artillery 
observation  parties.  We  could  not  take  that  route  in  the  first  attack  because  it 
would  have  broken  up  the  deployment  of  the  brigade  at  a  point  too  close  to  the 
enemy. 

In  the  last  attack  we  used  an  advance  guard  to  guard  against  surprise  and  to 
drive  off  any  small  patrols  that  might  be  met  between  us  and  our  objective.  In 
the  first  attack  the  whole  brigade  was  deployed  and  ready  for  surprise  parties. 
Besides,  reconnaissance  to  the  front  was  in  the  hands  of  higher  commanders. 

In  the  last  attack  we  sent  out  a  combat  patrol  of  four  men  on  our  left  flank. 
If  you  look  at  the  ground,  you  can  readily  see  that  we  would  need  warning  of 
the  approach  of  enemy  infantry  or  cavalry  from  that  direction.  Our  right 
Hank  was  safe  enough,  but  we  should  keep  in  signal  communication  with  our 
'regiment. 

In  the  last  attack  we  kept  one  platoon  out  as  support.  The  Drill  Regula- 
tions say  that  a  company  acting  alone,  as  we  were,  is  handled  the  same  as  a 
battalion,  allowance  being  made  for  the  difference  in  strength.  The  battalion 
usually  deploys  whole  companies  in  the  firing  line.  But  the  whole  of  our 
company  could  not  be  deployed  until  we  knew  that  there  was  no  immediate 
danger  of  a  surprise  party  on  our  left  flank,  or  until  the  fight  became  so  stub- 
born that  we  needed  the  fourth  platoon  in  the  firing  line  in  order  to  win  and 
had  to  take  a  chance  on  other  things.  I  can  imagine  a  situation  where  a 
platoon  acting  alone  should  hold  out  a  squad^or  two  until  the  situation  became 
clearer,  particularly  on  the  defensive,  but  ordinarily  a  platoon  acting  alone 
needs  its  whole  firing  strength  early  in  the  game,  and  it  must  depend  on  small 
combat  patrols  to  guard  it  against  surprise.  The  smaller  the  force  the  more 
easily  it  can  withdraw  or  change  its  front. 


161 

In  the  first  attack  we  used  half-pace  intervals,  or  about  one  man  per  yard  of 
front.  In  the  second  attack  we  use  two-pace  intervals,  or  about  one  man  to  a 
little  more  than  2  yards  of  front.  We  need  as  many  rifles  as  possible  against 
the  enemy.  If  the  enemy's  front  is  5,000  yards  long,  we  need  5,000  rifles  against 
his  front  and  others  against  his  flanks.  But  a  platoon  or  a  company,  or  even 
a  battalion,  if  attacking  alone,  may  deploy  with  only  a  half  rifle  to  the  yard  and 
still  have  all  its  rifles  effectively  in  action.  So,  if  you  see  any  advantage  in  a 
thinner  line  when  acting  alone  with  a  small  force,  do  not  hesitate  to  use  it, 
provided  you  do  not  lose  control  and  provided  all  rifles  get  on  the  target.  In 
our  last  attack  I  wanted  the  right  of  the  company  near  the  road,  but  I  also 
wanted  the  left  platoon  to  get  forward  under  cover  of  that  patch  of  woods 
(400  yards  northwest  of  the  farmhouse).  We  deployed  three  platoons  on  a 
front  of  about  225  yards.  I  can  imagine  a  case  where  I  would  deploy  three 
platoons  on  a  front  of  325  yards,  but  I  would  first  make  sure  that  I  could  easily 
signal  the  platoon  leaders,  and  then  I  would  place  a  50-yard  interval  between 
the  platoons,  the  platoons  deploying  with  not .  more  than  two-pace  intervals 
between  men  in  order  to  preserve  the  control  of  platoon  leaders.  But  remem- 
ber this :  When  you  fight  a  real  fight  with  thin  lines  you  are  playing  with  fire. 
A  counterattack  may  put  you  out  of  business.  Speaking  offhand,  there  are 
practically  only  three  cases  where  you  may  attack  on  a  broad  front  with  a 
small  force :  First,  a  fake  attack  that  you  do  not  intend  to  press  home ;  second, 
an  attack  against  an  enemy  greatly  inferior  in  strength  and  whom  you  hope  to 
drive  out  quickly  and  cheaply  by  threatening  to  overlap  him;  third,  fighting 
against  poor  troops. 

In  the  first  attack  it  was  decided  beforehand  that  we  would  probably  begin 
the  fire  fight  when  we  reached  the  wooded  ridge  east  of  the  farmhouse.  That 
was  on  account  of  the  fact  that  we  were  only  a  small  part  of  a  long  line.  But 
in  the  second  attack,  where  we  had  no  other  troops  to  cooperate  with,  we  pushed 
ahead  until  we  began  to  feel  seriously  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  then 
we  halted  and  opened  fire.  We  could  not  tell  in  advance  where  the  halting 
place  would  be,  but  we  wanted  it  to  be  as  close  possible  to  the  enemy. 

Are  there  any  questions? 

FOURTH   EXAMPIJJ. 

The  use  of  cover  in  attack  is  largely  a  matter  of  the  individual 
judgment  of  the  men.  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  152-155,  refers 
more  especially  to  single  men  or  patrols.  Infantry  Drill  Regula- 
tions, 156,  points  out  the  modifications  imposed  on  the  men  of  a 
firing  line.  In  spite  of  the  added  difficulties  of  a  firing  line  in  the 
matter  of  effecting  concealment,  it  will  surprise  many  to  learn  how 
well-trained  men  can  conceal,  and  therefore  partially  protect,  them- 
selves behind  objects  which  to  the  inexperienced  seem  wholly 
inadequate. 

The  captain  takes  the  company  to  the  small  orchard  midway  be- 
tween Hershey  Mill  and  crossroads  616;  thence  west  400  yards  to 
the  fence  corner.  Between  this  point  and  hill  707  the  fields  lie 
fallow,  with  many  low  weeds.  The  weeds  are  scattered  irregularly, 
from  four  to  eight  feet  apart.  None  is  over  knee  high.  Some  are 
thin  in  foliage;  others  are  quite  dense.  The  ground  and  vegetation 
are  such  as  one  often  sees  in  pastures,  rank  meadows,  or  fallow  fields. 
96790—17 11 


162 


The  captain  announces: 


First,  we  shall  .see  how  much  cover  a  man  needs  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
seeing  him;  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  I  am  going  to  demonstrate  how  little 
cover  a  man  really  needs  in  order  to  conceal  himself. 

The  captain  deploys  a  squad  with  two-pace  intervals,  facing  hill 
707,  and  causes  the  men  of  the  squad  to  lie  down  in  firing  positions 
behind  the  lowest  and  thinnest  weeds  which,  in  his  opinion,  will 
screen  them  from  view  at  a  distance  of  200  yards  or  more.  He  then 
explains  to  the  company: 

Standing  here,  and  without  any  experience  in  the  matter,  you  would  suppose 
that  these  weeds  give  these  men  no  protection  whatever.  In  order  that  you 
may  learn  the  value  of  slight  cover  and  learn  how  to  use  it,  I  am  going  to  .show 
you  that  while  these  men  are  not  protected  by  anything  that  amounts  to  a 
bullet  stop,  they  are  protected  against  aimed  fire.  Protection  against  aimed 
fire  may  reduce  our  casualties  to  one-fifth  or  even  one-tenth  of  what  they 
otherwise  would  be. 

Leaving  the  squad  in  position,  with  instructions  to  kneel  at  the 
signal  "  one  whistle  blast,"  and  lie  down  under  cover  at  the  signal 
"two  whistle  blasts,"  the  captain  marches  the  company  200  yards 
toward  hill  707,  faces  it  toward  the  deployed  squad  and  asks: 

Can  anyone  see  the  squad? 

We  shall  assume  that  the  squad  has  been  well  placed  and  is  Con- 
cealed. The  captain  then  signals  the  squad  to  kneel  and  says  to  the 
company : 

Each  man  select  a  man  of  the  squad  to  watch.  When  he  lies  down  apiin. 
pick  out  the  point  that  you  would  aim  at  if  you  were  firing  on  him.  See  how 
long  you  can  keep  your  eyes  on  that  point  without  confusion  or  uncertainty. 

He  then  signals  the  squad  to  lie  down,  and  about  a  half  minute 
later  he  commands: 

Eyes  right.  Front.  Pick  up  your  aiming  point  again.  Those  who  are  sure 
they  have  found  it  hold  up  their  right  hands. 

Having  disposed  of  this  matter,  he  adds: 

The  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire  upon  you  depends  mostly  on  his  ability  to  use 
his  target  as  his  aiming  point.  Each  of  you  may  be  considered  a  target ;  but 
if  you  can  not  be  seen,  you  can  not  be  an  aiming  point,  although  you  are  still 
the  real  target  that  the  enemy  is  trying  to  hit.  Yon  can  not  help  being  a 
target ;  the  mere  fact  that  you  are  a  soldier  makes  you  a  target ;  but  you  can 
frequently  avoid  being  an  aiming  point,  and  if  you  succeed  in  doing  that,  you 
are  no  longer  a  good  target  for  the  enemy.  Now,  if  your  enemy  sees  you 
disappear  behind  a  bush  or  weed,  you  are  still  the  target,  but  the  bush  or  weed 
becomes  the  aiming  point.  If  there  are  many  bushes  around  you  the  enemy 
soon  loses  sight  of  the  particular  bush  behind  which  you  disappeared.  You 
have  seen  what  a  trifling  object  can  conceal  a  man  at  even  so  short  a  distance 
as  200  yards.  You  have  also  seen  how  easy  it  is  to  lose  your  aiming  point. 
Remember,  then,  if  you  do  not  give  the  enemy  a  good  aiming  point,  your  chance 
of  being  in  good  health  at  the  end  of  the  fight  is  improved  from  500  to  1,000 


163 

per  cent.  Ordinarily  the  smaller  the  forces  engaged  the  greater  is  the  impor- 
tance of  individual  concealment,  because  the  excitement  and  confusion  is  less 
and  we  aim  at  individuals  instead  of  areas.  But  concealment  is  always  im- 
portant. 

The  captain  then  sends  the  first  lieutenant  with  half  of  the  com- 
pany back  to  the  position  of  the  deployed  squad,  with  instructions 
to  deploy  the  half  company  with  two-pace  intervals  and  attack  hill 
707,  advancing  by  rushes;  and  with  instructions  to  platoon  leaders 
and  guides  to  inspect  and  correct  the  positions  of  their  men  at  each 
halt.  The  captain  takes  the  other  half  of  the  company  to  the  wire 
fence  on  hill  707  to  observe  the  attack  and  the  use  of  cover.  When 
the  first  lieutenant  has  advanced  200  or  300  yards,  the  two  halves  of 
the  company  change  places,  the  captain  remaining  on  hill  707.  He 
comments  freely  on  the  faulty  positions  or  movements  observed,  with 
a  view  to  thorough  instruction  in  the  details  of  using  cover  while 
advancing  in  attack.  We  may  assume  some  of  his  comments  to  be 
as  follows: 

Look  sharp  and  you  will  see  that  a  part  of  the  firing  line  is  getting  ready 
to  rush.  Two  or  three  men  are  on  their  knees  and  elbows  with  their  backs 
raised  and  no  longer  concealed.  They  should  lie  close  to  the  ground  when  the 
warning  for  a  rush  is  given.  It  may  be  30  seconds  or  even  more  before  the 
platoon  leader  is  sure  that  all  men  have  heard  or  seen  the  warning  and  are 
ready  to  jump  when  he  shouts,  "  follow  me."  We  must  not  give  the  enemy  a 
better  aiming  point  during  that  preparation  for  a  rush,  nor  give  him  warning 
of  the  rush. 

Notice  those  men  with  their  rifles  vertical ;  the  butt  probably  resting  on  the 
ground.  They  think  that  makes  it  easier  to  jump  when  the  rush  is  ordered. 
Maybe  it  does,  but  it  is  wrong. 

Some  of  those  men  would  conceal  themselves  better  by  aiming  through  the 
weeds  or  bushes  instead  of  along  the  right  edge.  When  you  use  a  rock  or  tree 
for  cover  you  are  obliged  to  aim  along  the  right  side  of  the  tree  or  rock,  but 
frequently  a  bush  or  clump  of  weeds  will  be  so  wide  that  you  can  poke  your 
rifle  somewhere  between  the  center  and  right  edge  and  thus  get  complete  con- 
cealment. 

Some  men  are  shifting  about  too  much,  long  after  the  halt.  That  gives  the 
enemy  a  chance  to  pick  up  his  aiming  point  again.  The  men  should  do  all  of 
the  necessary  shifting  just  after  dropping  behind  cover.  They  must  be  able 
to  fire  on  the  enemy,  but  they  should  get  good  firing  positions  promptly,  and 
after  they  have  them  they  should  lie  still. 

FIFTH  EXAMPLE. 

The  company  is  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  hill  707.  The  captain 
says  to  the  company : 

In  a  bayonet  charge  against  the  enemy's  position  the  company  is  bound  to  be 
mixed  up  and  disorganized.  Men  of  several  companies  may  be  mixed  together. 
Your  squad  leader  or  platoon  leader  or  company  commander  may  be  out  of 
action  or  lost  to  view  in  the  mix-up.  When  we  reach  the  enemy's  position  the 
success  of  the  charge  depends  mostly  on  every  man  knowing  just  what  he 


164 

ought  to  do.  The  proper  thing  to  do  depends  on  the  situation  at  the  moment. 
The  confusion  will  probably  be  so  great  that  your  leaders  will  not  be  able  to 
tell  you.  In  other  words,  we  must  count  on  temporary  loss  of  control  and  we 
must  make  up  for  it  by  teaching  you  a  few  common-sense  rules  to  guide  you.  I 
have  seen  companies,  at  the  end  of  a  charge  in  a  combat  exercise,  .simply  untix 
bayonets  and  assemble,  as  though  the  fight  were  over.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a 
very  critical  stage  is  reached  the  moment  we  are  in  the  enemy's  position  and 
we  have  to  see  the  thing  through  and  do  it  right.  We  shall  practice  charging 
several  times  and  change  the  situations  each  time. 

A  squad,  to  outline  the  enemy,  is  deployed  with  15-pace  intervals 
along  the  wire  fence  that  crosses  hill  707.  The  squad  is  instructed  to 
remain  at  the  fence  and  meet  the  charge.  The  company  is  deployed 
about  100  yards  to  the  northeast  and  facing  the  fence.  The  men  are 
told  that  the  company  in  attacking  has  reached  this  point.  The 
line  opens  fire. 

A  moment  later,  4i  fix  bayonets  "  is  signaled,  followed  by  the  neces- 
sary commands  and  signals  for  the  charge.  The  outlined  enemy 
meets  the  charge.  The  captain's  comments  before  and  after  the 
charge  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

The  signal  "  fix  bayonets  "  seems  to  bring  the  firing  to  a  complete  stop  for  a 
half  minute  or  less.  That  does  not  matter.  It  would  not  happen  in  real  battle 
because  in  the  noise  and  excitement  it  would  be  probably  two  minutes  before 
all  the  men  of  a  battalion  firing  line  caught  and  understood  the  signal.  Wo 
need  not  bother  to  drill  a  system  of  fixing  bayonets. 

Platoon  guides  must  ride  the  laggards  hard  and  see  that  the  charging  line 
is  as  compact  and  stiff  as  possible. 

Your  enemy  stayed  in  his  position  to  receive  the  charge.  He  will  not  do  so 
every  time,  but  when  he  does,  you  must  beat  him  by  better  work  with  the 
bayonet  or  clubbed  rifle,  or  probably  fire,  and  by  better  teamwork.  To  beat, 
him  by  better  teamwork  you  should  pair  off  with  the  man  nearest  you  and  the 
two  of  you  should  go  after  one  man  at  a  time.  If  you  can  not  find  a  man  to 
pair  with,  join  the  nearest  pair  and  then  the  three  of  you  go  after  one  man  at 
a  time.  Don't  fight  alone  if  you  can  avoid  it.  You  can  not  arrange  your  pair 
beforehand,  because  your  partner  may  not  be  near  you  when  you  need  him. 
At  the  last  moment  a  man  from  another  company  may  be  your  nearest  neighbor. 

After  a  short  rest  the  charge  is  repeated,  but  the  men  who  outline 
the  enemy,  instead  of  meeting  the  charge,  run  back,  according  to  in- 
structions, when  the  charging  line  is  about  50  yards  off.  The  cap- 
tain's comments  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

When  the  enemy  retreats  across  open  country,  it  is  foolish  to  chase  after 
him ;  at  least  until  your  officers  get  a  chance  to  restore  order  and  size  up  the 
situation.  The  enemy  is  fresher  than  you  are.  He  will  outrun  you.  Go  for- 
ward to  his  trench  if  you  can,  and  a  little  beyond  it  if  necessary  for  a  fair  firing 
position,  and  then  chase  him  with  bullets.  As  long  as  he  is  in  sight  and  in 
range,  fire  rapidly  but  accurately  and  demoralize  him  as  completely  as  possible. 
Keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  orders  or  signals  from  the  nearest  leaders,  but  re- 
member that  the  confusion  and  disorder  may  be  very  great.  It  may  be  a  minute 
or  two  before  some  planned  action  can  be  ordered  and  we  want  every  man  to 
know  that  during  that  short  time  a  hot  fire  will  do  the  most  good. 


165 

The  company  then  faces  northwest  and  charges  an  outlined  enemy 
posted  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  north  of  707.  The  enemy  withdraws 
when  the  charge  begins  and  is  too  deep  in  the  woods  to  be  seen.  The 
captain  shows  that  the  proper  action  is  to  press  forward  in  the 
woods,  with  as  good  a  line  as  is  consistent  with  rapid  progress,  un- 
less or  until  other  action  is  ordered. 

A  fourth  charge  may  be  made  in  which,  after  the  capture  of  a 
first-line  trench,  one  platoon,  previously  designated,  occupies  the  cap- 
tured trench  and  hastily  prepares  itself  and  the  trench  for  defense 
against  counterattack,  while  the  other  platoons  push  forward  to 
charge  a  second-line  trench. 

Other  charges  may  be  made,  illustrating  the  numerous  situations 
that  may  confront  charging  infantry.  Most  of  these  charges,  par- 
ticularly where  they  involve  the  organization  of  local  pursuit,  or 
counterattack  by  the  enemy,  would  more  properly  be  battalion  or 
regimental  exercises. 


.YC  63 


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